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ABSTRACT
It is held that the police officer is liable at criminal and civil law the same as the citizen;
given constitutional expression in the common law office of constable. Yet, in the
execution of their duty police officers are prone to committing a range of criminal
offences - assault, false imprisonment, perverting the course of justice - defined in this
thesis as police crimes. Statistical analysis reveals that police officers are rarely
prosecuted for these offences, suggesting that criminal liability is an illusion, and civil
proceedings have become an increasingly popular remedy for police wrongdoing.
This thesis holds that ss.48 and 49 of the Police Act 1964 played a prominent part in
undermining the police officer's accountability to the law. This was achieved under s.48
by removing the police officer's personal responsibility for his wrongdoing at civil law,
and introduction of a vicarious liability rule. And, under s.49, by definition of reports of
alleged criminal offences committed by police officers as complaints, and codification of
a separate criminal procedure. Since the 1964 Act, statute and case law on police
wrongdoing have caused further damage to the constitutional position by emphasising the
internal police complaint and disciplinary processes and devaluing issues of liability.
It is argued that there is a conflict between the ancient office of constable and the recently
developed doctrine of constabulary independence, and it is proposed that a 'balance
model' accurately reflects the constitutional position of the police. This thesis examines
recent developments at common law alongside the statutory trend, including intended
reform of the complaint and discipline processes, and concludes that the integrity of the
constitutional position has been seriously damaged. It is proposed that the police officer
is no longer accountable to the law for his wrongdoing in like manner as the citizen, and
the office of constable survives as a constitutional fiction.
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PREFACE ANTI) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Although dedicated research for this thesis commenced in October 1995, I have had a
personal interest in police misconduct dating back over a decade. I was assaulted by
police officers in 1983 when living and working in Manchester. Like many others who
suffer at the hands of the police, I did not know what to do. I did not see a doctor (jolice
officers took me to hospital where several sutures were applied to a head wound), nor did
I make a complaint or see a solicitor. I pleaded guilty to a charge of drunk and
disorderly, resigned from my job with the local authority and moved to London.
By coincidcnce I settled in Stoke Newington, London N16, an area notorious for poor
police community relations. I took no interest for several years until I heard that a young
mixed race man required an operation to remove a blood clot from the surface of his
brain after he had been detained at the local police station. A community campaign was
set up by his family in an attempt to discover what had happened to him, and I
approached them to offer my assistance. It was apparent that this case was not an isolated
incident as several other people came forward to tell of their experiences with the police.
In the spring of 1988 I helped create Hackney Community Defence Association (HCDA),
an organisation which described itself as a self-help group for the victims of police crime.
I-ICDA provided emotional support to those who were traumatised by their experiences
with the police, and group members developed an expertise on the subject of police
criminality. Firstly, by analysing patterns of police behaviour, concentrating on the
tendency for officers to charge their victims with criminal offences in an attempt to
conceal or justify their wrongdoing. Secondly, the police complaint process was shunned
in preference for civil proceedings as a remedy to police wrongdoing. These decisions
were not made on the basis of sound legal judgment, it was more an instinctive reaction
by persons who suffered varying degrees of psychological trauma and wanted nothing
whatsoever to do with the police at that moment in time. They wanted an intermediary to
act between them and the police, somebody they could trust, and solicitors who were
developing police litigation practices came the closest to filling this role.
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My involvement as a civil rights activist ended in 1995. This was after the conclusion of
the Operation Jackpot investigation into allegations that Stoke Newington police officers
had controlled the local crack cocaine trade, and the first of the plaintiffs who alleged
they had been planted with drugs settled their actions for damages against the
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. I was keen to develop my interest in police
criminality by embarking on a legal study, and I enrolled as a research student at the
Faculty of Laws, University College London. My initial concern was to record the
experiences and views of the victims of police wrongdoing and proceed to make a
comparative study with other victims of crime. However, I was immediately struck by
the dearth of legal analysis on police wrongdoing and the prevailing assumption that
police officers are accountable to the law. Instead of devoting my research to empirical
data, I reflected on the theoretical significance of the proposition that the individual
police officer's accountability to the law serves as the basis for the constitutional position
of the police. It appeared to me that at some time in history police officers ceased to be
accountable to the law in like manner as the citizen, and that it should be possible to
accurately determine what was the cause of that separation. This was the task I finally set
myself.
Since I commenced my research nearly three years ago, it has been difficult to keep up
with events. In the summer of 1996 I was fortunate enough to attend a series of police
action trials at the Central London County Court. In three of the cases awards in excess
of £100,000 were made against the Metropolitan Commissioner, and he subsequently
appealed against quantum in these cases and seven others. I attended the full hearing of
the test case, Thompson and Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,' when
Lord Woolf M.R. set damages guidelines for police actions. The following summer I was
also present at the Divisional Court for three judicial review applications of the Director
of Public Prosecution's decisions not to prosecute police officers. I managed to keep
abreast of these developments in my research, and then, with my thesis half written, it
was announced in the summer of 1997 that the first Home Affairs Select Committee of
'[1997] 2 All E.R. 762.
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the new Labour administration would examine the police complaint and discipline
processes. The Select Committee heard evidence in the autumn and reported in January
1998. I have, therefore, had to revise my final draft so that I can incorporate the Select
Committee's findings, and comment on their implications.
'Organic' is a description which springs to mind for this doctoral thesis, and the dubious
privilege of supervision fell to Elaine Genders. I am most grateful to Elaine for her
patience and detailed comments on a succession of chapters, some of which were
eventually discarded. Her perseverance with a student whose interests developed in a
diametrically opposite direction to her own was admirable. Among the staff at University
College London I am also indebted to Roger Rideout who, after gentle persuasion,
recognised that a law faculty was the right place for me to study police wrongdoing. It
was Rodney Austin who, as my second supervisor, suggested I spend less time in the
library and encouraged me to put digit to keyboard. Many a discussion I enjoyed with
him as I sounded out my ideas. Finally, Ian Dennis helpfully looked over my
interpretations of the case law on criminal evidence. I owe much to Bill Dixon, presently
writing up a doctoral thesis on sector policing at Brunel University, who took time out
from writing up to discuss issues of central importance to me, which could only be of
peripheral interest to him. His depth of knowledge on the law and sociological
perspectives of the police has been of great assistance; his comments on my draft were
most helpful.
The many people who worked under HCDA's umbrella contributed to my understanding
of police wrongdoing, along with their lawyers and the journalists who publicised their
cases. I make particular mention of Martin Walker, a veteran campaigner against police
injustice; Maria Franklin, who gained an understanding of post traumatic stress disorder
among victims of police wrongdoing; John Stewart, who kept me informed of events in
Parliament on policing; Mark Metcalf for his solidarity as an activist and his
encouragement and support when I turned to academic research; Russell Miller, who
entered legal practice to become a leading authority on the police complaint process; and
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Deborah Coles and Helen Shaw at Inquest, who provided me with part time employment
so that I could continue my research.
Throughout the years that I have been concerned with police wrongdoing Raju Bhatt, a
solicitor with B. M. Birnberg & Co., has been omnipresent. At the same time when I
started campaigning against police crime in Hackney, he set out to perfect civil actions as
a remedy to police wrongdoing. It was Raju who was responsible for my interest in the
law as we spent many hours working together on cases in the early years of our
collaboration. More recently he has shown a keen interest in the progress of my research.
I am also grateful for the assistance provided by Fiona Murphy, also with Birnbergs, who
invited me to observe several civil trials.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis questions the assumption that police officers are accountable to the law.' This
may cause alarm to police officers and constitutional traditionalists who believe that this
principle serves as the only guarantee of impartial and independent policing. But I do not
consider this to be the case as the expression 'accountable to the law' is open to
interpretation in several ways. A strict, some may say puritanical, reading of the
principle of accountability to the law, as propounded last century by Dicey, 2 would be to
hold that all citizens are equally subject to the same laws. However, special laws have
been introduced by statute which cause citizens who are public officials to be subject to
the rule of law in a different manner to the general public. This happened when the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) codified police powers and, as a
corollary, regulated them. Thus, PACE's provisions hold police officers accountable to
the law when exercising their law enforcement duties in a manner which citizens are not.
Another area of the law in which police officers are separated from the citizen concerns
criminal investigation and charge. Citizens suspected of a criminal offence are subject to
police powers of investigation under Parts I. - VIII., and to criminal charge under s.37(7),
of PACE. Investigations of what may be identical allegations against police officers,
however, are provided for under the police complaint process in Part IX., and criminal
charge under ss.90(1), (4) and 92(2), of PACE. Further, on 1 April 1999 new police
discipline regulations are due to be introduced. 3 On that date Part IV., and schedules 5
and 6, of the Police Act 1996, covering the police complaint and discipline processes,
will be implemented. Therefore, police officers and citizens will be subjected to entirely
different statutes when investigated and charged for alleged criminal offences. Of course,
'This thesis is restricted to consideration of policing in England and Wales. Different criminal procedures
in Scotland, including the powers of the Procurator Fiscal, are not analysed. With regard to Northern
Ireland it is held that the exceptional circumstances prevailing make comparison with policing in England
and Wales inappropriate.
2 Dicey, A. V. (1929).
Announcement to the House of Commons by the Home Secretary, Home Office News Release, 23 March
1998, 107/98, Home Secretary Acts on Police Complaints and Discipline; available on the internet at
www.coi.gov.uk .
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police officers are liable to private prosecution the same as any citizen. However, if the
victim of an offence resorts to the common law in a case where the suspect would
otherwise, if it were not for the fact that he is a police officer, be subject to statutory
procedures conducted by public officials; then, that officer is differentiated from the
citizen. Similarly, police officers are liable to investigation and charge under PACE's
criminal provisions independently of the complaint process. Therefore, to be precise, it is
when the police have been notified of an alleged offence committed by a police officer by
a member of the public, that they are treated differently to other citizens.
It is apparent that police officers are not accountable to the law in like manner as the
citizen on two counts. Firstly in that special powers are available to police officers to
enable them to perform their peace keeping and law enforcement functions. Secondly, in
that they are subject to an internal police process following particular allegations of
wrongdoing made against them. This separation of the police officer from the citizen is
of major significance to the doctrine of constabulary independence, which holds that the
police officer's accountability to the law is fundamental. If the police officer is subject to
different procedures and regulations to other citizens, then that should be reflected in the
constitutional position along with the existence of safeguards and mechanisms by which
the police can be held democratically accountable.
It is undeniable that codification of police powers under PACE interfered with the
constitutional position of the police by separating the police officer from the citizen.
However, as codification also served to regulate police powers, PACE brought to the
developing constitutional position the safeguards necessary to balance the extension of
police powers and the separation of the officer from the citizen. It is remarkable how
quickly, particularly given the extent of opposition at the outset, that it has become
acceptable for police officers to be held accountable to the law for the exercise of their
powers in a maimer peculiar to law enforcement personnel. 4 However, with regard to the
police officers answerability to the law for his alleged wrongdoing under Part IX of
See Christian, L. (1983), Baxter, J. and L. Koffman (eds) (1984), for early criticisms of PACE; and
Dixon, D. (1995) and (1997), for recent reappraisals.
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PACE, there has not been a corresponding realignment of the constitutional position.
Although the effectiveness of the complaint process has emerged as one of the most
enduring problems of modern policing, the constitutional implications of the police
officer's subjugation to different criminal procedures to the general public has been
neglected. This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the police officer is not accountable to
the law for his wrongdoing in like manner as the citizen, and explores the implications of
this assertion for the constitutional position of the police.
As a private citizen a person is liable to the criminal and civil law for his wrongdoing.
The criminal law can be set in motion where there is prima facie evidence of a criminal
offence, and a plaintiff can commence civil proceedings if he has an actionable case in
the laws of tort. By convention it is acknowledged 5 that the criminal sanction is reserved
for wrongs which are most deserving of social condemnation, whereas the primary
function of civil damages as a private law remedy is restitutio in integrum, restoration to
the original position. 6 Given the precedence accorded the criminal sanction it follows
that priority must be given to examination of the police officer's accountability to the
criminal law, before consideration of the civil law as an alternative legal remedy. It is
proposed that there exist a range of criminal offences peculiar to police officers which are
defined here as police crimes.
Police crimes are criminal offences committed by police officers when falsely purporting
to be in the execution of their duly. My reason for introducing a definition is in
recognition that police crimes are distinguished from other offences by the presence of
two elements. Mention has already been made of one element, the procedural separation
of the police officer from the citizen in that he is subject to different criminal procedures
of investigation and charge. The other defining element of police crimes is that they are
restricted to a range of offences particular, although not exclusive, to the police function.
Ashworth, A. (1986).
v. Raywards Coal (1880) 5 A.C. 25 at 39.
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I do not categorise all offences committed by police officers as police crimes, only those
committed under the cloak of authority. Offences generically referred to as corruption
are connected with the police function, in that a police officer's responsibilities place him
in a position to unlawfully benefit, by either failing to enforce the law or transgression.
Such offences are excluded from police crimes on the basis that they are not open to
interpretation as having occurred in the execution of duty. For example, a police officer
who supplies drugs to a street level supplier commits a criminal offence under the Misuse
of Drugs Act 1971. If he protects his supplier from prosecution by warning of a
surveillance operation he is liable for obstructing the police in the execution of their
duty.7 Neither offence is defined as a police crime because they are patently not in
performance of the police function. But, if the same officer fabricates evidence, by plant
for example, to obtain the conviction of a person he believes to be competing with his
supplier, that is a police crime, although primarily committed in furtherance of the
officer's drug supplying activities. A characteristic of police crime is that the opportunity
exists on the facts for an officer to claim that his action was in the execution of his duty.
The principal offences are statutory offences of assault and perjury, and common law
offences of assault, false imprisonment and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.8
Primacy attaches to the officer's false claim to be acting in the execution of his duty so
that there is intent or recklessness, with falsity to be determined as a finding of fact which
precludes the exculpatory defence of mistake.9
Police crimes can be sub-divided into two types of offence, which have no legal
significance. The purpose of this exercise is to assist with understanding the problem of
police wrongdoing by attributing meaning to police officers criminal activity and their
victims responses. First, there are offences which are primarily attributed to the pressure
under which officers operate and the expectation that they will solve crimes, which might
encourage officers to resort to time saving methods in cases where they are convinced of
a suspect's guilt. Secondly, there are offences where officers intentionally or recklessly
cause harm to their victims in the full knowledge that their victim did not commit a
S.89(2) of the Police Act 1996, Moore v. Green [1983] 1 All E.R. 663.
8 Sharpe, A. N. (1995), defmes these offences as 'police performance crimes'.
9 R. v. Gladstone Williams (1984) 78 Cr. App. R. 276.
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wrong in the first instance. The law does not recognise such distinctions, firstly on
grounds that it is not possible to get inside peoples' heads to ascertain their beliefs.
Secondly, the reason why a person commits a criminal offence is irrelevant to
establishing liability, it may only be taken into account for mitigation of sentence.
However, the categorisation is helpful for placing police crime in context. In the first
category, if the officer's belief is correct it will be apparent to the suspect why he was a
victim of police wrongdoing. This may also be the case where the officer's suspicion is
misplaced, but the victim has, nevertheless, managed to understand why he has been
subjected to unlawful police conduct. In other cases innocent suspects against whom
police officers fabricate evidence will be completely bewildered by what has happened to
them. The second category, however, is qualitatively different in that the officer knows
that the suspect has committed no wrong, and he resorts to his authority as a police
officer to conceal his criminality. The victim, on the other hand, may suffer alienation as
a consequence of his inability to rationalise why a police officer should behave in such a
maimer. Or, if he does manage to give a meaning to his experiences, it will be that he has
been the victim of oppressive policing and police crime.
Morton has used the terms 'bent for job' and 'bent for self to distinguish different types
of police wrongdoing.'° These are not appropriate to this study as their main point of
reference is whether or not offences have been committed for personal gain, including
corrupt practices. Here, the accused officer's beliefs, whether or not he believes that his
criminality furthers or impedes the administration of justice, serve as criteria to
differentiate the types; and the terms procedural police offences and substantive police
offences are preferred." Procedural police offences conform to the label 'noble cause
corruption' adopted by chief officers.' 2 They include common law offences of
attempting to pervert the course of justice,' 3 for example if a false allegation is made
against a suspect to corroborate evidence of an offence; and false imprisonment,' 4 where
'° Morton, J. (1993), Chs. 7 and 8.
"It is reiterated that these defmitions are not intended to have legal significance, their sole purpose is to
place these two types of police criminality into context.
2 Maguire, M. and C. Norris (1994), p.74.
' R. v. Rowe/I [1978] 1 W.L.R. 132.
' R. v. Rahman (1985) 81 Cr. App. R. 349.
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an officer unlawfully arrests a person in order to administer punishment, perhaps as
demonstration of his authority or to 'teach a lesson'. In addition, an officer is liable for
the statutory offence of perjury' 5 if a false allegation is recorded in a statement for legal
proceedings or repeated in evidence under oath. I also include under procedural offences
occasions when police officers fail to perform their duties, as recently reported in three
cases.' 6 Whereas the fabrication of evidence or resorting to 'summary justice" 7 is an
'active' or 'positive' response to police work pressures, with officers doing more than is
expected of them, failure to act is a 'passive' or 'negative' response, with officers doing
less than is expected of them. Common to both situations is that a police officer
unilaterally decides how the interests of justice are best served, whether he sets the
criminal justice process in motion against a suspect presumed to be guilty or, by
omission, protects a suspect, who may be a colleague, from prosecution.
Substantive police offences, where an officer deliberately sets out to cause harm and
refers to his legitimate authority to conceal the commission of the offence, possibly
committing the full range of police crimes in the process, are more complex. An officer
who takes steps to obfuscate his criminal act, for example an assault, by giving a false
account so as to misrepresent the use of force as being in the execution of his duty, or as
self defence, is also liable for attempting to pervert the course of justice. Similarly, an
officer who seeks to conceal an assault by arresting the victim in an attempt to justify the
use of force as being in the execution of his duty in effecting the arrest or preventing a
criminal offence, is liable for false imprisonment. It follows naturally that officers who
continue to justify their actions against the victim in legal proceedings perjure
themselves.
Statutory provision for the use of force is the same for police officers and citizens under
s.3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967.
' 5 S.1 ofthe Perjury Act 1911.
16 R. v. Dytham [1979] 1 Q.B. 722; R v. Coxhead [1986] R.T.R. 411; R. v. Ward and Hollister [1995]
Crim. L.R. 398, see Chapter One, below p.47.
17 Holdaway, S. (1983), p.129.
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A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in
the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest
of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawftilly at large.
Self-defence is defined at common law along with the concepts of necessary, reasonable
and excessive force.' 8 By definition all violent police crimes are substantive offences,
and a charge of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice will normally attach. The only
occasion when an offence of violence will not also involve an attempt to pervert the
course of justice is if the officer does not report the incident. Therefore, he does not
attempt to rely on his authority as justification for his use of force. If a formal complaint
is then made, and the officer accepts that an incident occurred, he caimot be accused of
attempting to pervert the course of justice if he then refers to his authority, not as a priori
justification, but as a defence to an allegation against him. However, the allegation of
violence will still be of a substantive police crime in that i) the offence was connected
with the officer's duties, ii) its investigation under the complaint process,' 9 iii) the
officer's knowledge that he did not act in the interests of justice and iv) his eventual
claim that he was acting in the execution of his duty. Finally on this point, if an officer
maintains at interview that he did not use force of any description, or admits that he did
resort to illegal violence, then the fact that he does not rely on his authority to conceal his
criminality places these cases in a separate category. He might have taken advantage of
police procedures, or he might receive preferential treatment, but the definition of police
crime adhered to in this thesis does not apply due to the fact that he has not falsely
purported to be in the execution of his duty.
This thesis does not set out to weigh up arguments for and against a particular view of
police wrongdoing. It embarks on a comparative study of criminal, civil and disciplinary
proceedings against police officers, which, as far as I have been able to ascertain, have
not been subjected to thorough analysis, legal or sociological. I find this omission
' Palmerv. R. [1971] A.C. 814; it v. Gladstone Williams [1984] 78Cr. App. R. 276; Beckfordv. R. [1987]
3 All E.R 425; R. v Scarlett (1994)98 Cr. App. R. 291; R. v. Owino (1996) 2 Cr. App. R. 128. On police
officers and the use of force in self-defence, preventing crime and making an arrest see Molyneux, M.
(1985); Smith, J. C. (1994); Parish, S. (1997).
19 If PACE's provisions for criminal procedure were to apply the officer would be informed of the
allegation against him when questioned or charged. But, due to the different procedure for investigation
and initiation of proceedings in police crimes it is when details of a complaint are put to an officer under
regulation 7 of the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985, S.!. 1985/518.
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somewhat surprising as comparative study of alternative legal remedies to police
wrongdoing is assisted by the existence of commonly defined wrongs. The criminal
offences of assault and false imprisonment are also torts, the offences of perjury and
conspiracy to pervert the course ofjustice correspond to the tort of malicious prosecution,
and these criminal and civil wrongs are also breaches of the Police Discipline Code.2°
Further, it is central to my argument that academic debate on police complaints has
managed to overlook the problem of police criminality by focussing on the logistics of
police discipline. It would, therefore, have been a luxury to devote space to a
presentation of the literature, and then discount its relevance to my research. Where
relevant I refer to sociological texts on police wrongdoing, but I rely on primary sources
for developing my argument. In the main these consist of annual reports by the
Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Inspectors of Constabulary, the Police Complaints
Board and Police Complaints Authority, reports of Royal Commissions, Select
Committees on parliamentary debates, and law reports.
The approach I have adopted is an inter-disciplinary one, combining legal analysis with
sociological inquiry. As with the definition of police crime outlined above, I attempt to
place the law in a social context in order to understand better its deficiencies for dealing
with the problem of police wrongdoing. However, rather than conclude that police
wrongdoing is an insoluble problem, I am optimistic that a legal solution can be found.
On account of my inter-disciplinary approach I have found it necessary to first discuss
issues in their social and political context, in Chapter Two on the relative merits of police
actions and complaints, and in Chapter Three on the compensatory and restorative
elements of civil justice, and return to them in a discussion of the relevant case law in
Chapter Six.
Chapter One commences by presenting a range of different perspectives on police
wrongdoing and providing an outline of the constitutional issues involved. Its purpose is
to introduce the police wrongdoing problematic and the nature of my approach, before
Chapters Two and Three define the problem of police crime.
20 Sch.1, Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985, S.!. 1985/5 18.
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Chapter Two examines the growth in successful police actions in recent years and
contrasts this with the infrequency of proved criminal and disciplinary charges against
police officers as demonstrated in Metropolitan Police statistics on civil, complaint,
criminal and disciplinary findings. The second part of the chapter then explores possible
explanations for these trends and suggests they raise a question mark over the police
officer's accountability to the criminal law.
When starting out on this doctoral thesis it was my intention to present a detailed
victimology of police criminality. However, I commenced pilot interviews with plaintiffs
in March 1996, at the same time as juries at the Central London County Court set about
rewriting the record books on police actions. 2 ' As the number of quantum appeals by the
Metropolitan Police Commissioner increased it was evident that there would be
constitutional repercussions, and it was clear that I would have to devote the larger part of
my thesis to discussion of these underlying issues. The consequence of this is that
instead of attempting a comprehensive ethnography, I restricted myself to presenting an
illustrative account of police wrongdoing as perceived by plaintiffs. Chapter Three
presents the views of plaintiffs who have successfully sued the Commissioner for
damages. The purpose of this chapter is to ascertain whether there is any substance to the
proposition that the accountability to the law principle applies to police officers
differently to the citizen, as perceived by the victims of police wrongdoing.
Chapters Four and Five seek to establish whether it has ever been the case that the police
officer has been subject to the criminal law in like manner as the citizen. If he was, how
and when did the situation change? Chapter Four traces the development of the police in
the nineteenth century since the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 created the first modem
police force. It pays particular attention to how the police's expansion of their powers to
include criminal investigation and prosecution may have impacted on the numbers of
police officers prosecuted. Chapter Five specifically focuses on the pivotal importance of
After tracing the history of legal proceedings against police officers, pivotal importance is
attached to ss.48 and 49 of the Police Act 1964 in Chapter Five. Section 48, which
21 See Chapter Two, below p.59.
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introduced vicarious liability to police actions, and s.49, which codified the police
complaint process for the first time, were originally presented to Parliament by the
government as a package designed to deal with the problem of police wrongdoing.
However, this thesis argues that the legislation was to have major constitutional
repercussions by separating the police officer from the citizen in his accountability to the
law.
Chapter Six is premised on the contention that the consequences of ss.48 and 49 were not
immediately apparent as they represented a practical attempt to resolve difficulties with
compensating victims of police wrongdoing, on the one hand, and punishing the
officer(s) responsible, on the other; and argues that problems with the underlying
constitutional position have only emerged as the case law on police wrongdoing has
developed. The chapter examines this body of case law and in doing so subjects to legal
analysis some of the issues raised in Chapters Two and Three. The primary purpose of
the chapter is to demonstrate how police complaints and actions have impacted on each
other to such a degree that their development has become inextricably linked.
Finally, Chapter Seven draws the thesis together by considering the integrity of the
constitutional status of the police in light of recent developments at common and statute
law.
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CHAPTER ONE
Law and Sociology
The miscarriages of justice which came to light in the early 1990s caused a
haemorrhaging in public confidence with the police.' When the Royal Commission
on Criminal Justice adopted a broad approach, by considering the evasion of justice
by the guilty as well as the conviction of the innocent, 2 it was criticised for failing to
grasp the nettle.3 However, the Commissioners neglected to give full consideration to
the fact that criminal allegations against police officers were integral to these
miscarriages. This has been matched by commentators' disinclination to subject the
criminal justice process to scrutiny after the Crown Prosecution Service failed to
obtain a single conviction. 4 The Royal Commission revealed that it encountered
difficulties when examining police malpractice. It received a poor response from
chief officers to a questionnaire on criminal or disciplinary proceedings taken against
officers arising from criminal investigations or breaches of PACE. 5 Nevertheless, it
concluded i) few officers are recommended for prosecution by the DPP, 6 ii)
disciplinary action rarely follows in such cases, 7 iii) few disciplinary actions arise
from breaches of PACE 8 and iv) no formal means exist for communicating to chief
officers criticisms made of police conduct by the courts. 9 The Commissioners'
recommendations on police wrongdoing were devoted entirely to discipline,' 0 founded
'Ashworth, A. (1994), Reiner, R. and L. Leigh (1994), Sanders, A. and P. Young (1994), Dixon, D.
(1997).
2	 of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Cmnd. 2263), 1993, p.2.
Bridges, L. and M. McConville (1994), and see above fn.1
Home Affairs Select Committee First Report, Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures:
Minutes of Evidence and Appendices (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. II., p.301. The present DPP, Dame
Barbara Mills, declared she had no knowledge of a single police officer convicted as a result of a case
overturned on appeal; she was aware of six prosecutions involving 17 officers since 1992, one of
which was pending. Researchers have examined the criminal justice process and police powers to
discover how miscarriages occur, but have stopped short of considering criminal law as a deterrent to
police criminality.
Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Cmnd. 2263), 1993, p.48.
6 Under ss. 90(1), (4) and 92(2) of PACE; due to be replaced by ss.74 and 75(3) of the Police Act 1996
on 1 April 1998.
' Under ss.90(5) and 93(1) of PACE; due to be replaced by ss.75(4)(b) and 76(1) of the Police Act
1996 on 1 April 1998.
Under s.67(8) of PACE, repealed by s.37(a) of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994.
9 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Cmnd. 2263), 1993, p.48.
'° Ibid., six recommendations are made at p.48.
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on their belief that the existing arrangements did not 'command general public
confidence."
Thus, the treatment of allegations of police criminality within the criminal process has
escaped inspection by both government inquiry and academic research. This is not
altogether surprising, for the prosecution decision making process has primarily been
considered as an extension of the police's law enforcement function,' 2 or as part of the
criminal justice process,' 3
 and since the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service'4
its particular function has not attracted much legal interest.'5
I.	 R. v. DPP exparte Treadaway
This lack of interest has continued despite the growing body of case law on the
reviewability of prosecution decisions.' 6 In R. v. DPP ex parte C.' 7 the wife of a
police officer sought review of a decision not to prosecute her husband for buggery
without consent. Judgment was for the applicant on the grounds that failure to adhere
to settled policy as contained in the Code for Crown Prosecutors' 8 rendered the
decision Wednesbury' 9 unreasonable. 2° In July 1997, C. was relied on as principal
Ibid., p.46.
12 McConville, M. etal(1991); Leng, R. etal(1992).
Ashworth, op cit.; Sanders and Young, op. cit.; Uglow, S. (1995).
S.1 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.
15 Excepting studies on CPS policy in specific areas there have been general studies by Mansfield, G.
and J. Peay (1987); Hetherington, T. (1989); Fionda, J. (1995); and papers by Ashworth, A. (1987);
Ashworth, A. and Fionda, J. (1994).
16 Uglow, S. et a! (1992), discuss the decision on cautioning in R. v. Chief Constable of the Kent
County Constabulary r parte L. [1993] 1 All ER 756, and that decisions to prosecute juveniles are
reviewable if contrary to established policy guidelines (at 768 per Watkins L.J.). Osborne, P. (1992),
gives an account of the history of judicial review in the wake of ex parte L. and the move away from
the effectual immunity granted when the police had responsibility for prosecutions, commencing with
R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 118 (see below,
p.38). Hilson, C. (1993), updates the position by analysing R. v. Inland Revenue exparte Mead[1993]
I All E.R. 772 which allowed for review of prosecution decisions against adults. Sanders and Young,
op. cit., Ch. 5, also give a summary of the above cases.
[1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 136.
Given statutory authority by s.lO of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. The decision maker had
failed to properly consider any line of defence available to the accused under paragraph 4.17 of the
Explanatory Memorandum to the Code.
' Often described as an 'irrationality test', the Wednesbury principles are used to objectively determine
whether a decision was 'so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it.'
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authority2 ' for three challenges to decisions by the DPP not to prosecute police
officers.22 The cases led to a remarkable sequence of events with the DPP agreeing to
relinquish some of her responsibilities for criminal prosecutions. She ordered an
independent inquiry into prosecutorial decisions after serious complaints against
police officers. 23 Pending the outcome of that inquiry it was announced that Treasury
Counsel's advice on serious cases involving police and prison officers would be
sought. 24 If the DPP were to disagree with that advice she would consult the Attorney
General and Solicitor General.
The DPP conceded two of the applications and judgment was for the applicant in the
third, R. v. DPP ex parte Treadaway.25 Common to all three applications was that
non-criminal courts had reached verdicts in support of allegations of criminality
against police officers. Juries at coroner's inquests into the deaths of Oluwashij ibomi
Lapite and Richard O'Brien returned unlawful killing verdicts following their arrests
by police officers. The causes of death were found to be asphyxia due to a neck hold
and postural asphyxia, respectively. In Treadaway v. Chief Constable of West
Midlands26 McKinnon J. gave a fully reasoned judgment when awarding the plaintiff
£50k damages for an assault described as torture.27
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223 at 234 per Lord
Greene M.R.
20 R. v. DPP ex parte C. [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 136, at 144-5 per Kennedy L.J. Judgment was that
review of the discretion to prosecute 'is one to be sparingly exercised' (at 140) on grounds of i)
unlawful policy, ii) failure to adhere to settled policy and iii) perversity, such that it was a decision
which no reasonable authority could have reached (at 141).
21 Supported by R. v. DPP ex parte Waterworth (1995) unreported, 1 December; and R. v. DPP ex
parte M and Hitchins (1997) unreported, 13 June, cf. R. v. Police Complaints Authority ex parte F
(1996) unreported, 23 January.
By Olamide Jones, the widow of Oluwashijibomi Lapite, and Alison O'Brien, the widow of Richard
O'Brien, who died in the custody of Metropolitan police officers, and Derek Treadaway, the victim of
a miscarriage ofjustice involving West Midlands Serious Crime Squad officers. In addition, a decision
by the PCA not to bring disciplinary proceedings against officers following Lapite's death was
challenged.
By retired circuit court judge Gerald Butler.
24 Times, 26 and 27 July 1997 and 1 August; Smith, G. (1997b)(See Appendix 5).
25 (1997), unreported, 31 July. With regard to R. v. DPP ex parte Jones and R. v. DPP ex parte
o'Brien, the record relied on here is the author's written note of the hearing.
26 (1994) Times, 29 July.
27 £lOk compensatory damages, £40k exemplary damages.
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On the first day of the Divisional Court hearing Rose L.J. quashed the decision not to
prosecute two Metropolitan police officers for manslaughter following Lapite's death
after the DPP conceded the decision was flawed. 28 The DPP gave two reasons for her
reappraisal of the case; the original decision having been made by a Principal Crown
Prosecutor on grounds of insufficient evidence.29 Firstly, the decision not to prosecute
was based on an incorrect assessment of the evidence and, secondly, a basic error of
law had been made with regard to the harm elements of unlawful act manslaughter.3°
The DPP conceded Mrs O'Brien's application on the second day of the hearing after
the applicant's counsel, Mr Patrick O'Connor QC, revealed the contents of CPS
briefing documents which the court had ordered to be disclosed the previous day. He
submitted that there were fundamental discrepancies between the Principal Crown
Prosecutor's affidavit, on which the DPP was relying to respond to the application,
and notes made by various CPS personnel at different stages of the discipline process.
He concluded that the applicant was left in the impossible position of not knowing
who the decision maker was or what decision was being reviewed. The DPP shortly
decided to concede the application.3'
The DPP's decision not to prosecute four West Midlands officers involved with the
Treadaway investigation for assault and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice
was made after the applicant's award of damages, 32 and explained in the following
terms by a senior CPS solicitor:
I cannot see there is a shred of evidence that supports the allegation
made by Treadaway, and in my view he was extremely lucky to
succeed in the civil claim. But the evidence obviously came across
in his favour, but on a much lower standard than we would require.
2S Times, 24 July 1997. The PCA also agreed to reconsider its decision not to bring disciplinary
charges against the two arresting officers. Consideration of disciplinary proceedings against training
officers was severed and adjourned.
29 Paragraph 5 of the Code for Crown Prosecutors.
° The PCA also agreed to reconsider preferring disciplinary charges against officers after
acknowledging its initial decision had been based on an error of fact.
Independent, 25 July 1997. On 11 February 1998 the CPS summonsed three Metropolitan police
officers involved in the arrest of Richard O'Brien to appear before a magistrate on 18 April 1998 for
manslaughter, stating 'errors were made in the original decision-making process', Times 12 February
1998.
32 The decision was affirmed after the conviction for robbery and conspiracy to rob was quashed, R. v.
Treadaway (1996) unreported, 18 November.
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In my opinion there is not any realistic prospect of a conviction
here against any officer for any offence.33
Giving judgment in ex parte Treadaway, Rose L.J. detailed ten separate findings by
McKinnon J. when reaching his conclusion in the civil trial that there was a high
probability of 'serious misconduct by police officers amounting to commission of a
criminal offence'.34 In summary, McKinnon J. had found the plaintiff an impressive
witness and did not believe the evidence of the four police officers. He found the
medical evidence was consistent with the plaintiffs allegations and, on a sliding scale
of probability in accordance with the seriousness of the allegations, 35 he had no doubt
of his conclusions on some points. The Divisional Court concluded that the decision
not to prosecute four West Midlands police officers was flawed in breach of the
evidential test in paragraph 5 of the Code for Crown Prosecutors. In reaching this
conclusion major importance was attributed to McKinnon J's judgment:
.this is a very unusual case indeed. A High Court judge heard
evidence from the material witnesses on both sides and, having
directed himself as to the high standard of proof necessary in the
light of the serious allegations made against police officers,
concluded that they had assaulted the applicant. He set out his
process of reasoning in detail and expressed his conclusions in
trenchant terms. There was no appeal against his decision. In those
circumstances, although his decision did not bind the Director [of
Public Prosecutions], it required, in our judgment, a most careful
analysis if a decision not to prosecute was to be made. In our
judgment it did not receive such an analysis.36
The successful Jones, O'Brien and Treadaway review applications are not significant
for their contribution to the common law. The grounds for review of non-prosecution
decisions had already been established under ex parte C. 37 The importance of the
three cases was that they starkly demonstrated the working assumptions of CPS
personnel who have responsibility for decisions on prosecutions of police officers.
All three decisions not to prosecute police officers were made after evidence was
improperly considered in a maimer which favoured police officers. It is not suggested
R. v. DPP ex parte Treadaway (1997) unreported, 31 July.
Treadciway v. Chief Constable of West Midlands (1994) Times, 29 July.
Hornal v. Neuberger [1957] 1 Q.B. 247.
36 R. v. DPP ex parte Treadaway (1997) unreported, 31 July.
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that CPS solicitors responsible for decisions not to prosecute police officers in these
cases conspired to pervert the course ofjustice. On the contrary, it is argued that they
adopted a standard approach to allegations of police criminality which has been lent
considerable support in the last quarter century by sociologists and criminologists.
II.	 The Constitutional Position of the Police
According to Halsbury's Laws of England:
.notwithstanding that present day police forces are the creation of
statute and that the police have numerous statutory powers and
duties, in essence a police force is neither more or less than a
number of individual constables whose status derives from the
common law, organised together in the interests of efficiency.38
The constitutional position accorded to police services is defined by constabulary
independence,39 a doctrine founded on the status of the individual police officer under
the common law office of constable.4°
Office of constable
The origin of the modern police officer's authority dates back to just after the turn of
the twentieth century in Stanbury v. Exeter Corporation, 4 ' a case unconnected with
the police. A fanner sought damages from the local authority for the negligence of a
cattle inspector who detained his sheep at market under the Diseases of Animals Act
1894. Judgment was for the defendant on the grounds that the local authority was not
vicariously liable; although employed by the local authority the inspector was acting
in performance of duties directed by the Board of Agriculture which annulled the
master servant relationship. The inspector's position was compared to that of a police
officer; a public official statutorily employed by the watch committee appointed by
the local authority whose public administration duties were not locally specific but
" See above fn.20.
38 Fourth Edition: vol.36, para.201.
39 R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis e parte Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 118.
° Fisher v. Qidham Corporation [1930] 2 K.B. 364.
" [1905] 2 K.B. 838.
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pertained to the security of the general population. 42
 This principle was soon to be
reconsidered in the Australian High Court in Enever v King, 43 an action under the
Tasmanian Crown Redress Act. Giving judgment, Griffiths C.J. was dissatisfied with
the tenuous differentiation in Stanbury between local and national duties and gave the
police officer's independent authority for law enforcement as reason against vicarious
liability:
.the power of a constable, qua police officer, whether conferred by
common law or statute law, are exercised by him by virtue of his
office, and cannot be exercised on the responsibility of any person
but himself.... A constable, therefore, when acting as a peace
officer, is not exercising a delegated authority, but an original
authority..
McCardie J. tidied up the position in Fisher v. Oldham Corporation. 45 He ruled, after
Stanbury and Enever, and by reference to the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, Local
Government Act 1888, the Police Acts of 1890 and 1919 and the Police (Appeals) Act
1927, that the local authority was not vicariously liable for the plaintiffs false
imprisonment because a master servant relationship did not exist between the local
authority and the police officer:
I hold that the defendants are not responsible in law for the arrest or
detention of the plaintiff. The police, in effecting that arrest and
detention, were not acting as the servants or agents of the
defendants. They were fulfilling their duties as public servants and
officers of the Crown sworn to "preserve the peace by day and
night, to prevent robberies and other felonies and misdemeanours
and to apprehend offenders against the peace.46
Fisher was affirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General for New South Wales v
Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. 47 when it was ruled that a police officer's employers had
no claim for the loss of his services against the owners of a tram car following an
accident which caused him serious injury.
42 Ibid., at 842-3 per Wills J.
[1906] 3 C.L.R. 969.
Ibid., at 977.
[1930] 2 K.B. 364.
Ibid., at 377.
[1955] AC. 457.
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Police constitutional theorists48 and sociologists49
 have subjected Fisher to critical
examination and arrived at the similar conclusion that judgment did not reflect the
reality of watch committee control over the police in the boroughs. 5° Their argument
is supported by historical research which has documented that watch committees
regularly called police officers before them to account for their actions5 ' and that
Victorian rate payers considered them as servants with responsibilities for protecting
property and keeping the streets clean. 52 Nevertheless, Fisher is the starting point for
the emergence of the constitutional doctrine of constabulary independence. Marshall
attributes primordial importance to McCardie J.'s ruling, stating 'The modem thesis
[of constabulary independence] rests almost entirely upon fairly recent inferences
from the law of civil liability.' 53 Lustgarten adopts this interpretation of events when
he asserts that within two decades of the judgment Fisher had become 'enshrined
orthodoxy'. 54 Although there is no doubting Marshall and Lustgarten's pinpointing
the present constitutional position in case law to Fisher, it would appear that
McCardie J. did not single-handedly mastermind a new theory, his judgment was in
line with official thinking. The 1929 Royal Commission on Police Powers and
Procedure similarly reported:
The essential feature which distinguishes Police organisation from
most other organised bodies is that the Policeman's powers are not
delegated to him by superior authority... A constable is not an
'agent', but is personally liable for any misuse of his powers or any
act in excess of his authority..
Constabulary independence
Writing nearly 20 years after Marshall's major discourse on the police, Lustgarten
singles out R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn 56 as
representative of a 'big jump' in constitutional law. Lord Denning M.R.'s ruling on
Keith-Lucas, B. (1960); Marshall, G. (1965); Lustgarten, L. (1986).
Brogden, M. (1982); Jefferson, T. and R. Grimshaw (1984).
50 See below, Chapter Four, for an outline of nineteenth century police legislation, and Chapter Five on
watch committees as the disciplinary authority for borough police forces.
Brogden, op. cit., Ch. 2; Steedman, C. (1984), pp.31-37.
52 Steedman, op. cit., p.7.
Marshall, op. cit., p.34.
Lustgarten, op. cit., p.48.
'Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure' (Cmnd. 3297), 1929,
Parliamentary Papers (1928-1929), vol. 9, p.127 at p.15 of Report.
[1968]2Q.B. 118.
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an application for an order of mandamus against the Metropolitan Commissioner's
decision to cease observations of gambling premises 57 was unequivocal in providing
chief officers with a high degree of autonomy when performing their law enforcement
responsibilities.58
I hold it to be the duty of the Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis, as it is of every chief constable, to enforce the law of
the land. He must take steps to post his men that crimes may be
detected; and that honest citizens may go about their affairs in
peace. He must decide whether or no suspected persons are to be
prosecuted; and if need be, bring the prosecution or see that it is
brought. But in all these things he is not the servant of anyone save
of the law itself. No Minister of the Crown can tell him that he
must, or must not, keep observation on this place or that; or that he
must, or must not, prosecute this man or that one. Nor can any
police authority tell him so. The responsibility for law enforcement
lies on him. He is answerable to the law and the law alone.59
Lustgarten forcefully argues that the Master of the Rolls' reliance on Fisher and
Perpetual Trustee in concluding that chief officers are solely answerable to the law is
misplaced. 6° Those two authorities are concerned with the law of civil liability with
regard to individual police officers without mention of chief officers and their
responsibilities. 6 ' Thus, Blackburn transposes the independent authority attached to
the office of constable on to the shoulders of chief officers to grant them authority for
policing under the doctrine of constabulary independence. The historical link between
the two constitutional positions is provided by police discretion, on which Marshall
writes - 'The step from 'original' to 'discretionary' powers is by no means a logically
necessary one; yet the transition has been easily made.' 62 It is apparent that the
instrument of that transition was the police officer's recourse to reasonable suspicion
' Issued as a written force order although revoked before the hearing.
Then including the conduct of prosecutions, see above fn.16.
[1968] 2 Q.B. 118, at 135-6.
60 Again, other commentaries on the police have questioned the degree of autonomy that Blackburn
grants chief officers; Plehwe, R. (1974); Brogden, op. cit., Ch. 5; Marshall, G. (1984), Ch. 8; Spencer,
S. (1985), Ch.2.
61 Lustgarten, op. cit., p.65.
62 Marshall, G. (1965), p.17.
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when exercising his powers, 63 culminating with leading judgment on police discretion
by the House of Lords in Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke.M
In defence of Blackburn, chief police officers hold that it properly establishes the
police as a democratic organisation with officers having to take public opinion into
account rather than follow political orders. 65 Blackburn has been affirmed time and
again since 1968 in other cases of judicial review brought by Mr Blackburn, the
Central Electricity Generating Board, 67 a robbery victim68 and in actions for
negligence.69 In R. v. Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall ex parte Central
Electricity Generating Board, 7° judgment accommodated the office of constable under
the doctrine of constabulary independence by establishing that chief officers:
• .command their forces but they cannot give an officer under
command an order to do acts which can only be lawfully done if
the officer himself with reasonable cause suspects a breach of the
peace has occurred or is imminently likely to occur or an arrestable
offence has been committed.7'
63 As developed through McArdle v. Egan (1934) 150 L.T. 412; Dumbell v. Roberts [1944] 1 All E.R.
326; Glinski v. Mclver [1962] A.C. 726; Hussein v. Chong Fook Kam [1970] A.C. 942.
[1984] 1 A.C. 437, at 443 per Diplock L.J; 'the lawfulness of the way in which [a police officer] has
exercised [executive discretion] in a particular case cannot be questioned in any court of law except
upon those principles laid down by Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v.
Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223,'. See Ryan, C. and K. Williams (1986); Lustgarten, op.
cit., Ch. 5.
65 Alderson, J. (1973), pp.'1l-3; Mark, R. (1977), pp.283-4. Marshall, G. (1978), p.61, although
continuing to question constabulary independence's pedigree, reached the conclusion that democracy
is better served with chief officers at the helm of the police rather than elected politicians.
R. v. Metropolitan Commissioner of Police es parte Blackburn (no. 3) [1973] Q.B. 241 and R. v.
Metropolitan Commissioner of Police ex parte Blackburn (No. 4) (1980) Times, March 6; applications
for review of non-prosecution under the Obscene Publications Act 1959.
67 R. v. Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall ex parte Central Electricity Generating Board [1982]
Q.B. 458.
R. v. Oxford, ex parte Levey (1986) Times, 1 November. The accountability to the law principle
assumes abstract qualities in Levey with Sir John Donaldson M.R. ruling that it was not for the courts
to review chief officers' policing methods provided they did not exceed the limits of the discretion
accorded them by law. Thus it would appear that chief officers are accountable to the law, but not to
law-makers, whether the legislature or the judiciary. Balcombe L.J. in the Divisional Court goes some
way towards clarifying the situation in 1?. v. Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte ITF Ltd [1995] 4 All
E.R. 364, by ruling how the Wednesbury principles of reasonableness apply in police cases (see Dixon,
B. and G. Smith (1997), Appendix 4).
69 Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] A.C. 53; Alexandrou v. Oxford [1993] 4 All E.R.
328; Osman v. Ferguson [1993] 4 All E.R. 344.
70 [1982] Q.B. 458.
71 Ibid., at 474 per Lawton Li.
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More recently, Fisher was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Farah v. Commissioner
of Police of the Metropolis,72 an action for damages for unlawful racial
discrimination.73
Since the inception of the modem police by the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 the
police have come to occupy a unique status under the U.K.'s unwritten constitution
such that this branch of the executive has been conferred with unparalleled
independence from the legislature and judiciary. The police institution has both
defended itself against, and also been protected from, extemal interference by other
agencies in accordance with the authority granted by the common law office of
constable which holds individual officers accountable to the law. This principle has
been consistently referred to as grounds for non-interference by the courts in police
affairs. Paradoxically, judicial review proceedings against chief police officers, which
have the capacity to subject police decisions to the law in the shape of the Divisional
Court, have been rendered ineffective by oblique references to the police officer's
personal accountability to the law. It is as if one aspect of the law's domain has
cancelled out the other, and thereby placed the police decision making process beyond
the law.
Debate on the police's constitutional position has focussed on the evolution of a
politically autonomous police institution and removal of the extemal controls once
exercised by police authorities. 74 In these studies, the police officer's accountability to
the law has been largely taken for granted, with Lustgarten standing apart as a notable
exception.75 He has argued that if application of the rule of law is relaxed for police
officers for the protection of the integrity of the police institution, this has serious
implications for a democratic polity founded on the rule of law:
If policemen who have committed acts which would result in
members of the public having to pay compensation or to undergo
significant punishment are in effect absolved from responsibility on
the dual grounds of organisational pathology and the paramount
72 [1997] 1 All E.R. 289, at 303 per Hutchinson L.J.
See below Chapter Five, p.18!.
Keith-Lucas, op. cit.; Marshall, G. (1960), (1965), (1978) and (1984); Plehwe, op. cit.; Brogden, op.
cit.; Jefferson and Grimshaw, op. cit..
Lustgarten, op. cit., Ch. 9.
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importance of its cure, we will have dishonoured the fundamental
value of equality before the law in its simplest, formal liberal sense
that is at the heart of the rule of law. A liberal democratic state
cannot accept such a rule without jeopardising its moral legitimacy,
particularly when the institution involved is itself devoted to law
enforcement.76
Adherence to the principle of police accountability to the law requires equality before
the law for police officers the same as citizens. This fundamental proposition does
not interfere with police officers' possession of common law and statutory powers.
The five basic powers of i) arrest, ii) stop and search, iii) use of physical force, iv)
criminal investigation and v) instituting criminal proceedings, enable police officers to
perform their law enforcement responsibilities. Discussion on the quality of the
criminal justice process has tended to concentrate on the balance, or imbalance,
between police officers' powers on the one hand and citizens' rights on the other.77
My principal concern is not with how efficient the criminal justice process is, or
debating where the line should be drawn between police powers and civil rights. I
seek to look beyond the form of appearance of the criminal justice system at some of
the principles which govern it in an attempt to ascertain whether the particular
constitutional principle of police accountability to the law withstands scrutiny.
Regardless of the general efficacy of the criminal justice system, when police officers
commit acts which contravene the criminal code or exceed their lawful powers, their
accountability to the law can be measured according to whether they are held
responsible for their actions, in criminal and civil law, 78 the same as for all citizens.
The quality of justice may be poor but the principle of equality before the law is
confirmed by its identical application for police officer and citizen alike.
Alternatively, the administration of justice may be popularly acknowledged as fair
despite the fact that the principle of accountability is undermined as a result of police
officers evasion of liability. This situation can arise on the basis that there is public
acknowledgement of the inevitability of police wrongdoing and therefore a socially
76 ibid., p.127.
Reiner and Leigh, op. cit., p.'7l; Sanders and Young, op cit., passim. Ashworth, op. cit., p.292,
argues the notion of balance suggests powers and rights should be accorded equal weight, with the
danger that due priority is not accorded to rights and duties. Dixon, D. (1997), p.81, contends that
additional powers do not automatically improve efficiency.
78 Most particularly actions for damages for intentional torts.
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defmed acceptable level of police crime. In a nutshell, I am more concerned with
issues of equality than quality. This does not amount to an abstract and futile exercise
that crumbles into insignificance under the weight of a utilitarian theory which holds
that the police operate to the benefit of the vast majority of the population.
Underpinning these concerns lurks a question of major constitutional importance, are
police officers answerable to the law, or are they accountable to the police institution
as personified in the office of chief police officer?
III.	 Law and Sociology
A consequence of constitutional lawyers over-riding concern with the police's
accountability to central and local government, and debate on the maintenance of a
politically independent police service, is that the police officer's accountability to the
law has not been scrutinised.79 This state of affairs is all the more alarming because it
is the individual officer's personal answerability to the law that has been taken as
justification for the doctrine of constabulary independence.80
The prevailing view used to be that the police officer's answerability to the law was
on account that he served as a citizen in uniform and was comprehensively bound by
the law in everything he did, both as a law enforcement officer and as an ordinary
citizen. However, as police powers have been perfected and extended over the years
this position became increasingly untenable. 8 ' The first formal recognition that his
law enforcement powers separated the officer from the citizen was by the 1981 Royal
Marshall, G. (1965), (1984); Alderson, op. cit.; Oliver, op. cit. See also Reiner, R. (1993), P. 13, -
'It is uncontentious that police officers are accountable to the law in the concrete shape of the courts';
and Marshall, G. and B. Loveday (1994), p.307 - 'It is a truism that police officers are accountable to
the law.'
° See discussion on Blackburn, above p.40. Each of the Royal Commissions on the police held this
century accept the premise of police accountability to the law prior to considering evidence: 'Report of
the Royal Commission on the Duties of the Metropolitan Police' (Cmnd, 4156), 1908, Parliamentary
Papers (1908), vol. 50, p.1 at p.26; 'Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure'
(Cmnd. 3297), 1929, Parliamentary Papers (1928-1929), vol. 9, p.127 at p.6 of report; Final Report of
the Royal Commission on the Police (Cmnd. 1728), 1962, p.10; Report of the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure (Cmnd. 8091), 1981, p.2.
' Devlin, P. (1960), p.14, argues that the citizen in uniform ideal never applied as ordinary citizens
never had similar powers to police officers, permission to enter other persons premises for example.
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Commission on Criminal Procedure. It remarked that the citizen in uniform ideal was
'too simple a view' as a consequence of the officer's subjugation to police discipline
and his recourse to 'greater legal powers than the ordinary citizen' •82 The impact of
the subsequent reforms in PACE was to give constitutional effect to the Royal
Commission's observation by extending police powers, 83 particularly in the area of
stop and search, and also to provide ground rules for the regulation of the use of those
powers.TM
If the rule of law is considered in its most general sense as a principle of institutional
morality which cautions against the exercise of arbitrary power 85 it can be seen that it
applies to the police officer in two ways. Firstly, the manner in which a police officer
performs his duty is subject to the rule of law in that his powers are defined at
common and statute law. This is the standard approach to the rule of law as it applies
to police officers86 and considerable research has been devoted to police powers and
their regulation in recent years, particularly after codification by PACE. 87 The second
application of the rule of law concerns the police officer's answerability to the law for
his wrongdoing, which must be the same as for the citizen if the principle of equality
before the law is to be upheld. In this regard the function of the rule of law is not
concerned with regulation of police powers, it is for controlling police conduct in the
same way that it has responsibility for imposing punishment and compensation at
criminal and civil law following wrongdoing by the ordinary citizen. It is held,
therefore, that the police officer's accountability to the law is not an indivisible
concept but is separated into two closely connected elements as a consequence of the
police officer's separation from the citizen as a law enforcement officer. One
component of the police officer's accountability to the law recognises his separation
from the citizen and the need for specific powers, and regulations to control those
powers. The other component does not distinguish between the police officer and the
82 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (Cmnd. 8091), 1981, p.2.
See Christian, L. (1983); Baxter, J. and L. Koffinan (eds) (1985).
Dixon, D. (1997). Also, a new police complaints body, the PCA, replaced the PCB with additional
supervisory powers, and the complaint and discipline processes codified in greater detail.
Jowell, J. (1994), p.72.
86 Sanders, A. and P. Young (1994b).
87 Bottomley, A. et al (1991); McConville et a!, op. cit.; Sanders, A. and P. Young (1994); Dixon, D.,
op. cit.
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citizen and requires that he should be liable at criminal and civil law for his
wrongdoing the same as the citizen. It is the first element of the principle which has
monopolised debate, and policy, on grounds that it affords protection to a public
servant who is vulnerable to false allegations when performing his duties. The
validity of this point is not disputed, it is my argument that non-recognition of the
duality of the police officer's accountability to the law weighs the scales of justice
heavily in favour of the police officer. It is suggested that consideration of the police
officer's answerability to the law as a citizen has been subordinated to his
accountability to the law when enforcing the law as a consequence of the Law's
preoccupation with the police function rather than the police officer. It is apparent
that lawyers have a tendency to limit their interest in the police to the officer's
performance of his duties on account that most of their dealings with police officers
are in connection with their mutual interest in law enforcement. 88 In contrast to the
legal paradigm's emphasis on the police officer as the embodiment of the law,
sociological research has revealed that only a small amount of police time is actually
devoted to law enforcement. 89 It is unfortunate that, although sociological inquiry has
consistently questioned lawyers' assumptions on the police for more than a quarter of
a century, lawyers have not sufficiently taken these research findings into account by
modifying their views on the police. And, of equal importance, sociologists
responsible for the broadening of knowledge on the police have not trespassed into the
law's domain and examined the assumption that the police officer is accountable to
the law.9°
For a police officer to be recognised as a citizen, subject to the same laws as the
citizen, he has to be acknowledged as a citizen who enters into inter-personal relations
with citizens, and not solely as a functioning law enforcement officer who engages
with suspects. Although the two aspects of the police officer's accountability to the
See, for example, Lord Woolf's comment that judges and police officers are both concerned with
maintainmg law and order, Thompson and Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2
All E.R. 762 at 773.
89 Banton, M. (1964), Skolnick, J (1966), Bittner, E. (1976), Muir, W. (1977), McBarnet, D. (1981).
9° Brogden, op. cit., and Jefferson and Grimshaw, op. cit., have considered the constitutional position
of the police in detail, however, as with constitutional lawyers, their main concern has not been with
the position of the individual police officer but with the degree of political autonomy enjoyed by police
forces.
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law are closely associated they are distinguishable, and the principal reference point
for separation is acceptance that the person who enters into a relationship with a
police officer has an identity other than 'suspect'. Once established that police-public
contacts are between two citizens, then if a dispute arises between the two parties it is
equally possible that at issue is the unlawful conduct of either party and the police
officer's accountability for his alleged wrongdoing should apply the same as for the
citizen. If, on the other hand, a dispute arises at a meeting between the embodiment of
the law and its antithesis, the allegation against the police officer will be that he
wrongfully exercised his powers when in the execution of his duty. The difference
may only be of emphasis, but it has fundamental consequences for the police officer's
accountability to the law.
In presenting this argument I am not attempting to reinvent the notion of the officer in
uniform. On the contrary, I am seeking to show that this ideological representation of
the police officer, which has been all but formally abandoned by lawyers and social
scientists concerned with the criminal justice process and police powers, 9 ' continues
to dominate thinking on police wrongdoing. I do not put it so high that the
assumption that the police officer is accountable to the law for his wrongdoing in like
manner as the citizen has survived. It is more the case that the principle has not been
subjected to the same degree of scrutiny as police powers were after the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure reported and during the progress of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Bill through Parliament in the early 1980s.
Case law
A practical reason for the underdevelopment of discussion on police crime is that
police officers are infrequently prosecuted with a tendency for cases to collapse or for
juries to acquit. I have managed to track down four recent law reports involving
convictions of police officers. In each case it is arguable that the principal concern in
prosecuting was not to address the harm caused to a victim, but to punish damage to
the public interest by police officers acts or omissions. First, Moore v. Green, 92 a case
91 See Dixon, D., op. cit., Ch. 7.
[1983] 1 All E.R. 663.
46
Chapter One: Law and Sociology
of a police officer obstructing other officers in the execution of their duty can be dealt
with briefly. The prosecuting police officer, PS Moore, successfully appealed to the
Divisional Court against the acquittal of PC Green at his Crown Court re-trial, after
the constable had appealed against his conviction at magistrates court for obstructing
an officer in the execution of his duty. 93 It was ruled that the offence did not require
hostility to the police, it was sufficient that PC Green's warning to a publican of a
police operation against his premises was intended to obstruct the police.94
The three other cases concern failures by police officers to fulfil their law enforcement
responsibilities rather than intentional criminal acts. In R. v. Dytham95 a police officer
who ignored a fatal assault he witnessed shortly before he finished his working day
appealed against his conviction for the common law offence of misconduct in a public
office. Relying on constitutional and jurisprudential grounds it was argued on the
appellant's behalf that the offence required an element of dishonesty, normally
corruption, by a public servant which did not apply in the instant case as the officer
had merely been negligent. Dismissing the appeal Lord Widgery C.J. ruled:
The allegation made was not of mere non-feasance but of deliberate
failure and wilful neglect... This involves an element of culpability
which is not restricted to corruption or dishonesty but which must
be of such a degree that the misconduct impugned is calculated to
injure the public interest so as to call for condemnation and
punishment. Whether such a situation is revealed by the evidence
is a matter that a jury has to decide.
The Court of Appeal's decision that it was a question for the jury whether or not a
police officer's omissions are deserving of criminal sanction also arose under different
circumstances in the drink driving cases of R. v. Coxhead 6 and R. v. Ward and
Hollister. Whereas in Dytham the degree of misconduct was ruled an issue for the
jury, in Coxhead the case turned on whether a police officer has a duty to perform
particular tasks or whether it is within his discretion. A police sergeant in charge of a
police station abandoned his preparations for an intoximeter test after a positive
S.51(3) of the Police Act 1964.
Ibid., at 665 per McCulloch J. This case is not defined as a police crime in this thesis as the officer
did not attempt to justify his action on grounds that he was acting in the execution of his duty.
[1979] 1 Q.B. 722.
[1986] R.T.R. 411.
[1995] Crim. L.R. 398.
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roadside breathalyser test on recognising the suspect as a police inspector's son.
Instead, the sergeant telephoned the inspector, who he knew to be suffering heart
trouble, to come and collect his son from the station. The sergeant's appeal against
his conviction for attempting to pervert the course of justice was dismissed with Lord
Lane C.J. supporting the trial judge's decision to leave the jury to decide if his
decision not to proceed was within his discretion. The Lord Chief Justice agreed that
discretion in law enforcement is on a scale with discretion allowed in some cases, like
riding a bicycle without lights, and not in other cases, where there is evidence that
murder has been committed for example. It is for the jury to decide on the facts where
on the scale a particular case should be and whether or not the power to proceed is
discretionary. The appellant's case was that the power to conduct a breath test is
discretionary, 98 and therefore a matter of law for the trial judge, and that his decision
based on humanitarian concerns for the suspect's father, accepted by the prosecution
at trial, was lawful. The Court of Appeal adopted a different approach in the more
recent case of Ward and Hollister. A member of an ambulance crew reported two
police officers for misconduct for failure to breath test a police colleague involved in a
road traffic accident whose breath smelt of alcohol and whose behaviour appeared to
indicate that he had consumed alcohol. The two officers' convictions for attempting
to pervert the course of justice by failing to administer a breath test were quashed on
appeal and reduced to misconduct in a public office under s.3 of the Criminal Appeal
Act 1968. The Court of Appeal ruled it was for the judge to inform the jury that
police officers have a discretion whether or not to administer a breath test, and for the
jury to decide if it was the police officers duty to do so on the evidence.
In each of these three cases it was considered necessary, although for different
reasons, for the facts to be put before a jury to determine whether or not criminal
sanction was appropriate. The Court of Appeal was unimpressed by the argument in
Dytham that the office of constable should be disregarded for the common law offence
of misconduct in a public office, and the officer treated the same as any other public
servant. It was sufficient that a jury should decide if a police officer's failure to help a
Now, s.6 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, see Williams, G. H. (1986) for discussion on case.
Staughton L.J., Owen and Holland JJ. sitting.
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citizen in need warranted condemnation and punishment. In Coxhead the Lord Chief
Justice had little room for manoeuvre, firstly because the prosecution conceded that
the officer acted out of humanitarian concern and not to improperly protect a
colleague. Secondly, he believed the trial judge 'fell over backwards in the
appellant's favour' in his summing up'°° and still failed to persuade jurors that this
was a case for the exercise of discretion. The consequence was a judgment which
effectively empowered a jury to interpret police powers. 10 ' It is held that the proper
balance, although arrived at in convoluted fashion, is established in Ward and
Hollister. After a liberal interpretation of Coxhead - ' whether a police officer had a
duty to administer a breath test was to be decided by the jury on the evidence" 02 -
reference is made to the police officers' authority, their powers and their duties. The
trial judge had incorrectly ruled that s.6 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 laid down a duty
to breath test and failed to mention that if the officers thought there was a risk of harm
to the suspect they were not required to conduct a roadside breath test. It was for the
judge to rule the 1988 Act provided police officers with powers to administer a breath
test and their duties arose from their employment, it was then for the jury to decide on
the facts if the officers had a duty to apply the test.
In the same way that police discretion did not bar criminal prosecutions for officers
omissions in Coxhead and Ward and Hollister, there is no reason why it should serve
as a defence for offences of assault, false imprisonment and perjury. Executive
discretion is more commonly analysed as a problem for administrative law,'°3 and
following the landmark judgment on police discretion in Holgate-Mohammed v.
Duke'°4 attracted the attention of lawyers with an interest in police powers.'°5
However, Holgate-Mohammed was an unsuccessful police action for false
imprisonment, the House of Lords ruling that the power to arrest without warrant is at
the police officer's discretion provided he has reasonable grounds for suspicion which
v. Coxhead[1986] R.T.R. 411 at 414.
'°' G. H. Williams, op. cit.,
102 R. v. Ward and Hollister [1995] Crim. L.R. 398.
103 Davis, K. (1971); Jowell, J. (1973), (1994); Galligan, D. (1976).
'° [1984] 1 A.C. 437.
'° Ryan and Williams, op. cit.; Sanders, A. and P. Young (1994b).
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can only be challenged on grounds of Wednesbury'°6 unreasonableness.'°7 Of major
importance to police actions, Clayton and Tomlinson argue that, as a consequence of
the fine balance between police powers and civil liberties, relaxation of the reasonable
suspicion standard in Castorina v. Chief Constable of Surrey'° 8 allows for 'sloppy
police work' and threatens the presumption of innocence.' 09 There is a greater
potential for police discretion, compared to other public servants' discretionary
powers, to interfere with the rule of law on account of police officers opportunity to
rely on their suspicions or beliefs when exercising their 10 As noted above
and discussed further below, this has given rise to the much discussed problem of
regulating police discretion, which has taxed criminal lawyers and criminologists for
the last quarter century and more. Further, it is recognised that the wide discretion
available to police officers makes the difference between lawful and unlawful police
conduct prone to controversy," particularly as the judges have declared the issue a
question of law and not a matter of fact for the jury." 2 What has evaded notice,
however, is that excepting the two noted breath test cases police discretion has not
been considered worthy of consideration by the criminal courts in the form of
prosecutions of police officers."
Sociological research
Lustgarten's wide reaching study concentrates on the control of executive discretion
as problematic for police governance, looking to judicial review remedies in
administrative law and the election of overseers to achieve political accountability."4
However, as D. J. Smith points out 'Lustgarten gives too little attention to the work of
sociologists', arguing that elected representatives are as likely to condone police
106 See above fn.19.
107 See above fit 64.
lS (1988) New L.J. 180.
109 Clayton, R. and H. Tomlinson (1988), and (1992), pp.171-178.
"° Ryan and Williams, op. cit., p.298.
'"Ibid., p.286. Jowell, J. (1973), pp.216-7, comments 'the greater the discretion, the more necessary it
is to control that discretion' with a tendency towards 'symbolic reassurance'.
"2 Ryan and Williams, op. cit., p.299.
Smith, J. C. (1994) endorses this oversight in a discussion on lawful uses of force arguing that the
absence of mens rea makes law enforcement officers transgressions inappropriate for criminal sanction
although suitable for civil compensation, see below fn. 118.
"4 Lustgarten, op. cit.
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misconduct as lawyers are." 5 In 'The Jurisprudence of Discretion" 6 Lacey uses the
example of police discretion to argue for an inter-disciplinary approach to the general
problem of executive decision-making. Her contention is that the legal paradigm,
with its emphasis on normative theory, is restricted to questions of controlling and
justifying discretion when protecting individual rights" 7 and pays insufficient
attention to the socio-political context in which agents operate." 8 Lacey concludes
that discretion is a political question, with the social sciences' insights into human
behaviour, motivation and organisation providing a starting point for analysis. Duly
informed, it is then for legal inquiry to examine by general normative reflection the
constitutional and political issues raised by police powers and make recommendations
for reform."9
While agreeing with the need for inter-disciplinary study, the danger is that
explanations for legal problems can be sought in the social sciences. Inter-
disciplinary research has been increasingly successful in analysing the criminal justice
process and police powers, largely in studies of PACE.' 2° Those studies address the
problem of controlling police discretion when considering police abuses of power, a
matter of fundamental importance to the fair and efficient administration of criminal
justice. However, inter-disciplinary studies of police powers and their regulation do
not, strictly speaking, take the insight provided by socio-political research as their
starting point, analysis is solidly based on legally defined concepts. Thus, the legal
paradigm is responsible for setting the parameters of research with a continuous
dialogue between disciplines. Unfortunately, police crime has not been devoted to
such rigorous inquiry. On a basic level, there are qualitative differences between
police powers and police conduct; obviously, a police officer does not spend all his
' Smith, D. J. (1988), p. 438.
116 Lacey, N. (1992).
The origin of this debate being Dicey's principle of equality before the law proposed as a defence of
the rule of law against the increasing imposition of administrative decisions; ibid, p.369.
The narrowness of the legal paradigm is also apparent in J. C. Smith's discussion (1994) on
justification and excuse in the use of force in self-defence and the prevention of crime. He relies on
normative analysis of s.24 of PACE to distinguish between police and citizen powers of arrest; the use
of force by an officer to effect a lawful arrest on grounds of reasonable suspicion being unlawful for a
citizen, although he argues the absence of mens rea would excuse from criminal liability, see above
fn.113.
119 Lacey, op. cit., p.385.
120 Reiner and Leigh, op. cit.; Sanders, A. and P. Young (1994) and (1994b); Dixon, D., op. cit.
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time exercising his powers to keep the peace or enforce the law, and, an abuse of
power can be a criminal offence, a tort or a disciplinary offence. Of particular interest
to the study of police crime is the requirement that an officer has falsely claimed to
have lawfully exercised his powers, which need not apply where there has been an
abuse of power. Study of police misconduct, however, has been left primarily to
social scientists' 2 ' who, in the absence of legal definitions, have adopted the
assumption that police officers are accountable to the law.'22
Social scientists categorise police studies by method, the two principal schools being
'interactionist', where priority is given to human interactions to explain social
behaviour, and 'structuralist', where the restrictions imposed by social structures are
given primacy in accounting for human behaviour) 23 In a move away from
sociological myopia, Dixon has suggested a third 'legalistic/bureaucratic' method to
accommodate the legal paradigm.' 24 With particular regard to police wrongdoing,
research can also be classified according to subject matter. As a general rule
researchers on the criminal justice process have preferred structuralist explanations for
police abuses of power,' 25 while those interested in police administration favour an
interactionist approach to police misconduct.' 26 These preferences can be ascribed to
the need for criminal justice researchers to explain police behaviour in connection
with their law enforcement responsibilities as legally defined by their powers. Police
researchers, on the other hand, have been more concerned to understand how police
officers operate, internal police organisation and the general police function, with
police deviance identified as a dysfunction of policing. Research of the latter type is
largely dependent on the police for empirical data, whereas criminal justice research
121 With the exception of two practitioners guides, Clayton and Tomimson op. cit.; Harrison, J. and S.
Cragg (1995).
' See, for example, Bittner, E. (1975), p.39, quoted below p.54.
123 For taxonomy see Reiner, R. (1992).
124 Dixon, D., op. cit., pp.1-9, concluding that 'various theoretical perspectives are of value', ibid.,
p.267.
125 McBarnet, D. (1981); McConville, M. et a! (1991); Reiner and Leigh, (1994); Sanders, A. and P.
Young (1994).
126 Wilson, J. (1968); Bittner op. cit.; Holdaway, S. (1979) and (1983); Smith, D. J. and J. Gray (1985);
Maguire, M. and C. Corbett (1991); Skolnick, J. and J. Fyfe (1993). Chan, J. (1997), in her study of
police discrimination moves away from polarisation of interactionist and structuralist models. She
takes a more eclectic or combined approach to demonstrate weaknesses in theories which ascribe
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has been able to draw on raw material from other disciplines as well as the law, thus
the increase in inter-disciplinary study of police powers.
It is lamentable that lawyers and social scientists have not embraced inter-disciplinary
study of police wrongdoing in a similar fashion. My concern is that while lawyers
and social scientists have been able to comprehensively analyse police powers, social
scientists have been largely restricted to commentating on police misconduct and the
complaint and discipline processes. Some blame for this situation attaches to lawyers
for their neglect of police misconduct as a legal problem, and they also suffer as a
consequence from the absence of informed sociological research on the subject. It is
also contended that lawyers' disinterest in police misconduct leaves the false
impression that legal control of police conduct extends only as far as regulating police
powers.' 27 An assumption which led the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice to i)
ignore police crime when considering miscarriages of justice, and ii) adhere to
conventional wisdom in holding that police misconduct is a police management
problem. This is a view ideally suited to chief police officers who have robustly
defended their powers to discipline since granted throughout England and Wales
under the Police Act 1964.128
This study, in contrast, starts from the simple proposition that at the core of police
wrongdoing is a legal problem. It is held that the popular belief that police
wrongdoing is a management issue is a misconception which, if persevered with, will
continue to inhibit police reform and undermine public confidence in the police. The
accusation that police crime has escaped the notice of legal, criminal justice and
police researchers is not quite accurate. Social science researchers, including inter-
disciplinary adherents, in their consideration of police abuses of power or misconduct
have tended towards the theoretical decriminalisation of unlawful police conduct. It is
argued that this is primarily due to the dichotomous analysis of the police which has
already been referred to above and is illustrated in Figure I.
police racism to the reactive nature of police work or as a feature of institutionalised racism in modern
society.
127 Dixon, D., op. cit., barely mentions criminal, civil or disciplinary sanctions for police misconduct.
128 By repeal of nineteenth century statutes, under Sch. 10, see Chapter Five, below p.166.
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Figure I. Social science research on the police
Emphasis	 School One
Subject matter	 Police powers
Police function	 Law enforcement
Explanations for wrongdoing 	 Abuse of power
Methodology	 -	 Structuralist
Discipline	 lnter-disciplinary/
criminological
School Two
Police administration
Social control
Misconduct
Interactionist
Criminological/sociological
Deconstruction by both schools of the police in this manner fails to do justice to the
complexities of the police concept in that they fail to address the dialectical forces
acting on the constitutional position' 29 on the one hand. And, neither school has been
able to approach the problem of police crime, on the other hand, because of their
neglect of the duality of the police function and conceptualisation of wrongdoing as
either abuses of power or misconduct. It is suggested that largely as a result of this
failure of definition both interactionist and structuralist research on police wrongdoing
has been overwhelmingly pessimistic.' 3° Interactionists undervalue regulation as legal
rules which can be discarded by officers working on the ground.' 3 ' The sociologist
Bittner in reaching a sociological definition of the police's core function' 32 asserts 'the
police are nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of situationally
justifiable force in society'.' 33 On police wrongdoing he presents a case for what is
arguably the decriminalisation of unlawful police conduct:
• the frequently heard talk about the lawful use of force by the
police is practically meaningless and because no one knows what is
meant by it, so is the talk about the use of minimum force.
Whatever vestigial significance attaches to the term 'lawful' use of
force is confined to the obvious and unnecessary rule that police
officers may not commit crimes of violence. Otherwise, however,
the expectation that they may and will use force is left entirely
undefined.., the entire debate about the troublesome problem of
police brutality will not move beyond its present impasse, and the
desire to eliminate it will remain an impotent conceit, until this
point is fully grasped and unequivocally admitted. In fact, our
129 See Figure III., Chapter Five, below p.178.
130 As has legal analysis, Lustgarten op. cit., p.160. Baxter, J. (1985), p.44, comments 'making the
constable accountable to the law may be possible but there are many difficulties to be overcome.., they
all take the form of post mortem action and are a poor substitute for meticulous law observance on the
part of the police, and it would be a dangerous state of affairs if the risk of such action were regarded
by the police as one of the inevitable overheads of the system'.
131 Holdaway, S. (1979), (1983); Smith and Gray, op. cit.
132 As compared to the legally defined function of keeping the peace and law enforcement, Rice v.
Connolly [1966] 2 Q.B. 414.
Bittner, op. cit., p. 39.
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expectation that policemen will use force, coupled by our refusals
to state clearly what we mean by it (aside from sanctimonious
homilies), smacks of more than a bit of perversity.'34
Bittner has been highly influential among criminologists, particularly in the United
States.' 35 His emphases on improved selection, training, complaint and discipline
procedures along with other management methods, has been instrumental in setting
terms of reference for debate on police misconduct. The most comprehensive
interactionist study of police misconduct in England and Wales is Maguire and
Corbett's Home Office and PCA commissioned research on police complaints.' 36 The
value of this study is the insight it provides on the experiences and attitudes of persons
involved in the police complaint process - complainants, officers complained against,
complaint investigation officers and PCA members. Although dependent on the
police and PCA for information and access to complainants, it documents the only
available empirical data on complainants. However, the scope of the research' 37 is
limited to the complaint and discipline processes, and the study stops short of analysis
of criminal proceedings following complaint investigations. Thus, examination of the
complaint process is predetermined by managerial concerns with internal police
disciplinary procedures as influenced by the PCA, which precludes proper
consideration of the complaint process as the pre-prosecution stage of criminal
procedure against police officers.
Structuralist studies of the criminal justice process do not underrate the law's
importance' 38 and are not vulnerable to police influence in the same way as
interactionism. However, in seeking to understand police powers and their
contribution to the quality of criminal justice an essentially procedural approach to
police wrongdoing has been adopted. McConville et a! lead the way by setting out in
the wake of the Guildford Four and Birmingham Six miscarriages of justice to
establish 'whether such cases were simply aberrations or rather were the natural result
Ibid., p. 38.
' Kiockars, K. (1980); Goldsmith, A. (1991); Skolnick and Fyfe op. cit.; Geller, W. and H. loch
(1996).
136 Maguire and Corbett, op. cit.
137 The terms of reference determined by the commissioning bodies.
After McBarnet, op. cit., pp.154-156, the standard proposition is that the gap between the rhetoric
and reality of the law allows police officers to remain within its limits by taking advantage of its
pennissiveness.
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of our adversarial process and the autonomy of the police." 39
 They commence by
defining criminal justice, not as a system consisting of independent institutions, but as
a process with suspects having to progress through definite stages. This affords police
officers the opportunity, through their law enforcement powers up to the initiation of
criminal proceedings, to control the criminal justice process through its subsequent
prosecution stages when ostensibly under the direction of the CPS. Police officers
establish their domination over the process by manipulating their powers to maximum
effect in the early stages so that by the time a suspect is charged a case has been
designed and constructed to overcome any obstacles encountered en route to a guilty
plea or a conviction. On the basis of empirical research conducted within the police
and the CPS,' 4° McConville et a! conclude that the provisions of PACE and the
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 have had little effect in controlling and reviewing
police practices. In contradistinction to McBarnet' s argument that police officers as
petty officials are scapegoated for the failings of the law makers,' 4 ' McConville et a!
contend that police officers should not escape so lightly, but apart from urging that
police powers should be scrutinised, no further recommendations are made.' 42 A more
fatalistic than pessimistic conclusion is reached with the authors identifying police
abuses of power as a product of an adversarial legal system, and then rejecting the
introduction of inquisitorial procedures on grounds that it would be unlikely to have
an impact:
For the state, existing models of law enforcement work. And this is
so even when they fail or sometimes encounter resistance: indeed,
occasional failure and the possibility of resistance is a requirement
for an effective legal system.'43
McConville et a! do not set out to tackle the problem of police criminality and they
arrive at a structuralist explanation for police abuse of power which does not contrive
to excuse it. Their research was conducted at a period in police history when public
anxiety was at a peak, not long after the 1984-5 Miners Strike,' and written up when
' McConville eta!, op. cit., p.3.
140 Relying on interactionist methodology to compliment their structuralist theoretical analysis.
'' McBarnet, op. cit., p.156.
142 McConville eta!, op. cit., p.176.
Ibid., p.208.
' Coulter, J. eta! (1984); Fine, R. eta! (1985).
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those concerns had been given full expression by the release of the Birmingham Six.
However, without wishing to undermine the barrier police autonomy poses to
accountable and democratic policing, it is argued that their portrayal of the police as a
monolithic power fails to politically locate the police on any level other than between
officer and suspect. Further, their critique of the adversarial legal system does not
give proper regard to the police's opponents, who are formally represented by defence
or police litigation practitioners under that system, and have campaigned on particular
cases and for general reform. As a result of these failings there is some inevitability to
their argument which outlines the criminal justice process as a linear process,
programmed by police officers and largely unaffected by others, whether victims,
suspects, lawyers, CPS or other officials. It is suggested that their fatalistic view,
although providing an accurate description of some police practices, does not
accurately reflect the reality of resistance to oppressive policing methods.' 45 This
weakness emerges on the basis of a passive approach to community with McConville
et al displaying a disregard for suspects as powerless victims up against meaningful
and oppressive police officers. Their analysis is limited to consideration of abuses by
a dominant power against a subjugated population, with the small step from abuse of
power to procedural police crime prevented by the absence of a point of reference;
namely, a credible victim capable of alleging that a criminal offence has been
conimitted.' 46 Paradoxically, they arrive at a radical critique which comprehensively
articulates the overbearing power of authority but also disempowers those with the
greatest interest in overcoming the cause of their own oppression.
The points taken from Bittner, Maguire and Corbett and McConville et a! are made
not so as to single them out for criticism, more because of their representative value,
influence, attention to detail and coherence of argument. It is concluded that
criminological research into police misconduct is of practical value primarily to the
police service and, without being properly informed of legal problems, can lend
undeserving respectability to popularly held assumptions. A lesson the DPP appears
Similar criticism can be levelled at Sanders and Young, op. cit., for their adherence to continuity
theory on increasing police powers which questions the efficacy of checks and balances.
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to have found out to her cost in R. v. DPP ex parte Treadaway.'47 There are
indications of a move away from the criminological tradition as demonstrated by both
Chan and Dixon who, although they maintain the police administration/misconduct1
criminology and police powers/abuse/inter-disciplinary emphases, attempt to break
down the interactionistlsocial control and structuralist/law enforcement dichotomy in
their research on police discrimination and regulation of powers, respectively.'48
Sharpe, A. (1995) in a paper appropriately entitled 'Police Performance Crime as Structurally
Coerced Action', defmes police crime in the same terms as expounded here, and then refers to
sociological research for explanation without mention of victims' interests.
(1997) unreported, 31 July, see above, p.32.
148 Chan, op. cit.; Dixon, D., op. cit.; Reiner and Leigh, op. cit., p.'78, advise a synthesis of culturalist
and structuralist positions.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Rising Popularity of Police Actions
On 28 March 1996 a Central London County Court jury awarded a record £220k
damages for assault and false imprisonment to Kenneth Hsu against the
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.' Metropolitan police officers were found
to have assaulted Hsu during the course of an unlawful arrest after he objected to their
entering his home. His arms were twisted round his back, he was placed in a head
lock, struck in the face and kicked in the back, before he was taken to Brixton police
station and falsely imprisoned for one and a quarter hours and then released without
charge. He suffered minor injuries to his body, passed blood in his urine and was
diagnosed to be still suffering symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder five years
later. Quantum consisted of £20k compensatory, including aggravated, damages and
£200k exemplary damages. Less than one month later, on 26 April, this figure was
surpassed in the same court when Danny Goswell was awarded £3 02k; consisting of
compensatory damages of £120k for assault and £12k for false imprisonment
(aggravated damages included) and £170k exemplary damages. 2 The jury found that
Goswell had been handcuffed by two Woolwich police officers and then truncheoned
to the head by a third and falsely imprisoned for 20 minutes, leaving him with an
injury which required six sutures and a permanent scar. After both findings the
Commissioner, while accepting liability appealed against quantum. Not surprisingly,
the two cases attracted intense media attention and sparked off a lively public debate.
The front page of the Daily Mail screamed 'E60,000 for each stitch!' after the Goswell
verdict.3 The two men's solicitors, writing separately in the Guardian,4 argued that
'Guardian, 29 March 1996. Reduced to £35k on appeal; Thompson & Hsu v Commissioner of Police
of the Metropolis [1997] 2 All E.R. 762, see Smith, G. (1997a) (See below Appendix 3), and Chapter
Six, below p.220. The previous record jury award, for general and exemplary damages, was of100k
for assault, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution in Taylor v. Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis (1989), unreported, Independent 6 December 1989. The Commissioner appealed and the
damages were settled at £60k, Guardian 28 May 1990. There have been larger awards to cover special
damages, for example £114,206 in the High Court where the plaintiff spent a year in prison on remand,
Nugent v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1990) unreported, Guardian, 15 December 1990.
2 Guardian, 27 April 1996. The Court of Appeal reduced the award to £47.6k, Goswell v.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1998) unreported, 7 April.
27 April 1996.
' 1 May 1996.
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the damages were punishment for the failings of the authorities to hold police officers
to account for criminal acts. 5 The Times, in a news report on Commissioner Sir Paul
Condon's decision to appeal quoted him at some length, concluding: 'They were
minor incidents which have been speculatively given a run on legal aid. In some
cases the police have been seen as a soft touch.' 6 The Independent featured an article
by the author on the constitutional importance of exemplary damages as a means of
holding the police to account. 7 The Daily Telegraph ran a news item on Home Office
expectations that costs of police actions could reach £300 million annually by 2004,8
and the Guardian rejoined the debate by reporting that the MPS feared that the cost of
1996's police actions could amount to the loss of 100 officers.9
I.	 Police Action Statistics
The Commissioner eventually appealed against 10 jury awards from the Central
London County Court made between June 1995 and October 1996. The awards are
listed below in Table I. with details of the breakdown in damages and liability
findings. Assaults are described as 'serious' where plaintiffs required medical
attention (including treatment for post traumatic stress disorder), 'minor' where the
injuries sustained did not require treatment and 'technical' where there was a laying
on of hands to effect an arrest. In the false imprisonment column the length of time
plaintiffs were unlawfully held in custody is given. These details have been included,
along with malicious prosecution findings, to give an indication of the liability
verdicts on which damages were assessed. In the test case of Thompson and Hsu v
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis' 0 the Court of Appeal upheld the £5 1,5k
award to Thompson, reduced Hsu's to £35k, £20k compensatory damages and £15k
exemplary damages, and issued quantum guidelines for police actions.
The officer who truncheoned Goswell had been dismissed from the force following a complaint and
disciplinary proceedings, only to be reinstated by the Home Secretary on appeal.
6 7May 1996.
29 May 1996 (See below Appendix 1).
8 30 May 1996.
93 June 1996.
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Table I. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis quantum appeals from the
Central London County Court, June 1995- October 1996.11
I	 Damaaes £k	 Torts
Date	 I Plaintiff
12.6.95	 Thompso
28.3.96	 Hsu____
28.3.96	 Winyard
26.4.96	 Goswell
29.4.96	 Kownack
3.6.96	 BrownbiD
13 .6 . 96*	 Bozkurt
_____ Ates
26.6.96	 Scafe
18.7.96	 Gerald
18.10.96 Beckford
* Joint plaintiffs.
Total
51.50
220.00
64.00
302.00
108.70
150.00
73.25
77.00
-10.0o
125.00
50.00
Compe-
1.50
20.00
14.50
132.00
63.75
100.00
18.25
22.00
90.00
25.00
15.00
50.00
200.00
50.00
170.00
45.00
50.00
55.00
55.00
20.00
100.00
35.00
Assau
minor
serious
minor
serious
none
minor
serious
serious
technical
serious
serious
False
Imprisonment
3 hours
2 hours
5 hours
20 minutes
16 hours
10 hours
21 hours
12 hours
4 hours
3 hours
5 hours
Malicious
Prosecution
Yes
No
Yes_____
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No______
Yes_____
Yes
The spate of six figure awards in the spring and summer months of 1996 came after a
steady increase in the number of civil actions brought by the victims of police
wrongdoing. Former Metropolitan Commissioner, Sir David McNee, had been alert
to this trend and wrote in his autobiography; 'Actions against my officers and myself
arising out of arrests, searches, etc. had risen from 16 in 1967 to 182 in l982." The
Police Committee of the Greater London Council was also abreast of this situation
with the occasional publication of articles and statistics in Policing London."
However, despite a fundamental shift in opinion among legal practitioners in favour
1 [1997] 2 All E.R. 762.
See also Smith, G. (1996)(See below Appendix 2. Note. The Commissioner withdrew the appeal in
Case 10, Table 2, and subsequently appealed Beckford.) Prior to this spate of cases the upper bracket
for global jury awards was between £50k and £60k (not allowing for inflation) for assault, false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution. For example - Riley v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire
Police (1990), unreported, £60k, Guardian 19 December 1990; Cusworth v. Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire Police (1991), unreported, £60k, Guardian 10 July 1991; Thorpe v. Chief Constable of
Greater Manchester Police (1991) unreported, £5 Ok; Mar/cs v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester
Police (1991) Independent, 21 January, £55k, Guardian 6 December 1991; Burke v. Commissioner of
Police of the Metropolis (1992), unreported, £5 Ok, Times 20 March 1992. For full range of awards see
Clayton and Tomlinson (1992), pp.411-431.
12 In addition to the Court of Appeal's reduction of quantum in Hsu and Goswell, see above fnn. 1 and
2, the following appeals were reduced by Alternative Dispute Resolution: Winyard to £32k; Kownacki
not known; Brownbill to £55k; Bozkurt and Ates to £45k each; Scaft to £20k; and Beckford to £38k.
On the day this thesis was completed, 10 June 1998, judgment in Gerald v. Commissioner of Police of
the Metropolis reduced quantum to £50k.
13 McNee, D. (1983), p.181.
14 Published by Greater London Council Police Committee Support Unit, and following abolition of the
GLC in March 1986 by the London Strategic Policy Unit until October 1987. Policing London relied
on Parliamentary written answers by the Home Office minister with responsibility for the police for its
statistics. In 1973, 27 actions were concluded costing the MPS £200 in settlements and awards
(excluding legal costs); by 1981 this sum had increased to £31,871 for 21 actions, with a further 92
actions initiated. In the eight year period 1973 to 1980 the MPS paid out £74,585 for 201 actions,
Policing London (1985), Vol. III, p.76.
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of civil proceedings as a suitable means of redress to police wrongdoing, indicated by
the rise in payouts in Graph I., there is a dearth of information on police actions. No
academic research has been published, although the Home Office has conducted its
own unpublished research,' 5 and the only two books published have been
practitioners' guides.'6
Graph I. Settlements and awards paid by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
(k); 1981-1995.
Source: Hansard.
The Metropolitan Police Commissioner's 1990 annual report commented that in the
last three months of the year there was a sharp increase in actions commenced for
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, from 50 to 72, with a total of 220
actions in 1990 compared to 205 in 1989.' The following year a Central Legislation
Unit was added to the Metropolitan Police Solicitors Department, which organised a
national conference for legal practitioners acting for chief constables when defending
police actions. The 1991/2 annual report introduced statistical profiles of police
actions noting a 47% increase in the year and the trend for complainants to pursue
police actions rather make complaints.' 9 Unfortunately, other forces do not keep
' Daily Telegraph, 30 May 1996.
16 Clayton, R. and H. Tomlinson, op. cit., Second Edition; Harrison, J. and S. Cragg (1995), Third
Edition.
' Graph compiled from an amalgam of parliamentary written answers: up to 1984 reproduced in
Policing London, see above fri.14; and, H.C. Written Answers, 17 July 1995, col. 933; 17 April 1996,
col. 522; 10 May 1996, cols. 156 and 305; 4 June 1996, col. 325; 9 July 1996, col.140.
of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the year 1990, MPS, p.1 8.
1	 of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the year 1991/2, MPS, p.97.
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records of police actions, an omission recently lamented by the Chief Inspector of
Constabulary.2°
Table II. Civil actions against the Commissioner of Police
of the Metropolis; 1990-1996/7.
1991	 1991/2	 1992/3
Civil actions
Actions commenced	 324 j
	
379	 436
Threatened	 495	 573	 692
Damages	 I total	 £k	 total	 £k	 total	 £k
Threatened	 [	 39	 60J	 39	 54	 43	 76
Settled	 I	 390 - 77 -. 393	 65	 926
Awards	 9 1	 21	 ut	 124	 8	 111
Totals	 I 22	 i11 	 127	 581	 116	 1113
Civil actions
Actions_commenced
Threatened
- _1
494	 490
I
:1995i6I - _	 1996/7
495	 409
1000	 769
P.mages	 tot	 £iTtotaII.tot	 £k totaljk
Threatened	 126	 272	 101	 200	 72	 249	 79	 169
__ _ __
Settled	 162	 1436	 170	 1182	 146 1138	 190	 960
Awards	 7!	 53	 12	 86	 30 542*	 31Th 529"
Totals	 295	 1761	 283	 1468	 248 1929*1 305 1____2658k'
* Figure adjusted to take into consideration Court of,.ppeal's reduction of Hsu's dafrii21
" Six cases still awaiting appeal totalling £945k.22
Source: Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Annual Reports 1991-1996/7.
Two clear trends are evident from the statistics. The number of persons suing the
Commissioner has steadily increased since the 1 970s, 23 and the amount he has had to
pay out has risen dramatically, over 90 times between 1981 and 1995/6 or, allowing
20 
'A recent review of forces revealed a dearth of information on the nature and extent of such [civil]
claims.' Report of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary for the year 1995/6 (H.C. 10), 1996,
p.1 15. As a result of the unavailability of national police action figures, police complaint, discipline
and criminal prosecution statistics outlined below are also restricted to the MPS. The statistical trends
for police actions and complaints identified below, however, are not confmed to the MPS. The Chief
Inspector of Constabulary stated in evidence to the Home Affairs select Committee 'Whilst the number
of complaints has decreased in recent years, there has been a significant increase in civil actions against
the police' Home Affairs Select Committee First Report, Police Disciplinary and Complaints
Procedures. Minutes of Evidence and Appendices (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. II., p.24!. And the same has
been reported for the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland (Hayes, M., 1997, p.5), with
approximately £500k paid out annually (ibid., p.20).
21 The Commissioner's Annual Reports for 1995/6 and 1996/7 fail to mention the Thompson appeal.
22 Although 10 appeals in total, the Commissioner's Annual Reports for 1995/6 and 1996/7 only make
reference to eight.
23 See above fn.14.
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for inflation, an increase in excess of 2,000%.24 Further, the average cost per action
more than doubled between 1991 and 1995/6, from £3.86k in 1991 to £7,778 in
1995/6; if the eight cases awaiting appeal were to be included in calculation for
1996/7 that average would increase to £8.72k. A conservative assessment of the
statistics indicates that during the 1 990s over twice as many people sue the police and
the 'going rate' for police torts has more than doubled.25
Having gained an overall quantitative picture of police actions, it only remains to
determine the principal causes of action. The ten quantum cases appealed by the
Metropolitan Commissioner outlined in Table I. give an idea of the standard
actionable torts - assault, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. An
alternative to official sources of information on police actions are the solicitors and
banisters who represent plaintiffs. In December 1996, proformi were sent out to 70
legal practitioners in London known to specialise in police actions. Information was
requested on all actions against the Commissioner concluded by settlement or
damages for the period 1990 to 1996. Eight solicitors from four firms responded and,
together with a trawl of press reports, it has been possible to assemble information on
40 cases involving 49 plaintiffs in which damages were awarded, and 108 settled
actions involving 128 plaintiffs. It is acknowledged that the sample is not
representative of police actions given that i) it only amounts to approximately 12.5%
of all cases recorded by the MPS during the same period and ii) it is not a randomly
collected sample. The sample of 148 cases is unable to satisfy statistical comparison
tests with official statistics. Even if the ten quantum appeal cases are removed from
the equation, the mean average payment in 138 cases is in excess of £20k, more than
three times the MPS mean average of £6.2k, again covering the same period.
Explanation for this divergence is due to i) specialist solicitors pursuing the more
serious cases, ii) the restriction of media reports to large payouts and iii) the inclusion
of a series of exceptionally high settlements arising out of cases involving Stoke
24 £2 1k was paid out in 1981, Ibid. On account of the quantum appeals a rate has not been calculated
to 1996/7.
25 Technically it is not possible to put a figure on police torts because civil awards normally correspond
to the sum required to compensate the plaintiff for his loss. However, in the same way that guidelines
have been developed for personal injury claims, the availability of exemplary damages in the majority
of police actions have established something approaching a standard rate.
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Newington officers. 26 However, particularly in the absence of figures from other
sources, the solicitors' returns on causes of action detailed in Table III. provide an
indication of the torts committed by police officers, or allegedly committed where
settlement has been reached without admission of liability by the Commissioner.
Table Ill. Plaintiffs' causes of action in proceedings against the
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 1990-1996.
Assault, false imprisonment and malicious pro
Assault and false imprisonment
Assault and malicious prosecution
False imprisonment and malicious_prosecution
False imprisonment
Assault
Malicious prosecution
Deathin custody	 _______________
Other (trespass, libel, etc.)
Totals
* including four technical assaults.
Award!j Settlements
on
	 27
	
48
	
8j	 22
	
21
	
5
	
3j	 24*
	
5t1
	
11
	
2j	 8
lj
I
-	 9
1	 128
t including three technical assaults.
Table III. confirms the impression given in the table of quantum appeals, 27 nearly half
(42.37%) of all actions in the solicitors' returns consist of the three torts of assault,
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. False imprisonment actions were
brought by 83.62% of plaintiffs (148), assault 68.93% (122) and malicious
prosecution by 62.15% (110). Thus, false imprisonment, and not assault, is the major
cause of action, a finding which some may find surprising given commentators
preoccupation with police violence. False imprisonment cases where there have been
technical assaults, and no battery, have not been recorded as assault cases on the
assumption that if it had not been for an unlawful arrest, which is not a tort in itself,
the plaintiff would not have proceeded with their action. 28 Another important factor is
that in 68.92% of false imprisonment actions and 67.21% for assault, malicious
prosecution is also alleged. Given that the torts of assault and false imprisonment are
substantively the same as criminal offences, and malicious prosecution translates to
the offences of perjury andlor attempting to pervert the course of justice, it was found
26 £566k was paid in settlements to 11 plaintiffs arrested by Stoke Newington drug squad officers
subsequently investigated by the PCA supervised Operation Jackpot complaint investigation, see
Chapter Six, below p.218.
27 See Table I., above p.61.
28 This is also most probably true in minor assault cases where the plaintiff has suffered no injury, but
was subjected to an assault.
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that police officers committed criminal offences, although to the civil standard of
proof,29 in at least 84.75% of the actions in this sample.3°
II.	 Police complaints statistics
In contrast to the dearth of information on police actions, there is an abundance of
official statistics, reports and research literature on police complaints and discipline.
Publication of regular statistics on police discipline date back to the first
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis's annual report in 1869,31 with the
Inspectors' of Constabulary annual reports following suit in 1876.32 The Chief
Inspector of Constabulary commenced recording complaint statistics in his 1963
report,33 shortly before ss.49 and 50 of the Police Act 1964 codified the complaint
procedure and required police authorities and inspectors to keep themselves informed
of proceedings, and the MPS commenced records in 1 964. Despite the availability
of police complaint figures they are generally 'confusing and misleading', 35 and
identification of statistical trends is impeded by changes in recording methods.
Therefore, MPS complaints statistics tabled below date back to 1977 (see Table IV.),36
with indication of the type of complaints recorded restricted to the last three years (see
Table V.). Criminal and disciplinary proceedings go back to 1983, the years in which
the present recording methods were introduced for each category (see Tables VI. and
VII.), although reference is made to earlier figures to show recent trends.37
29 See below, p.'78, for discussion on the civil and criminal standard of proof.
° This may not have been the case in the 16 actions for false imprisonment, the two actions arising
from deaths in custody and the nine other causes of action, although the facts of those cases might also
include allegations of police crimes.
'Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the year 1869' (Cmnd. 150), 1870,
Parliamentary Papers (1870), vol.36, p.461.
32 
'Inspectors of Constabulary Reports for year ending 29 September 1876' (H.C. 23), 1877,
Parliamentary Papers (1877), vol.42, p.1.
Report of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary 1963 (H.C. 259), 1964.
Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 1964 (Cmnd. 2710), 1965.
Maguire, M. and C. Corbett (1991), p.35.
36 The Police Complaints Board commenced operating on 1 June 1977, and there was a 17% increase
in complaints received over the previous year, Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
1977 (Cmnd. 7238), 1978, p.19.
66
Chapter Two: The Rising Popularity of Police Actions
Table IV. gives the total number of complaints recorded annually by the MPS since
1997 to the present, the number of complaints substantiated and the percentage of
recorded complaints substantiated up to and including 1994, the last year for which
figures are available.
Table IV. Total complaints recorded and substantiated for the MPS; 1978-1996/7
Total	 Substantiated	 % substantiated	 Total	 Substantiated	 % substantiated
1977	 8,679	 391	 4.51	 1987 *	 5,236	 105	 2.01
1978	 8,982	 _____ 287	 3.20	 1988	 6,934	 184	 2.65
1979	 8,786	 235	 -	 2.67	 1989	 6,873 -	 103	 1.50
1980	 8,607	 223	 2.60	 1990	 8,457	 172	 - - 2.03
1981	 9,178	 276	 3.00	 1991	 8,513	 184	 2.16
1982	 8,617	 253	 2.94 1 1992	 8,395	 170	 - 2.02
1983	 7,711268	 -	 3.48	 1993	 9,528163	 1.71
1984	 6,594	 285	 4.09	 1994	 9,658	 162	 - 1.68
1985	 5,462	 150	 2.75 1995/6 3 10,128	 n/a	 n/a
1986	 5,093	 141	 .	 2.77 1996/7	 9,919	 n/a -	 n/a
Sources: Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis Annual Reports 1978-1995/6.
Home Office Statistical Bulletins, Police Complaints and Discipline 1991-1994.3
In Table IV. the fact that each year approximately 40% of complaints are withdrawn,
or dispensations from investigation granted, 39 and that since 1985 many complaints
are informally resolved without investigation or a finding, has been ignored. 4° There
are three main reasons for these omissions. The simple practical reason is that the
MPS has not separately recorded withdrawn, informally resolved or substantiated
complaints since 1987. There is a great deal of controversy as to why complaints are
withdrawn with independent research indicating that they are not necessarily invalid
as a consequence of complainants retracting under police pressure, 4 ' or as dispensation
can be granted if a plaintiff decides not to co-operate. 42 Further, although complaints
' Although this study is restricted to MPS statistics the same trends are identifiable in the figures for
England and Wales, see annual Home Office Statistical Bulletins on Police Complaints and Discipline.
Since 1987 the MPS has not recorded substantiated complaints, and figures for 1987 to 1994 have
been extrapolated from the Home Office Research and Statistics Department's listing of two sets of
national figures including and excluding MPS totals until it ceased to do so in its 1995/6 Bulletin
(Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Issue 17/96, Police Complaints and Discipline England and Wales,
April 1995 to March 1996).
Police (Anonymous, Repetitious Etc. Complaints) Regulations 1985, S.I. 1985 No.672 (amended and
renamed Police (Dispensation from Requirement to Investigate Complaints) Regulations 1990, S.I.
1990 No.1301), allow for the dispensation of a complaint investigation on several grounds, including if
anonymous, repetitious, vexatious or complainant cannot be contacted.
° Police (Complaints) (Informal Resolution) Regulations 1985, S.!. 1985/671.
' Russell, K. (1986), Maguire and Corbett, op. cit., Ch.7. See also evidence to 1997 Home Affairs
Select Committee by Police Action Lawyers Group; Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures:
Minutes of Evidence andAppendices (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. II., p.225.
42 R. v. Police Complaints Authority es parte Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary
[1989] C.O.D. 325.
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are only suitable for informal resolution for relatively minor incidents, where neither
criminal or disciplinary offences are alleged, 43
 Harrison and Cragg warn of the
tendency for police officers to encourage complainants to seek informal resolution of
serious allegations of misconduct. 44 Therefore, this study does not assume that
uninvestigated complaints are equivalent to unsubstantiated complaints. From Table
IV. it can be observed that the annual total of substantiated complaints against the
MPS has fallen since 1984 in both real terms and as a proportion of all complaints
made, as illustrated in Graph il.45
WJI .#W. WuuuuuI	 ........ '..••	
. . . .
Home Office Statistical Bulletins, Police Complaints and Discipline 1991-1994.
Regarding causes of complaint, the Home Office introduced new complaint categories
on 1 January 1994 which do not bear direct comparison with previous years, thus
Table V. is restricted to complaints completed in the last three years. The most
common cause of complaint is for assault, followed by incivility and allegations of
failures in duty. Complaints concerning the lawfulness of arrest amount to
approximately 20% of the total number of assault cases, whereas in Table III.'s police
action sample the false imprisonment total was nearly 20% higher than for assault,
and there is no comparable complaint category for the malicious prosecution cause of
action.46
Police (Complaints) (Informal Resolution) Regulations 1985, S.!. 1985/671, reg. 3.(3).
' Harrison and Cragg, op. cit., pp.45-48.
Figure IV. in Chapter Seven, below p.240, reveals the same trend for England and Wales including
the MPS, although peaking in 1982.
See Table III, above p.65.
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Criminal prosecutions
The Commissioner's annual reports have not included figures for the number of
officers prosecuted since 1 979•47 Table VI. gives the numbers of MPS officers
convicted of criminal offences and sentenced to terms of imprisonment, excluding
traffic offences, arising out of complaints and other circumstances.
Table VI. MPS officers convicted of criminal offences (excluding traffic offences).
	1983	 1984	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989
Arising out of a complaint 	 1	 2'	 3	 2	 14	 15 --	 9
Received custodial sentence	 0	 1	 1	 0	 10 -	 2 _____ 6
Other circumstances	 9	 14	 15	 19	 14	 6	 18
Total convictions -	 10	 16	 18	 21	 28	 21	 27
Total custodial sentences 	 I	 - 7	 6	 6	 15	 3	 13
i99oJ 1991/2 1992/3 1993/4 1994/5J1995/6J 199617 1
Aifsing out of a complaint	 12 L	 10	 13	 10	 0J_	 2J	 I
eceived custodial sentence	 8 [
	
4*	 7	 9	 0j	 2J	 I
I Other circumstances 	 0	 8	 7	 5	 5J	 11
Total convictions	 12	 18	 20	 15	 j-	 13J__ 10
Total custodial sentences	 8 L	 - 9t	 12	 6 j	 6
* two officers received suspended sentences.
t one officer received suspended sentence.
Source: Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Annual Reports 1983-1996/7.
The Home Office has published national figures, including the MPS, for officers prosecuted arising
from complaints (excluding traffic) in the last three years: 1994— 11; 1995/6 - 10; 1996/7 - 15; Home
Office Statistical Research Bulletin, Issue 21/97; Police Complaints and Discipline England and
Wales, April 1996 to March 1997, p.15.
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Earlier records show that between 1971 and 1978, roughly coinciding with the time
Sir Robert Mark was Commissioner, 48 135 officers were prosecuted for non traffic
offences and 65 convicted;49 averaging just under 17 prosecutions and eight
convictions annually, with a low of 10 prosecutions and no convictions in 1973 and a
high of 29 prosecutions and 21 convictions in 1977. Figures on criminal prosecutions
and disciplinary findings were not provided at all between 1979 and 1982, while Sir
David McNee was Commissioner, when there was much argument over complaint
investigations and disciplinary methods.5°
Disciplinary proceedings
Turning now to disciplinary proceedings, some preliminary explanations of the
figures in Table VII. are necessary. Police officers who retire or resign before
disciplinary proceedings have concluded cannot be the subject of a finding 5 ' and their
cases are excluded. Two forms of disciplinary action can arise from a complaint.
Firstly, directly from a complaint when a police officer is charged with a disciplinary
offence as alleged by the complainant in terms of the original complaint. Secondly, a
disciplinary charge may be brought as a consequence of a complaint, that is where the
original complaint is not found, but the complaint investigation reveals evidence of a
separate disciplinary offence. As both forms of disciplinary action are dependent on
the initial complaint they are presented together in Table VII.
When there was major public concern with corruption in the Metropolitan Police and after Mark's
reforms of the C.I.D. and complaints, Cox, B. et al(1977); Mark, M. (1977).
This total excludes prosecutions not referred to the DPP, and cases which had not been concluded at
the time of publication of annual reports.
In his 1980 Annual Report McNee remarked 'There are those who, no matter what the system of
investigating complaints, will never be satisfied with the outcome. To them, the independence of the
Director of Public Prosecutions and the Police Complaints Board is not enough.' Report of the
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 1980 (Cmnd. 8254), 1981, p.9.
Cooper v. Wilson [1937] 2 All ER 726.
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Table VII. MPS discipline cases completed (excluding resignationslretirements
when under investigation); 1983-1996/7.
	
1983	 1984	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989
Totaldisciplinaryactions 	 251	 199	 110	 98	 138	 138	 93
Arising from complaints*	 53	 47	 16	 25	 39	 33	 13
Complaints charges proved	 43	 35	 5	 11	 30	 21	 4
Total charaes oroved	 224	 177	 99	 78	 123	 124	 80
* Including charges arising directly from a complaint and as a consequence of a complaint.
Source: Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Annual Reports 1983-1996/7.
The number of officers charged with disciplinary offences arising from complaints is
much less than the number of substantiated complaints shown in Table IV, on average
amounting to only 20%. This is because words of warning or advice are commonly
delivered by senior officers where it is considered a positive complaint finding does
not warrant disciplinary action. Management practices of this type do not require
disciplinary hearings and are not recorded as disciplinary findings, although a
substantiated complaint is recorded. Although the figures are erratic, since 1984 a
similar trend in declining numbers of total disciplinary charges proved, and those
arising out of complaints, can be identified as for substantiated complaints in Table
IV. The total number of disciplinary actions proved in Table VII. corresponds with
the number of officers punished in Table VIII. below. Where appeals to the
Commissioner against disciplinary findings have been determined, findings are
included in the figures, where appeals are outstanding at the end of the recorded year,
the figures have been included in brackets.
Table VIII. MPS officers punished as a result of disciplinary proceedings.
Main punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority (Taking account of variation on appeal)
Punishment	 (appeals	 outstanding in brackets)	 _________
	
1983	 1984	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988 I
Dismissed	 10(1)	 14(0)	 9(3)	 12(2)	 17(6)	 19(2)	 16(6)j
Required to resign	 11(3)	 12(2)	 8(7)	 9(2)	 11(8)	 21(3) _10(10)J
Reduction in rank	 9(1)	 8(3)	 7(1)	 3(0)	 2(2)	 5(1) _6(2)
Reduction in pay
	 17(1)	 14(0)	 4(2)	 6(2)	 13(3)	 6(1) _3(3) j
Fined	 71(4)	 72(2)	 39(1)	 31(1)	 39(0)	 37(2) _25(4)
Reprimanded	 89(0)	 49(0)	 28(0)	 15(0)	 34(0)	 26(0) _15(2)
Cautioned	 17(0)	 8(0)	 4(0)	 2(1)	 7(1)	 10(0)f	 5(0) j
Total	 224(10)	 177(7)	 99(14)	 78(8) 123(20)	 124(9) I_80(J
71
II
1(0) I
	
11
Total87(19) ___________________________________90(19)	 107(20) j 112(20) 	 86(18) I
the Metropolis Annual Reports 1983-1996/7.
Chapter Two: The Rising Popularity of Police Actions
Table VIII. MPS officers punished as a result of disciplinary proc
__________________	 1990 1991/2	 1992/3	 1993/4 1994/5
Dismissed	 15(4)	 13(2)	 17(1)	 18(4)	 5(4)
Required to resign	 16(9)	 9(7)	 17(1)	 16(10')	 10(7)
Reduction in rank	 2(1)
Reduction in pay
	
3(1)
Fined	 31(4)
Reprimanded	 16(0)
Cautioned	 4(0)
Source: Commissioner of Police
1995/6 1996/7
	
11(5)	 12(4)
	
24(12)	 9(7)
	
7(7)	 2(4)
	
7(3)	 0(1)
	
22(6)	 37(6)
	
20(1)	 21(6)
	
5(1)	 8(4)
MPS statistics do not separately record disciplinary punishments arising out of
complaints, thus it is not possible to determine a trend in disciplinary action relative to
complaints. However, the figures in Table VIII. show that despite the fall in the
number of officers disciplined since 1984, there has been no corresponding fall in the
number of officers being removed from the force each year, either by dismissal or
requests to resign. By including the number of officers who resign or retire before
the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings, a total of 479 between 1983 and 1996/7,52
Graph III. shows a constant trend in the number of officers who have left the force as
a direct or indirect result of disciplinary action in contrast to annual fluctuations in the
totals disciplined in Table VII.
Graph Ill. MPS officers who have left the service arising out of disciplinary
rr,,.rlir1rI lOQLlQQW7
Source: Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Annual Reports 1983-199611.
52 Figures excluded from Table V.: 1983 -41; 1984 - 35; 1985 - 38; 1986 - 35; 1987 - 31; 1988 - 41;
1989-46; 1990-20; 1991/2-31:1992/3-21; 1993/4-26:1994/5-20; 1995/6-41; 1996/7-33.
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III.	 The Increase in Police Actions
Five trends can be observed in the statistics - i) increasing police actions, ii) low, and
falling, substantiation of complaints, iii) infrequent convictions of police officers, iv)
few disciplinary findings against officers and v) a stable rate of departures from the
MPS in connection with the discipline procedure. The remainder of this chapter is
devoted to discussion of these trends, concentrating on the recent rise in police
actions, and their implications. It is important to bear in mind that police actions have
not been the subject of academic inquiry in the UK, and have only featured marginally
in US studies in the wake of the assault on Rodney King by Los Angeles Police
Department officers. 53 Therefore, the following discussion relies heavily on
information contained in official documents in suggesting four explanations for this
developing area of law: i) changing public attitudes to the civil and complaint
processes, ii) their procedural differences, iii) their separate functions and iv) the
police conduct which gives rise to police actions.
Changing public attitudes
An ideal starting point for discussion is the proposition that an increasingly litigious
society and citizens greater awareness of their rights are responsible for the rise in
police actions, as first suggested by McNee.54 A difficult subjective argument to
prove or disprove, it is held that equal weight has to be attached to falling public
confidence in the complaint process to explain why complainants resort to litigation.55
The issue of public confidence is central to a complaint process which holds
individual officers to account for citizens' grievances, and thereby serves as an
important mechanism for maintaining the policing by consent ideal. Balanced against
a citizen's right to have a legitimate complaint substantiated, followed by appropriate
sanction against the officer responsible, is the right of the officer complained against
Skolnick, J. and J. Fyfe (1993), Ch.9; Kiockars, K. (1996); Cheh, M. (1996).
See above, p.61; also, Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for 1993/4, MPS,
1994, P.10. Report of H. M Chief Inspector of Constabulary for 1995/6 (H. C. 10), 1996, p.1 15; Bathe
Irving quoted in the Times, 7 April 1995.
Russell, K. (1976), p.8.
73
Chapter Two: The Rising Popularity of Police Actions
to a fair hearing. 56
 This gives rise to possible causes of conflict as recognised by the
Chief Inspector of Constabulary in 1969: 'it is vital to ensure that the problem of
balancing public confidence in the police against the undermining of police morale is
fully recognised by all concerned'. 57
 Nine years later, the first full annual report of the
Police Complaints Board58
 stressed concern for police morale above the need for a
sense of balance:
The case for action against a police officer for breach of a provision
of the discipline code may have to be balanced against
consideration of force morale and the effect of the decision on the
police in general. To bring formal charges against a police officer
may have an inhibiting effect on his colleagues in carrying out their
duties if they see the decision as oppressive or as showing
insufficient regard for the particular difficulties faced by police
officers.59
Public awareness of the complaint process has been determined largely by the 'who
investigates the police' debate which has raged since the 1962 Royal Commission on
the Police, when a minority report by three commissioners recommended the
appointment of a Commissioner of Rights or 'police ombudsman'. 6° No doubt the
PCB's early comments on police morale were made with the intention of pacifying
police opposition to the intrusion of an independent element in the complaint
process.6 ' But, in doing so, early indication was given that external oversight would
not interfere with the complaint process's primary managerial function.62
56 The police complaint process is subject to the same competing crime controlldue process values as
the criminal justice process, Sanders, A. and P. Young (1994), pp.400-415. See discussion of case law
on fairness in disciplinary proceedings, Chapter Six, below p.1 90.
57	 of H M Chief Inspector of Constabulary 1969 (H.C. 308), 1969-1970, p.74.
Established by s.1 of the Police Act 1976, the PCB was the first lay element introduced to the
complaint process.
"Report of the Police Complaints Boardfor the Year 1978 (H.C. 5), 1979, p.14.
60 Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Police (Cmnd. 1728), 1962, Appendix 5, p.193. See
also Marshall, G. (1965), p.81. More recently the government accepted independent investigation of
complaints in Northern Ireland following recommendation for the creation of a police ombudsman by
Dr Maurice Hayes (1997), pp.43-46. The 'who investigates' debate is discussed below under
procedural issues, p.77.
61 Mark, op. cii., Ch.16, and see above fii.50.
62 See below, p.'79, for discussion on the function of the complaint process.
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In 1981 the Policy Studies Institute's Police and People in London, commissioned by
the MPS to survey Londoners attitudes found general support for existing complaint
practices, albeit with qualification:
Ninety per cent of Londoners say that if they were seriously
dissatisfied about something a police officer had done or failed to
do, they would make a complaint about it; in the great majority of
cases they say they would complain to the police. This suggests
that, among Londoners generally, there is a high level of
confidence in the present complaints system, although in the vast
majority of cases this will not be based on a detailed knowledge of
it, still less on experience of using it. Groups which have more
experience of the police than average, and those which are more
critical than average of police misconduct, are less likely than
average to say they would complain about police misconduct.63
In their research on ethnic minorities and the police Tuck and Southgate confirmed
that persons who have above average contact with the police are dissatisfied with the
complaint process and found a tendency for inner city residents not to complain,
despite wishing to do so.M Lord Scarman in his study of the inner city disturbances of
1981 concluded that 'there is a lack of public confidence in the existing system of
considering complaints against the police'. 65 As Scarman's inquiry focussed on the
policing of inner city areas it can be safely assumed that the above comment referred
to attitudes within those communities. Thus, in 1981 research evidence suggested
general support for the police complaint process although with significantly
disaffected communities. By the late 1980s there is evidence that public support had
deteriorated based on British Crime Survey findings in their regular nationwide
survey of a sample of households. The BCS has consistently found in its 1988, 1992
and 1994 surveys that approximately 20% of persons interviewed had been 'really
annoyed' with the police in the previous five years, but only 2% made a formal
complaint. 66 Whereas the PSI concluded there was a high level of confidence with
the complaint process among Londoners, the BCS surveys suggest that it was during
the mid-1980s that public confidence in the police complaint process was lost and that
subsequent efforts to regain public support have failed. The PCA has been at the heart
63 Smith, D. J. and J. Gray (1983), p.292.
Tuck, M. and P. Southgate (1981).
65 Report on the Brixton Disorders of 10-12 April1981 (Cmnd. 8427), 1981, para. 8.61.
Bucke, 1. (1995), p.4, 'For most people, making a complaint was unlikely to lead to the feeling that
the matter had been adequately resolved.'
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of attempts to restore public confidence in the complaint process and has emphasised
procedural differences with the civil process to explain the popularity of police
actions.67 The PCA's general surveys of public attitudes have confirmed low public
esteem for the complaint process. Its 1996 survey found that 39% of respondents did
not believe the PCA to be independent (down from 50% in 1992), only 37% thought it
impartial (down from 45% in 1995) and 37% also supported the police investigating
themselves (the lowest recorded being 34% in 1995).68
Research evidence indicating that public confidence in the complaints process
declined during the mid to late 1 980s coincides with the statistical evidence of a
falling substantiation rate of recorded complaints. 69 The Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure reflected this deteriorating position in its 1993 Report by
commenting:
We doubt whether the existing arrangements for police discipline
do now command general public confidence. They are seen as
ineffective in that they appear to be both lengthy and uncertain and
frequently result, when they lead to a finding against the officer
concerned, in the imposition of penalties less than the offence
would seem to require.7°
Nearly five years later, the first Home Affairs Select Committee under the new
Labour Government, after considering police complaint and action statistics, 7 ' stated
with greater force:
We conclude that there is a great deal of justified dissatisfaction
with elements of the disciplinary and complaints systems.
Improvements to the procedures are necessary if the system is to
succeed in dealing with, and if necessary removing, officers who
are corrupt or guilty of misconduct and if the public is to have full
confidence both in the system and in the police as a whole.72
67 See below fn.92.
68	 Report of the Police Complaints Authority 1995/6, (H.C. 469) 1996, p.48.
69 See Table IV. and Graph II., above pp.67 and 68, respectively. For the national trend see Figure IV.,
Chapter Seven, below p.240.
70 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Cmnd. 2263), 1993, p.48.
Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I., pp.x-xVi.
72 Jbid pp.xvi-xvii.
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Action and complaint procedural differences
There is general agreement that procedural differences between police actions and
complaints culminating in disciplinary proceedings, which benefit plaintiffs and are
disadvantageous to complainants, are responsible for the increase in police actions.73
The essential differences are outlined in Figure II.
Figure II. Procedural differences between police actions and complaints/discipline
-	
Police actions	 Complaints/discipline
Standard of proof required	 Balance of probabilities 	 Beyond reasonable doubt
Control of process	 Plaintiff	 Police
Financial assistance	 Legal aid	 -	 None
Adjudication forum	 Civil court	 Police tribunal
Adjudication	 Judge and/or jury	 Chief officer of police
Appeal process	 By either party to appellate 	 By officer ultimately to Home
courts on points of law	 Secretary in serious cases
Presented in this format police actions look most attractive compared to the complaint
process - a lesser burden of proof is required to establish wrongdoing, the victim has
greater control, financial assistance is available for plaintiffs on income support and
low incomes and adjudication is both independent and public. However, there are
inherent problems with engaging in a comparative study of this kind which can result
in misleading conclusions. Procedural questions have always figured prominently in
debate on police wrongdoing, and prior to the emergence of police actions as an
alternative remedy to complaints, argument raged over who should have responsibility
for complaint investigation and adjudication. 74 The 'who investigates the police?'
question has been presented as the modern expression of the Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes? conundrum, which has dominated parliamentary debate75 and has an
international profile. 76 Independent supervision of complaint investigations under the
auspices of the PCA77 can be described as a compromise between police and
independent investigation, and the 'who investigates' issue is no longer so keenly
Clayton and Tomlinson, op. cit., p.61; Harrison and Cragg, op. cit., pp.11-12; Cheh, op. cit., p.248;
Reiner, R. (1997), p.1025.
' A debate conducted largely in the absence of consideration of criminal sanction as a means of
controlling police wrongdoing.
Hewitt, P. (1982); Cohen, B. (1985).
76 Goldsmith, A. (1991); Bayley, D. (1996).
S.70 of PACE.
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argued although it remains unresolved. 78
 Yet, procedural questions have continued to
dominate debate on police wrongdoing with the present emphasis on the different
standards of proof required in civil and complaint proceedings. 79
 Problems arising
from the availability of two forms of redress have always taxed the PCA, and its
predecessor the PCB,8° with mention first made of the different standards of proof in
its 1980-1983 Triennial Review.8' However, at that time police actions were
relatively few, and the interested parties were preoccupied with calls for independent
investigation of complaints which had received an authoritative fillip in the Scarman
Report.82
The PCA initially tried to live with police actions, with its first Chairman, Sir Cecil
Clothier, urging that access to the civil courts for victims of police wrongdoing was
indicative of a legal system which both protected police officers rights and citizens
liberties. 83 The PCA's first intervention on the different standards of proof was not in
connection with police actions, however, but as part of a proposal to introduce a 'two
tier' disciplinary system which distinguishes between disciplinary charges, arising
from public complaints and internal police affairs, depending on the seriousness of the
allegation. According to the PCA, 'The standard of proof is, in our experience,
unnecessarily high resulting in the disciplinary process beginning to fall into
disrepute.' More recently, the PCA has supported its call for the introduction of a
two tier system with the civil standard of proof for lesser complaints so as to establish
a 'level playing field' with police actions. 85 On this point, their argument can be
shown to be seriously flawed on the basis of the statistical evidence that the vast
majority of police actions involve allegations of assault, false imprisonment and
78 GelIer, W. and H. loch (1996); Sanders, A. (1993), p.107; Sanders and Young, op. cit., pp.413-415.
As indication of movement away from the 'who investigates' question, PCA Chairman Peter
Moorhouse stated in evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee - 'public confidence will not be
achieved until the investigation, whoever carries it out, is made more open to the complainant and the
public.' Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures: Minutes of Evidence and Appendices (H.C.
258), 1997, vol. II., p.54
'9 Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I., pp.xxxvi-xli.
° See discussion on public interest immunity in Chapter Six, below p.197.
SI Police Complaints Board Second Triennial Review Report: 1983 (Cmnd. 8853), 1983, p.9.
82 RepOrt on the Brixton Disorders of 10-12 April 1981 (Cmnd. 8427), 1981.
Annual Report of the Police Complaints Authority 1985 (H.C. 307), 1986, p.6.
Police Complaints Authority Triennial Review 1988-1991 (H.C. 352), 1991, p.1 7.
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malicious prosecution86 which would continue to be detennined according to the
higher standard. In evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee87
 the PCA
changed its position to support for the introduction of the civil standard for all
complaints, in recognition that Hornal v. Neuberger provides a sliding scale of
probability depending on the seriousness of the allegation against the defendant.88
It can be observed that in the few cases where criminal prosecutions follow complaint
investigations, some of the procedural differences outlined above disappear. Police
retain control of the complaint investigation, but the victim does not have
responsibility for prosecution, which is with the DPP, and concerns with the
availability of financial assistance and openness are also removed. In a rare
discussion on legal proceedings against police officers in the United States, Cheh
argues that there has been a failure to exploit the potential of criminal law as a means
of controlling unlawful police behaviour, primarily because it is considered an
inappropriate instrument for solving social problems. 89 Where police wrongdoing has
been subjected to substantive legal analysis, it has been proposed that the absence of
mens rea leaves the offender immune from criminal punishment, although the victim
is entitled to compensation by civil proceedings.9°
Different functions
This study, while accepting that complaint and disciplinary findings have some
influence on complainants who elect to sue, challenges the assumptions that plaintiffs
commence proceedings because they do not like police methods of investigating
complaints. Likewise, it is questioned whether the ailing complaint process can be
cured solely by further procedural changes, as proposed by the PCA and the
85 Annual Report of the Police Complaints Authority I January1994 - 31 March 1995 (F1.C. 530),
1995, p.8.
84.75% of the sample in Table III, see above p.65.
Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures: Minutes of Evidence and Appendices (H.C. 258),
1997, vol. II., p.213.
88 [1957] 1 Q.B. 247.
89 Cheh, op. cit. argues that civil law can serve to introduce reform and she goes further than most in
outlining the potential for both criminal and civil proceedings, but she also embraces the dominant
view that police wrongdoing is an administrative issue, and better suited to sociological than legal
analysis.
9° Smith, J. C. (1994); Baker, S. and J. English (1995), p.58; Cheh, op. cit., p.252.
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Metropolitan Police Commissioner. 91 It is argued that the essential question is not
who, or how complaints are investigated, but what is the primary function of the
complaint process? Is it to satisfy the needs of the complainant by providing redress,
or is it a management tool to remove the proverbial rotten apple, and the only role of
the complainant is to assist with the identification of the recalcitrant officer?92
Likewise, what is the principal function of police actions and what are plaintiffs'
concerns?
In its deliberations on the police complaint process the 1962 Royal Commission on
the Police remarked:
Our impression is that the Police (Discipline) Regulations, and the
procedure they embody, are soundly conceived; but it is evident
that the regulations have been drafted primarily from the point of
view of police discipline, and only incidentally as a means of
dealing with complaints against the police by members of the
public.93
As already mentioned the introduction of the PCB, and its replacement by the PCA,
did not change the basic status of the complaint process as an adjunct of the
disciplinary process, 94 which, it is envisaged, will continue to perform a management
function. In their guide to the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, Baker and
English point out that the ideas underlying modern political thinking on the police are
to strengthen the managerial responsibilities of senior officers. 95 Drawing on
government statements in publications and parliamentary debates they argue that there
are moves to 'make disciplinary matters more a question of managerial decision',96
'make it easier for police managers to respond to minor complaints quickly and
91 Guardian 5 December 1997; Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures: Minutes of Evidence
andAppendices (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. II., pp.' 17-128.
Although the complaint process operates to reassure the public that their grievances are considered, it
is not held that complaint and disciplinary processes are merely presentational. The PCA clearly has a
public relations role, and has been used by police services in this capacity, particularly when asked to
approve police conduct after incidents not the subject of complaints have been referred for supervision
under s.71 of the Police Act 1996, Maguire and Corbett, op. cit., p.12l. But the PCA also has an
advisory role to both police and government.
Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Police (Cmnd. 1728), 1962, p.129.
Reiner, R. (1991), p.298; Sanders, A. (1993), p.101.
Baker and English, op. cit.; see also Reiner, R. (1993). The same point is forcefully made and serves
as a guiding principle in the Home Affairs Select Committee's first report Police Disciplinary and
Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I.
Baker and English, op. cit., p.58.
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effectively' 97 and 'free police managers to deal with the failures of officers more
flexibly' 98
MPS complaint and disciplinary statistics support the view that complaints do not so
much serve to initiate disciplinary action but operate as a filter between the public and
police management. On average only 20% of proved complaints culminate in
disciplinary proceedings, totalling 20%-30% of all disciplinary charges.'°° On closer
examination it can be seen that figures for disciplinary awards arising from complaints
have been consistently lower than for internally generated charges, falling to 14%-
20% of charges proved.' 0 ' Explanations for these outcomes have been attributed to, i)
the low visibility of police work and paucity of independent witnesses to police
wrongdoing,'°2 ii) evidential problems with complainants less credible witnesses than
police officers,'° 3 iii) code of silence among officers'° 4 and iv) neutralisation of
complaint by arrest and charge of complainant.' 05 Despite the decline in substantiated
complaints,' 06 the numbers of officers who have departed the force in connection with
disciplinary proceedings have remained remarkably constant, whether by dismissals,
requests to resign or voluntarily to preempt a disciplinary finding.' 07 The absence of
separate MPS records of disciplinary for substantiated complaints
prevents assessment of changes in disciplinary practices, however, there is a case for
arguing that, regardless of complaint findings, police managers find ways of ridding
the force of unwanted officers by resorting to internal disciplinary charges. As
explained by a complaint investigation officer:
As a result of an investigation where we have an allegation from a
victim and have to say 'I'm sorry but there is insufficient
Ibid., p.'77.
Ibid., p.79.
See Tables IV. and VII, above pp.67 and 71, respectively.
Excepting 1985 (14.55%) and 1989 (13.98), see Table VII, above p.71.
101 Again excepting 1985 (5.05%) and 1989(5%) see Table VII, above p.71.
102 Maguire and Corbett, op. cit., p.117-8; McConville, M. et a! (1991), Reiner, R. (1993), p.13;
Sanders, op. cit., p.87; Reiner, R. and L. Leigh (1994), p.'76, Maguire, M. and C. Norris (1994).
'° Box, S. and K. Russell (1975); Maguire and Corbett, op. cit., p.112; Reiner, op. cit., p.13
104 Walker, M. (1986); Maguire and Corbett, op. cit., p.71; Sanders and Young, op. cit., pp.407-S.
105 Russell, K. (1986); Maguire and Corbett, op. cit., p.152; and see below p.64 for discussion on false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution.
106 See Table IV., above p.67.
107 See Graph III., above p.72.
'° See Table VIII., above p.72.
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evidence,' we have serious concerns... We have an individual
undoubtedly involved who I cannot get through the criminal
process, so I go about attacking him through the disciplinary
process by presenting a different set of facts, looking at expense
claims, for example... As investigating officer I feel duty bound to
examine all possible options to rid the organisation of someone
who is demonstrably wrongdoing.'°9
Further, on this point, the two tier disciplinary system recommended by the PCA has
far greater significance for senior officers' powers than for equalisation of police
action and complaint procedures."°
Finally, on complaints management function, the Court of Appeal's judgment in R. v.
Edwards' that an officer may be cross examined on his/her disciplinary record when
giving evidence in legal proceedings, introduces a disincentive for police managers to
discipline officers. The 1993 PCA annual report comments on Edwards:
The effect .. may be to dissuade chief officers from recommending
disciplinary action against officers in cases where disciosable
findings of guilt might prejudice their future value to the force."2
It is suggested that in this age of financial accounting and strict budgeting a police
manager is going to have one eye on the cost efficiency of complaints, and a trained
police officer is one of his most expensive resources." 3 Maguire and Corbett found
that the majority of officers complained against were constables of 7-9 years service,
and that the chance of being complained against doubled after two years service and
declined rapidly after 16.I14 Thus officers complained against are experienced, well
109 Interview with a complaint investigation officer. Reiner, R. (1991), p.298, records a chief officer
declaring that 19 out of 22 officers he had dismissed in three and a half years were following internally
generated disciplinary charges. Magu ire and Corbett, op. cit., interviewed 19 CIOs and concluded at
p.73 'if it was believed that an officer had behaved unprofessionally but this could not be proved,
'quiet words' could be had with the senior officer in his division and transfers or changes of duty might
result... Of course, the complainant would be unlikely to learn of such consequences.'
110 Baker and English, op. cit., p.79, argue the redrafting of disciplinary regulations follows the PCA's
recommendations for a two tier system. Home Office press release, 2 17/96, issued on 11 July 1996 to
give notice of the introduction of new police disciplinary procedures, which were not introduced,
confirm this view with the criminal standard of proof's replacement with a test of 'reasonableness' on a
sliding scale according to seriousness of allegation. See also Police Disciplinary and Complaints
Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I., pp.xxxvii-xli.
1 (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 48, see discussion in Chapter Six on evidence relevant to police officers
credit, below p.204.
112 Annual Report of the Police Complaint Authority 1993 (H. C. 305), 1994, p.30. Similar concerns
were expressed in a letter by the Deputy Chairman of the PCA to Harrison and Cragg, op. cit., p.77.
113 In 1992 the MPS costed a constable at a daily rate off 156, Guardian, 9 September 1992.
" Maguire and Corbett, op. cit., p.41.
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trained and motivated, and a factor which may play a part in reaching a disciplinary
finding against such an officer is the replacement cost."5
With regard to the function of police actions and plaintiffs attitudes, very little has
been published on the subject with the exception of occasional press reports. The
general function of civil proceedings is to satisfy the plaintiff's claim for damages and
establish legal authority, thus police actions serve to financially compensate victims of
police wrongdoing and clarify police powers. 116 Liability in civil law for police
officers is fundamental to their constitutional position under the principle of police
accountability to the law." 7 From the point of view of the citizen, police actions are
available as a private law remedy for infringements of constitutional rights, but, as
Clayton and Tomlinson point out, 'The civil law is a blunt and imperfect instrument
for exercising day-to-day control over police misconduct." 8 This is because police
actions do not punish individual police officers for their conduct, which can only be
achieved by criminal or disciplinary prosecution, preceded by complaint
investigations in the type of case considered here. Despite the legal status of police
actions, police sources, including the PCA, have focussed on their financial aspect
when defining their purpose. The PCA has routinely referred to the different
functions of police actions and complaints in its annual reports:"9
Civil action is intended to secure compensation for the plaintiff
whereas the aim of a complaint investigation is to determine
whether a police officer should face disciplinary charges.'2°
The Metropolitan Commissioner has not been as considered in his comments to the
media on police actions when seeking to defend the credibility of the MPS in response
to public criticism arising from the rising costs of police actions:
The conflict between a chief officer's administrative and disciplinary responsibilities was
recognised in R. v. Chief Constable of the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary parte Hay [1996] 2
All E.R.711; 'the charging and judicial functions need to be kept separate not only from one another,
but from the administrative function of the chief constable as the head of his force.' at 733 per Sedley
J., a ruling which might interfere with a chief officer's discretion to allocate the limited resources
available to him, R. v. Chief Constable of Surrey exparte ITF [1997] 2 All E.R. 65, at 81 per Kennedy
L.J.
116 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (Cmnd. 8091), 1981, p.44.
' See discussion in Chapter One, p.36, on the constitutional position of the police.
Clayton and Tomlinson, op. cit., p.15.
119 See above p.78.
120 Police Complaints Authority - The First Ten Years (no H.C. ref.), 1995, p.7.
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What we have is cases five, or six or seven years old, some of
which had very little significance at the time. There were no
complaints against the police, no action... These are old cases,
exploiting the different burden of proof between civil and criminal
cases. They were minor incidents which have been speculatively
given a run on legal aid. In some cases the police have been seen
as a soft touch.'2'
False imprisonment and malicious prosecution
It is suggested that complainants' greater knowledge of their rights as mentioned at
the outset of this discussion has developed partially as a consequence of their need to
seek legal representation following arrest and charge. In the past, the PCA has
referred to complainants 'ulterior motives' in these circumstances,' 22 or to 'tactical
complaints' 123 implying that attempts are made to use the complaint process to
discredit officers for the purpose of obtaining an acquittal,' 24 while police sources
prefer the term 'malicious complaints'.' 25 The PCA's attitude is in contrast to early
PCB comments when it was stated that, although allegations of violence were the
largest category of complaint, 'the Board have from time to time been concerned by
complaints of arrest without good and sufficient cause, or detention in police cells."26
Returning to the issue three years later, a major reason for the relatively few false
arrest complaints was ascribed to the fact that 'the public are generally ignorant of the
criminal law and of the powers of the police'.' 27 Examination of recent MPS
121 See above p.60, Sir Paul Condon quoted in the Times, 7 May 1996. The suggestion that the MPS is
viewed as a 'soft touch' was advanced by Sir Paul at the media launch of his 1994/5 annual report,
reported in the Independent, 2 August 1994, see below p.90; and by a barrister at a conference for
police officers and lawyers on police actions reported in the Times, 7 April 1995.
' 22 Report of the Police Complaints Authority 1991 (no H.C. ref.), 1992, p.11.
n Report of the Police Complaints Authority 1992, (H.C. 611), 1993, p.23.
124 It is, perhaps, indication of a more independent stance by the PCA that reference was made to 'sub
judice complaints' in its 1996/7 annual report, Annual Report of the Police Complaints Authority
1996/97 (H.C. 95), 1997, p.47.
125 Guardian, 7 October 1997, in a speech to members of the Metropolitan Police Federation Sir Paul
Condon called for criminalisation of malicious and false complaints as well as calling for an increase in
his powers as disciplinary authority. Rose, D. (1996), p.293, referred to former PCA member, Jeff
Crawford's scepticism of claims that malicious complaints are commonplace. The Home Affairs
Select Committee found that malicious complaints were not a significant cause of injustice and
recommended against codification of an offence of 'making a false complaint', Police Disciplinary and
Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I., p.xlii.
' 26 Police Complaints Board Triennial Review Report 1980 (Cmnd. 7966), 1980, p.14.
127 Police Complaints Board Second Triennial Review Report 1983 (Cmnd. 8853), 1983, p.14. It is
held that these observations hold true despite the PCB's revision of its position after judgment on
reasonable suspicion as grounds for arrest in Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke [19841 1 AC. 437, Police
Complaints Board Final Review Report 1977-1985 (Cmnd. 9584), 1985, p.17.
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complaint categories shows the same situation persists today with 2,542, 2,853 and
2,621 assault complaints recorded in the last three years and 567, 653 and 724 for
false arrest.' 28 This is in direct contrast to the finding that the main cause of action for
the 177 plaintiffs who sued the police in this study's sample was false
imprisonment.'29
Police use of physical force has been subjected to close scrutiny by social scientists
who have provided several situational explanations for police violence. Police
officers who believe their authority is threatened resort to physical force as a means of
establishing their control over a situation.' 3° Officers' perceptions of themselves as
public servants, and of their duties, are that people expect them to use force and when
they do so, officers believe it is for the benefit of society) 3 ' Officers cynicism of the
criminal justice process can lead to their assaulting suspects as a form of summary
punishment in the expectation that they will escape prosecution or be leniently dealt
with by the courts. 132 Police officers regular contacts, and close identification with the
victims of crime, and their abhorrence of criminals, can similarly lead to police
violence.' 33 Finally, police officers resort to unethical and illegal means to justify
morally good ends,' 34 including recourse to the 'third degree' in order to gain
confessions where they believe suspects rights interfere with their law enforcement
duties.' 35 These explanations can be summarised under the general proposition that
police officers resort to the illegal exercise of physical force in order to punish, either
directly in the form of 'summary punishment', or indirectly, by acquiring sufficient
evidence to gain a conviction, and that the general public is amenable to a loosely
defined level of police violence. However, the level of violence acceptable to a public
broadly sympathetic to the police is not predetermined and public awareness of the
problem has increased significantly in the last 30 years. Young makes this point
succinctly when writing of an incident early in his police career:
128 See Table V., above p.69.
129 See Table III., above p.65.
'° Banton, M. (1965), p170; Westley, W. (1970).
'' Banton, op. cit.; Westley, op. cit.; Bittner, E. (1975), p38.
132 Banton op. cit., piTh; Holdaway, S. (1983), p.129; Young, M. (1991), p.306; Skolnick, J. and J.
Fyfe (1993), Ch. 2
Holdaway, op. cit.
Kiockars, K. (1980).
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I clearly recall that an outbreak of drunken violence in the 1950s
was resolved by putting out the police rugby teams in two vans to
give the culprits a chance to fight with 'real men'. Peace reigned
within a week or two, but few arrests were made and no report or
record of the event was published, even though some punishment
was handed out. The Police Complaints system of course prevents
such action now, and indeed it is hard to accept it happened so
recently!'36
Young clearly considers that tighter complaint procedures introduced during the last
30 years have had an impact on police violence. Arrest and detention, however, have
not been subjected to the same detailed analytical treatment as police use of force and
are more commonly regarded as the first steps in the criminal justice process, albeit on
the police's terms and in a hostile environment for suspects.' 37 However, arrest and
detention can also serve as forms of arbitrary or summary punishment.'38
Powerlessness in the face of overbearing officialdom can have a greater punitive
effect than the momentary pain suffered from a physical blow' and, whereas it may
be painfully obvious to a person who has suffered an assault, illegal incarceration is
not always so apparent to the lay person.'4°
Another important sociological definition applied to police work is its 'low visibility'
and the difficulties this presents for regulation.' 4 ' The inherent danger in imposing
strict controls on behaviour which is mainly unsupervised and involves interaction
with persons with whom there is a credibility imbalance is that the opportunity exists
for police work to be pushed completely underground and hidden.' 42 It is suggested
that this is exactly what has happened in the last 30 years since the codification and
enforcement of the police complaint process under s.49 of the Police Act 1964. Police
officers have sought to hide their unlawfulness, not by failing to record incidents, but
by justification of their conduct, as indicated by the high incidence of false
' Holdaway op. cit., p.124; Skolnick and Fyfe, op. cit., p.56.
136 Young, op. cit., p.306.
137 McConville, M. eta/(1991), Ch. 3.
138 Bittner, op. cit., p.1 10; Dixon, D. (1995), pp.157-158.
McConville et at, op. cit., p.47, 'Four hours may not seem long to an outside observer, but to a
suspect in a cell it can be torture.'
'° As noted by the PCB, see above p.84.
141 See above fn.102.
142 Sanders, A. (1993), p.104.
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imprisonment and malicious prosecution causes of action.' 43
 It is suggested that
police officers who have committed acts of unlawful violence sidestep the police
complaints process by arresting and charging their victims with criminal offences.'
In addition to various criminal violence and public order charges, the most suitable
charges which legitimise the exercise of force are - assaulting a police officer in the
execution of his duty,' 45 obstructing an officer in the execution of his duty,' 46 and the
use of threatening words or
For the police officer the immediate benefits of charging their victim are, firstly,
justification for the exercise of physical force; secondly, any injuries suffered by the
victim are explained as arising from the use of lawful violence; thirdly, the finger of
suspicion points away from the police officer to the victim; and fourthly, in the event
of the victim making a complaint it will be held sub judice and not investigated until
completion of criminal proceedings. In the longer term, the passage of time and the
devotion of police resources to proving the charge against the victim, and therefore
the discarding of evidence liable to show wrongdoing by the officer, will protect him
from the probabilities of a complaints finding and disciplinary charge.' 48 Whereas in
Young's example, 'few arrests were made and no report or record of the event was
published,' victims of police violence regularly find themselves facing criminal
proceedings today. This predicament requires the victim to appear as a defendant in a
criminal court against a police officer who is the apparent victim of a crime, with
credit worthiness conforming to his status as a professional, objective and independent
law enforcement officer. This situation directly influences how the defence is
constructed, and solicitors experienced in police crime cases have had to acquire
specialist skills including detailed knowledge of police powers under PACE and the
mechanics of the complaints process.' 49 It is when preparing their criminal defence
cases that the victims of police misconduct learn of the pitfalls of the complaints
procedure and receive legal advice on civil proceedings as an alternative means of
See Table III., above p.65.
' Russell, K. (1986), see above p.81.
' S.89(1) of the Police Act 1996
' Ibid., s.89(2).
' S.4 of the Public Order Act 1986.
148 By a process of case construction, McConville et a!, op. cit.; Sanders and Young, op. cit.
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redress. It is arguable that if criminal proceedings were not initiated, victims of police
crimes would either take the matter no further, in keeping with the BCS finding,' 50 or
make a complaint.
For allegations of unlawful arrest,' 5 ' independently of assault, the situation is
different. The argument advanced above in relation to low visibility policing does not
apply because low visibility policing consists primarily of actions which stop short of
arrest.' 52 Stops and searches are a grey area although considered low visibility
because of non-recording where a suspect is stopped and not searched, or consents to
a search, in spite of a statutory requirement for completion of a search record.' 53 Once
a citizen has been arrested he is in police custody and the arresting officer has to
escort him to a police station as soon as practicable.' 54 At the police station the
custody officer's duties include the recording of details regarding detention on the
custody record, and the decision to charge and with what offence.' 55 Thus PACE's
safeguards for suspects in the form of record keeping take effect in the police station,
and an officer not directly concerned with the arrest incident decides whether charges
are to be brought. Although arrest removes police practice from the field of low
visibility street operations, the same principle applies as for assault cases if the power
of arrest and subsequent detention has been exercised in order to administer 'summary
punishment." 56 Having taken the step of arresting an innocent person, it is most
probable that by providing the custody officer with a false account of the incident, or
by concocting a fabricated account in collusion with the custody officer, 157 the
consequent initiation of criminal proceedings will provide the arresting officer with
substantial protection from disciplinary action. Police powers of arrest are complex,
See Chapter Three, below p.106.
150 See above p.75.
' Although there is a complaint category for unlawful or unnecessary arrest, it is not a tort, the tort
lies in the consequence of the unlawful arrest which is actionable, the false imprisonment of the
plaintiff.
152 Lustgarten, L. (1986), p.12.
' S.3 of PACE. McConville eta!, op. cit., p.16; Dixon, D. (1995), p.152.
154 s.30(1) of PACE.
Ibid., s.37.
156 Where this is the intention of an officer, a police crime has been committed, however, not all false
imprisonment torts constitute police crime on the grounds that the officer believed s/he was acting
lawfully.
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s.24 of PACE restricts police powers of arrest without warrant to arrestable offences, a
limitation qualified by s.25 which allows arrest for non-arrestable offences under
general arrest conditions. A suspect may be charged, convicted and imprisoned for up
to six months for assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty, for example,
and still have an action for false imprisonment because it is a non-arrestable offence.
False imprisonment is very much the domain of lawyers, and victims of police
wrongdoing are unlikely to be aware of the prospect of an action. Thus, in cases of
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, the aggrieved citizen is effectively
denied recourse to the complaint process because of procedural imbalances which
favour the wrongdoer, who has caused the victim to be prosecuted for that precise
reason. And then, the victim's need for a lawyer can alert him to the alternative legal
remedy of a police action.
IV.	 Implications
The main concern here has been to explain the increase in police actions as the first
stage in a study which aims to pinpoint the problem of police wrongdoing and its
control. Five propositions emerge from the debate thus far. Firstly, declining public
confidence in the police complaint process coincided with falling complaint and
disciplinary findings in the mid to late 1980s. Secondly, by the early 1990s
complainants were increasingly turning to the courts as plaintiffs took advantage of
procedural differences between the complaint and civil processes. Thirdly, whereas
the management function of the discipline process can discourage potential
complainants, a major attraction of the civil process is its compensatory function.
Fourthly, a major influence on the increase in police actions is the police practice of
arresting and charging victims of their wrongdoing who then seek legal advice on
what forms of redress are available. Finally, consideration of criminal proceedings as
an alternative means of controlling police wrongdoing has been effectively
marginalised while debate has concentrated on the alternative remedies of police
157 McConville et a!, op. cit., pp.42-44, found that custody officers normally support arresting officers
in their actions.
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complaints and actions. In summary, it is suggested that official inaction on police
wrongdoing in the courts and disciplinary tribunals has caused complainants to seek
their own remedies in the civil courts.
One significant statistical trend identified above remains unaccounted for, the
meteoric rise in the financial value of police torts. One explanation offered here for
the spate of six figure awards in 1996 is that the Metropolitan Police Commissioner
abandoned a sound administrative policy of settlement' 58 in favour of a high risk
political strategy in the courts. If the Commissioner was right, high public regard for
the police would dismiss plaintiffs attempts to secure financial compensation and
deter would be complainants in the future.
At the news conference to launch his 1993/4 report, Sir Paul Condon was quoted to be
considering a change of policy:
One of the things that we fear is that more and more people are
tactically suing the police, and the Metropolitan Police is being
seen as a soft target. The notion is that we will settle rather than
challenge, and we are looking at the public interest dimension of
that.'59
The MPS do not record the number of cases defended, however, Home Office figures
given in a parliamentary written answer suggests a policy change was effected with 34
and 50 actions heard in 1994 and 1995 respectively, compared to 14 in 1993.160 MPS
statistics showing an increase in awards from 7 in 1993/4 to 12, 30 and 36 in 1994/5,
1995/6 and 1996/7 respectively, appear to confirm that more police actions were taken
to trial after 1993/4.161 Referring again to Home Office figures, the Commissioner
The MPS settles the great majority of police actions out of court, see above Tables II. and III., pp.63
and 65, respectively.
' 59 lndependent, 2 August 1994.
160 Outcome of police actions against the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 1991-1995.
	
Settled out of	 Court	 Successfully	 Damages
	
court	 hearings	 defended	 awarded
1991	 74	 16	 7	 9
1992	 85	 21	 10	 11
1993	 140	 14	 8	 6
1994	 174	 34	 23	 11
1995	 140	 50	 28	 22
Source: H.C. Written Answers, 9 July 1996, col. 140.
161 See above Table II, p.63.
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enjoyed some early success as he defended 67.7% (23 out of 34) cases heard in
1994.162 However, his good fortune was short lived as the defence rate slipped to 56%
(28 out of 50) in 1995,163 and record payouts followed in 1995/6 and 1996/7.1M Thus,
it would seem that the Commissioner's high risk trial strategy back fired.
In the political arena the police services have steadfastly defended themselves against
widespread criticism following the catalogue of miscarriages of justices and in the
wake of the West Midland Serious Crime Squad and Stoke Newington debacles.'65
The police have successfully argued that any assessment of police performance has to
be considered on balance in the face of rising crime and strict financial restrictions on
the one hand; and, the many daily contacts with members of the public executed to
high professional standards, which give rise to a relatively small number of
complaints, on the other.'66 Generalisations supported by statistical and research
evidence may dominate political debate, but they are of limited value in forums with
responsibility for determining precisely what happened in specific situations.'67
Powers to punish, deter and mark disapproval of unconstitutional, arbitrary or
oppressive conduct by government servants through awards of exemplary damages'68
empowers civil courts to give full consideration of the defendant's conduct right up to
the liability verdict.' 69 Thus juries, and judges sitting on their own, who reject police
witnesses' credibility when finding chief officers liable for their officers torts, are
entitled, when determining quantum, to take into account falsehoods and the manner
in which officers give their evidence, the absence of any apology by their chief officer
162 Ibid
'631b,d
'TMlbid.
165 The West Midlands Serious Crime Squad was disbanded in August 1989, and the Stoke Newington
drug squad was effectively disbanded in January 1992 with the transfer of eight officers, Guardian 31
January 1992. See discussion in Chapter Six, below p.204, on evidence relevant to police officers
credit.
' There were 841,799 noticeable criminal offences recorded by the MPS in the Metropolitan Police
District in 1996/7, 117,258 arrests and 13,088 incidents per 100 police officers amounting to over 3.5
million for the service. 9,913 complaints were recorded and a total of 1,378 police actions commenced
or threatened in the same year. The actions will not necessarily have been brought as a consequence of
incidents reported in the same year, because of the time taken to commence proceedings, but it does
indicate that very few police/public contacts culminate in civil proceedings. Figures from Appendices
to the Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 1996/7.
167 See below, Appendix 5.
168 Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129, at 1228 per Lord Devlin; see Chapter Six, below p.219.
169 Marks v. Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police (1991) Independent, 21 January.
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and any perceived failings in disciplinary procedure. It is suggested that this is
precisely what happened in the spring and summer months of 1996.'° The strength of
the actions heard at Central London County Court was such that juries exercised their
democratic right to award high exemplary damages. A measure of the effectiveness of
their quantum verdicts was they forced the Commissioner to seek a ruling from the
Court of Appeal to limit jury awards. And, they may have played a part in prompting
the Commissioner to attempt to break the impasse reached in negotiations to introduce
new disciplinary regulations.'71
Despite the extensive publicity the record awards attracted, the position remains that
the popularity of police actions and their material impact on the police has relatively
minor significance in practice. With regard to expense, the record total payouts for
police actions in 1996/7 (before appeal outcomes) represented 0.13% of the MPS
annual budget.' 72 In their study of police wrongdoing in the United States following
the Rodney King beating, Skolnick and Fyfe record that damages paid out by the Los
Angeles Police Department increased from $llk in 1971, to $890k in 1980, $4m in
1986 and $l1.3m in 1990.' Putting that figure in perspective they conclude, 'Even if
half of the LAPD's $11.3 million liability bill in 1990 could be eliminated and
converted to police salaries and personnel expenses, it would pay for only about 70
officers, less than a 1 percent increase in the departments personnel complement."74
Although highly significant for the victims of police wrongdoing who have recovered
damages and achieved public vindication, the limited function of police actions means
they do not have a direct impact on the police, apart from rare cases where judgment
is given on police powers. Their major significance for meaningful reform is if their
high public profile embarrasses officialdom into taking policy decisions in other areas
of police administration, reform of the complaint procedure for example.
'° Smith, G. (1996)(Appendices 1 and 2).
Guardian, 7 October 1997, and evidence to Select Committee, see below fn.179.
172 The budget estimate for 1996/7 was £1,980,835, Report of the Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis 1996/7, p.98. It is not known what legal costs were involved in the £2,658k payouts, even
if the figure were doubled the total would still be relatively insignificant.
173 Skolnick and Fyfe, op. cit., p.202.
174 Ibid., p.207. Baxter, J. (1985), p.44 warned of the danger that awards could be overlooked as 'one
of the inevitable overheads' of policing.
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Examination of the evidence to the first Home Affairs Select Committee, on police
disciplinary and complaint procedures, under the Blair Labour government, and its
report,' 75 suggests this has been the case.' 76 However, instead of addressing the
problems of accountability which the increase in police actions raise,' 77 the evidence
given to the select committee by various police and government was
overwhelmingly concerned with the difficulties faced by police management in
controlling corruption.' 79 It is argued that the select committee's agenda was
detennined by adherence to a traditional approach to the problem of police
wrongdoing with the consequence that there was a preoccupation with procedural
reforms in its recommendations. Thus, new life has been given to the who
investigates debate with the proposal that the Home Office researches the feasibility
of independent investigation of complaints,' 80 and the recommendation that the civil
standard of proof applies for all complamts.'8'
Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures: Minutes of Evidence and Appendices (H.C. 258),
1997, vols. I. and II.
176 Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I., p.xiv.
177 Which was of concern to Liberty, the Police Action Lawyers Group and B.M. Birnberg & Co.
Including the Home Office, Chief Inspector of Constabulary, MPS, CPS, PCA and police staff
associations.
179 Sir Paul Condon draws a direct comparison with the Mark era, making the point that his predecessor
as Metropolitan Commissioner was much more equipped to deal with corruption under disciplinary
measures than he, Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures: Minutes of Evidence and
Appendices (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. II., pp.117-118. The point was made by the PCA that there is
currently an 'upward cycle' of corruption, ibid., p.49.
° Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I., p.xxviii.
181 Ibid., p.xli.
93
Chapter Three: The Plaintiffs Perspective
CHAPTER THREE
The Plaintiffs Perspective
A benefit of the increase in police actions for research purposes is that it produces a
growing sample of plaintiffs whose experiences and attitudes as victims of police
wrongdoing may be examined. In contrast, a consequence of infrequent prosecutions
of police officers is a scarcity of research material on police crime. In order to add
substance to the proposition that the police officer's accountability to the criminal law
is a fiction, a valid point of reference is required which is solidly founded in social
reality, in the beliefs and experiences of human beings. Such a point of reference was
not readily available until the increase in successful police actions. Prior to the rise in
police actions the views of successful complainants were the only practical reference
point for such a study, but empirical research of complainants' views was, and still is,
limited by reliance on the police or PCA for access to research subjects and by low
substantiation rates for complaints.
It is not suggested that the plaintiffs perspective is the only point of reference, the
views of police officers alleged to have committed torts is of equal importance to
criminological research. Extensive research into police working practices and
occupational culture has sought to account for police conduct, and reference was made
to explanations for police wrongdoing in Chapters One and Two. Plaintiffs' attitudes
are not offered below as evidence that police officers are unaccountable to the law;
that would be to reach an unbalanced conclusion. Plaintiffs' views are presented in
this chapter to introduce a victimology of police wrongdoing, representing a further
stage in this attempt to understand police criminality, before the principle that the
police officer is accountable to the law is subjected to legal analysis.'
'See below, Chapters Five and Six.
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Research data has been collected in tape recorded and transcribed semi-structured
interviews with 18 plaintiffs2 and five specialist police action solicitors. 3 Fifteen male
and three female plaintiffs were interviewed; all were UK citizens, 14 of Afro-
Caribbean descent, three English and one Irish; 10 were aged 20 to 30 at the time of
the incident, five were between 31 and 50 and three were over 50. The breakdown of
causes of action was: false imprisonment, assault and malicious prosecution were
present in 10 cases, false imprisonment in 16, malicious prosecution in 15 and
allegations of assault in 13, and one plaintiffs sole cause of action was negligence.5
The views of this research sample are not taken as representative of all plaintiffs
attitudes, nor is it claimed that all police actions share the same characteristics as the
incidents described below. 6 However, the marked similarities in plaintiffs responses
to questions, as confirmed by practitioners' assessments of their caseloads, does
suggest that these findings are not confined to the particular cases researched.
The chapter is organised into three main parts, with the first part looking at the
plaintiffs' perspectives on their initial contact with the police, which gave rise in the
majority of cases to actions for assault and false imprisonment, and their reactions to
it. The second part examines what caused them to sue for damages, and particular
importance is attributed to their need to consult a solicitor as a defendant against
criminal charges, with many of the plaintiffs having made malicious prosecution
claims.7 In the third part their impressions of police actions as an effective means of
legal redress are assessed.
2 Conducted between March and August 1996. In addition, a senior Complaint Investigation Officer
was interviewed in April 1997. Access to six of the plaintiffs interviewed was through my work with
Hackney Community Defence Association, and access to the remaining 12 was through their solicitors.
Solicitors comments have been interspersed with plaintiffs views to explain technical details of police
actions and to give a general overview of their clients views.
Five convictions were overturned on appeal.
Apart from the higher incidence of malicious prosecution actions, this sample compares with the 177
cases used to establish the range of causes of action in Table III., see Chapter Two, below p.65.
6 To compliment my research I attended five civil trials, and was given access to 18 case
reports/statements in open court by the solicitors interviewed, making a total of 36 cases examined.
Attendance at the trials assisted my research by allowing me to observe the behaviour of all interested
parties in court, although this contributed more to my understanding of the process of police actions
than plaintiffs' perspectives and I do not refer to the extensive notes taken below. Likewise, I have not
relied on solicitors notes or their clients statements in open court, these have contributed to my research
by confirming my interview fmdings.
Consistent with the argument presented in Chapter Two that police officers' practice of charging their
victims is a factor in the increase of police actions, see below p.87.
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I.	 Assault and false arrest
All of the plaintiffs interviewed had major difficulties initially trying to make sense of
what happened to them and were unable to say what they actually felt as events
unfolded. They may have been aware of blows landing on their bodies and sensations
of pain. One man was unaware he had four broken bones in his foot because he could
only feel the intense pain in his wrists, caused by overtightened handcuffs, as he lay
on the floor of a police carrier before being dragged into a police station. As
situations calmed down, victims managed to gather their thoughts and accounted for
shock by describing their experiences in terms of 'mental rape', 'nightmares',
'helplessness' 'powerlessness' and 'traumatic'. A woman found by a jury to have
been falsely imprisoned stated - 'It was unbelievable. I was trying to find out what
they were doing to my son, and they turned on me. I don't know why.' A plaintiff
who was assaulted in his own home after his door was broken down was relieved
when told they were police officers. He thought the mistake would be quickly
resolved, only to become a victim of a miscarriage ofjustice before his conviction was
quashed. A man employed as a security officer and bouncer, who required hospital
treatment as a result of an alleged assault by a plain clothes officer, stated:
When I was put into the van I was in pain. By this stage I was
extremely frightened and I simply did not understand what was
happening to me. I told the officers in the back of the van [who
arrived on the scene after the incident] I couldn't believe what had
happened and I asked what had I done, and they just said 'it's
nothing to do with us.'
A plaintiff who was assaulted, arrested and charged after a demonstration stated:
Alone in the cell I felt confused. None of what the officer said bore
any relation at all to reality. I was expecting to be accused of trying
to hit him while he was running past me, or something to do with
disorderly conduct in connection with a real incident. Not
obstructing a police officer completely unconnected with what
happened.
In a third of the cases examined plaintiffs claimed some knowledge of their rights and
in a minority of cases offered as explanation for police officers' misconduct their
insistence that officers followed proper procedures. One plaintiff had appreciable
knowledge of his rights, although in most cases plaintiffs understanding was limited
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to knowing that police officers had to have proper grounds before making requests of
them. A plaintiff who settled his assault, false imprisonment and malicious
prosecution action following his arrest at an Irish festival stated:
I was arrested and then beaten in a police van simply because I
protested about the innocence of another man... At the station I
refused to give any details until I had seen a solicitor of my choice
and I demanded to see a doctor. I was refused a solicitor and a
doctor and told if I opened my mouth again I really would need to
see a doctor.
A plaintiff who was awarded a six figure sum by a jury for assault, false imprisonment
and malicious prosecution expressed disbelief and a sense of powerlessness on seeing
officers running up to him 'as if someone had done a robbery'. He refused to consent
to a search in the street and was taken to the police station, searched and placed in a
cell (the civil trial judge ruled the search unlawful). When about to be released
without charge, nearly four hours after he had been stopped in the Street, he objected
to the custody officer about the manner in which he had been treated, and was
eventually subjected to an assault by several officers before being replaced in a cell:
I was angry, I was thinking this should not be going down, and yet
I can't project it in a way they understand because I don't know
how to. I'm trying to tell the man you can't do this.... When he
grabbed me I was scared, I was shocked, but I was even more
scared when there were four or five of them... I tried to go along
with them but, if you know in your own mind that you are in the
right, you have got to let them know that, but without being violent,
because I knew that would not get me anywhere. It was frustrating
and frightening, a combination of the two.
This account can be seen to provide an important counter-view to interactionist
explanations of incidents where police officers are considered to deal with perceived
challenges to their authority by resorting to 'summary punishment', 8 here in the form
of unlawful detention eventually achieved by recourse to physical force. For their
part, at civil trial, police officers sought to explain the lengthy detention of the
plaintiff by giving evidence that his behaviour was violent and abusive. The custody
sergeant recorded in the custody record why bail was refused nine hours after he had
been arrested: 'Subject is still very abusive, and is still too violent to fingerprint, he
8 Banton, M. (1965), p175; Holdaway, S. (1983), p.129; Young, M. (1991), p.306; Skolnick, J. and J.
Fyfe (1993), Ch. 2.
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has been charged through the wicket gate. I fear for the safety of other officers if he is
to be removed from the cell. Therefore bail refused.'
For the victim, no justification, legal or moral, could excuse the deep sense of
injustice he suffered for asserting his rights in the face of adversity, and the clear
implication is that officers committed common assaults and false imprisonment. In
addition, the plaintiff was charged and acquitted of one count of assault occasioning
actual bodily harm,9 and two charges of assaulting a police officer in the execution of
his duty,'° against another police officer. It was the plaintiff's case, both at criminal
and civil trial, that these charges were based on false evidence in the form of
fabricated statements made in collusion by the officers responsible for the assaults on
him, and repeated in court under oath, in a concerted attempt to conceal their assaults
on a person who was unlawfully detained in the station. Thus, it was alleged that the
officers committed the common law offence of conspiring to pervert the course of
justice. However, not one of the officers faced criminal or disciplinary proceedings in
connection with the case. Although specific circumstances vary, and this case is
unusual because the 'main incident' took place in the police station after a preliminary
'minor incident' on the street, it does represent a fairly typical situation in which
plaintiffs found themselves in the cases examined. Whether frustrated, frightened,
disbelieving or confused as they lived through their ordeals, the only way by which
plaintiffs could rationalise their experiences was by identifying themselves as victims
of crimes. Credence was given to these views by the specialist solicitors interviewed
who recognised their clients as victims of crimes. A senior solicitor of 12 years
standing, having successfully concluded in excess of 200 police actions and
overseeing approximately 150 live cases, was only able to recall one case in which
there was not an allegation of a criminal offence against a police officer.
S.47 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861
'° S.51(1) of the Police Act 1964, now s.89(1) of the Police Act 1996.
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Police crimes
A plaintiff who settled an action for assault, false imprisonment and malicious
prosecution, following an alleged assault by an officer operating in a Police Support
Unit" in a public order situation, analysed his situation with considerable insight:
• because the inspector that monitors police officers needs the
responses, resources and the confidence of the group, you end up
with a criminal justice context in which senior officers support the
illegalities of junior officers... You have a complete system in
which the victim only feels the effect of one officer but it's the
whole group, the whole structure, that is actually responsible... I
was a victim of a criminal act, but that criminal act could only take
place in a context where police feel free to abuse their power. I
can't separate the two, I believe that without the authority to break
the law that PC W. felt he had as a member of the police force, he
would not have assaulted me.
Despite perceiving themselves to be victims of crimes, all of the plaintiffs interviewed
did not believe they were formally recognised as such, which they ascribed to the fact
that they suffered at the hands of police officers:
I wouldn't have got the kind of support other people have got if I
went to Victim Support. I don't think I could have walked in there
and said the police have done this to me. The one thing I have
learnt is that people have shied away, finding my story difficult to
believe. I have had to hold my head up high and say it wasn't my
fault, and they were wrong, and I've never had any doubt about
that.
All of the specialist police action solicitors interviewed considered themselves to have
an important secondary role as counsellors, something for which they had received no
training, as they helped plaintiffs come to terms with trauma. One solicitor gave a
comparative analysis of the problems facing the victims of police crimes and other
victims:
If you are a victim of crime you can at least take comfort from the
fact that you have been a victim of crime... You're not left in an
incredibly isolating and frightening position, as in the case of
someone beaten up or fitted up by the police, where you are
constantly questioning whether or not you in fact did something
wrong... Although it's true to say that victims of crime don't
necessarily achieve justice, the mere fact that there is a notion of
" Public order policing is organised on principles of Police Support Units, normally consisting of an
inspector, two sergeants and 20 constables, operating in paramilitary style under a unified command
system.
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crime, that something was wrong and there are victims, allows
people to at least take comfort in recognition of their plight.
There is a marked similarity between this solicitor's observation on the denial of
recognition for the victims of police crime with Maguire and Corbett's general
conclusion that complainants 'desire was less for 'revenge' than for an explanation,
apology or recognition of their point of view'.' 2 This issue of 'recognition' is a
subject which victimological research is particularly well placed to examine by
accounting for criminal behaviour by reference to victims' experiences.'3
Victimological studies have been of major importance in uncovering 'dark figures' of
crime which have been 'hidden' from official figures because of non-reporting or
under-reporting, as in regular Home Office British Crime Surveys. 14 Research of
sexual and domestic violence points to a power imbalance between assailant and
victim as a cause of non-recognition; initially because of victims' fears of a repeat
incident as a consequence of reporting to the police, and then as a result of official
inaction in response to many reports.' 5 Young generalises the significance of power
imbalances when considering the 'meaning of a punch':
Violence, like all forms of crime, is a social relationship. It is
rarely random: it inevitably involves particular social meanings and
occurs in particular hierarchies of power... the very impact of the
offence depends on the relationship between victim and offender.'6
Application of this principle to a minor assault by a police officer on a citizen
supports the conclusion that the impact on the victim will be amplified because of the
authority vested in the offender, particularly if the victim is a disadvantaged and
powerless member of the underclass.
Post traumatic stress disorder
Some victimological studies have been concerned with the psychological impact of
crimes on victims, and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has been identified in
victims of violent crimes, particularly sexual assaults.' 7 The same condition can also
12 Maguire, M. and C. Corbett (1991), p97.
Sparks, R. et a! (1977); Shapland, J. et a! (1985); Maguire, M. and J. Ponting (1988); Walklate, S.
(1989); Mawby, R. and S. Walklate (1994).
Mayhew, P. and M. Hough (1988).
Dobash, R. and R. Dobash (1979); Genn, H. (1988); Stanko, B. (1988).
16 Young, J. (1988), p'74.
Kilpatrick, D. eta! (1987); Lurigio, A. (1987); Resick, P. (1987).
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affect victims of police crimes. Both Hsu and Beckford among the plaintiffs awarded
damages in cases appealed by the Metropolitan Commissioner,' 8
 were diagnosed to be
suffering PTSD. In separate research studies Lurigio and Resick associated PTSD
with a range of psychological and physical dysfunctions dependent on whether
victims suffered robberies, violent or sexual assaults. The conditions they noted can
be summarised as - i) nervousness, including an increased fear of victimisation, ii)
low self-esteem and inability to perform simple tasks at home or work, iii) unpleasant
thoughts, including uncontrollable urges to retaliate, iv) sleep disturbances,
nightmares, v) flashbacks, triggered by sensory perceptions associated with the
original incident, vi) depression, vii) poor appetite and/or upset stomach, viii) greater
need to use prescribed drugs and the tendency to drink more alcohol, ix) fear of sexual
activity and low sexual appetite.' 9 In addition, Resick observes that the stigma
attached to victims of sexual crimes, compared to that for robbery victims, had an
aggravating effect and delayed recovery from PTSD.2°
It has been possible to distinguish six psychological responses which emerged in
interviews with plaintiffs in their replies to non-specific questions and which bear a
close resemblance to the symptoms of PTSD as identified by Lurigio and Resick.2'
Firstly, most plaintiffs mentioned some form of emotional and/or social isolation
arising, as stated above, from non-recognition of their status as a victim. Immediately
after the incident they said they stayed at home, turned towards family and trusted
friends for emotional support and withdrew from contact with persons who they felt
might require some form of explanation or justification of what happened. A
significant number also said they resorted to alcohol and drugs to avoid thinking about
the incident, if only for days or weeks. Secondly, many of the plaintiffs expressed
fear at the fact that they had suffered at the hands of members of an institution
responsible for their personal safety. Their fears appeared to extend beyond the dread
of a repeat experience to a deep rooted sense of insecurity and more general feelings
of alienation. This was particularly the case for victims who lived in high risk crime
See Table I, Chapter Two, above p.61.
' Lurigio, op. cit.; Resick, op. cit.
20 Resick, ibid.
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areas who thought they might have to call on the police's services in the future. Two
respondents moved home within one year, before their criminal trials, giving fear of
harassment by police officers as their reason. Thirdly, nearly half of the plaintiffs
experienced some feelings of guilt at some stage following their ordeals. This seemed
to arise as a consequence of victims own respect for the police, their self doubts and
difficulties when attempting to rationalise their experiences. Fourthly, nearly all
plaintiffs remarked on their loss of confidence and low self-esteem. Two main causes
were described - humiliation by police officers in front of neighbours and friends, or
implications of hypocrisy on being criminalised when they were known in their
conimunities for their opposition to crime (particularly with regard to drugs). Fifthly,
all of the plaintiffs interviewed spoke of some form of anger at what had happened to
them, either in relation to the initial incident, being charged with a criminal offence or
having to take lengthy civil proceedings. Their anger appeared to follow after other
emotions, guilt for example, and in some cases motivated them to do something about
their situation. One plaintiff, interviewed immediately after he had settled his action,
five years after the incident, maintained a deep rooted desire for revenge and spoke
about his abilities to defeat the police officers responsible for assaulting him in a fair
fight. Finally, the majority of the plaintiffs interviewed made reference to their being
obsessed about what happened to them. They said they went over and over what
happened in their minds, asking themselves why it happened, the consequences and
what they would like to do about it. For some, preoccupation with their experience
increased their anxieties and led to feelings of depression. Others, in contrast, said
they gave expression to their obsessions by absorbing all the information they could
about the police in general and their own case in particular. The following account is
by a woman who was trampled by a police horse, taken directly to hospital and later
diagnosed to be suffering PTSD. She was not arrested or charged, although she felt
criminalised merely because the police were responsible for her injuries. She settled
her negligence action three years after the incident, and was interviewed nearly eight
years after:
Even now I still have a lot of questions which have never been
answered. There were a lot of things I found out, I took a lot of
21 Several of the plaintiffs interviewed were examined by consultant psychologists for assessment of
psychological damage. Access to their reports was not sought for this research.
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time to fmd out as much as I could about police tactics with
horses... I think I lost the right to answers when I finished my case
against the police... I felt they psychologically trampled on me
more afterwards than they actually had done when I was first
trampled.
II.	 The Decision to Commence Proceedings
Despite research evidence that police harassment is particularly problematic for young
people,22 not one plaintiff interviewed was aged under 20, with the majority between
20 and 30. This response by a man in his mid-twenties at the time of interview, and
his early twenties at the time of the incident, suggests an explanation:
When you are young you grin and bear it, it's not like you are
going to whinge 'oh, my shoulder's aching.' When you become a
mature adult, you have kids and you have expectations of what is
right and what is wrong. It is only when you get older, you think
'no, I know this is wrong and I'm not going to put up with it, even
if it means going through their scheme of things in order to get my
voice heard.' Before, I was quite prepared to let things ride.
For this plaintiff, the only difference to previous occasions when he felt aggrieved
with police conduct towards him was that he chose to take remedial action. The
inference can be drawn that police treatment of young people on the streets is based
on their experience that they rarely complain. When a police officer subjects a more
mature person to similar behaviour, there is an increased likelihood that incivility or
abusiveness will be objected to. If the situation deteriorates and the officer then seeks
to assert his authority by the exercise of his powers, there is a possibility that a
complaint or police action will be pursued. Reasons for this may include the
plaintifflcomplainant no longer being subject to peer pressures, his greater confidence
when asserting his rights in the face of authority and/or where the officer may be
younger than him.
In the event of a police officer committing a criminal offence while on duty, and his
being fearful of the prospect of the victim making a complaint alleging criminal
22 Report on the Brixton Disorders of 10-12 April 1981 (Cmnd. 8427), 1981, paras. 4.47 and 48; Smith,
D. J. and J. Gray (1985), 'Survey of Londoners'; Institute of Race Relations (1987).
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conduct, it is beneficial to that officer to arrest and make counter criminal allegations.
He thereby provides justification for his action as being in the purported execution of
his duty and there is a high probability that he will evade criminal or disciplinary
proceedings. Following an initial withdrawal period, the majority of plaintiffs
interviewed described their first steps when attending magistrates court or making an
appointment with a solicitor. In their study of criminal defence solicitors, McConville
et a! reached the general conclusion that:
Clients are not provided with a coherent, tightly regulated service
geared to constructing and putting forward the best defence but
rather are passed through a disjointed and discontinuous set of
encounters, both with external elements of the criminal justice
system and with different members of the solicitor's firm
supposedly acting on their behalf.23
Support is lent to this finding by the fact that nearly half of the plaintiffs interviewed
for this study changed their criminal solicitor at some stage on the grounds that they
thought their accounts were disbelieved, on being advised to plead guilty or because
their case was not taken seriously. A full breakdown for the 18 plaintiffs interviewed
and their solicitors is shown in Table IX.
Table IX. Plaintiffs' solicitors (n18)
Criminal defence solicitor instructed
Changed criminal defence solicitor
Criminal defence solicitor also instructed for civil proceedings
Different specialist police action solicitor instructed for civil proceedings
Changed police action solicitor
Totals
15
7
4
14
Even when believed, several victims said they had to rely on their own efforts by
tracing witnesses, and in one case a plaintiff who was initially charged with a minor
summary offence, was refused legal aid on the grounds that the public expense would
not further the interests ofjustice:
I went to the library to read up how I could defend myself. I heard
about the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and went to my
local police station and demanded to see it. I then went and bought
a copy of it, read it word for word and memorised it.
He was eventually charged with violent disorder in connection with the incident when
attending magistrates court some two months later and granted legal aid. A freelance
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photographer who was arrested and charged following an assault at a demonstration
knew how important it was to quickly gather evidence:
The day after I got out of gaol, I phoned around most of my
colleagues asking them to watch for pictures.. I used photographs
to trace other photographers... In the end I found two good sets of
pictures showing my arrest, and a lot of pictures showing events
immediately after my arrest, but only one picture of my assault.
It is during the process of preparing their cases that victims reveal their obsession:
I was rushing around after pictures and my only subject of
conversation was this case. I was totally obsessed for a good year.
I'd hardly thought about anything else when I was sat on the
lavatory, or I was sitting in the bath or driving the car. I'd be
tossing ideas around in my mind, thinking of it. I must have spent
hundreds of hours just bashing my brain.
And, for another plaintiff:
Day and night I was reading, taking notes and, remembering what
happened to me, writing it all down. I did a substantial amount of
work, I spent most of my time getting into it for months. Once you
get into it, it is hard to stop. It is like you are obsessed.
All of the plaintiffs said they sought out or discovered persons who were sympathetic
to their predicament and eventually managed to find solicitors who specialised in
police crime cases. By this stage plaintiffs fell into one of two major categories.
Those who started out with a basic knowledge of their rights developed their level of
understanding of the law as it applied to their particular circumstances, and an
appreciation of criminal justice as informed by their own experiences. They
independently informed themselves of the alternative means of redress available and
their advantages and disadvantages. The second type of plaintiff was relieved to find
a legal representative who believed them, who was sympathetic to their situation, in
whom they had confidence and who's advice they accepted almost unquestioningly.
Three main reasons emerged during the course of interviews for why victims of police
wrongdoing chose to take legal action in preference to pursuing a complaint to its
conclusion. The most important reason was plaintiffs' confidence in their solicitor
and their trust in his judgment. In the majority of cases this confidence had been
23 McConville, M. et al(1994), p.282
105
Chapter Three: The Plaintiffs Perspective
established while the plaintiff was a defendant in criminal proceedings at a time when
many felt alone and isolated. Plaintiff's anger at being charged with a criminal
offence was another factor as was their distrust of the complaint process.
Confidence in solicitor
For the majority of plaintiffs their reason for contacting a solicitor in the first instance
was as a defendant in criminal proceedings. In interviews, all these plaintiffs
expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the criminal defence solicitors and
counsel who ultimately represented them at criminal trial or appeal. These criminal
defence practitioners were predominantly specialists in public order and police crime
cases, to whom the labels 'radical' or 'civil rights' lawyers might be applied. Most of
these solicitors did not prepare civil actions and referred their clients to specialist
police action solicitors on acquittal, either in the same firm or elsewhere.24
In nearly all of the cases plaintiffs said they had been advised by their criminal
defence solicitors not to make a complaint. 25 Solicitors interviewed explained this
was due to particular difficulties with preparing defences in police crime cases in the
late 1 980s and early 1 990s. Solicitors were reluctant for their clients to register
formal complaints because of the danger of alerting police officers to the victim's
intention to contest the charge by alleging police wrongdoing. These concerns are to
be considered in a general criminal justice context which encourages defendants to
plead guilty and discourages them from making allegations against the police. 26 In
these circumstances practitioners relied on police officers' assumptions that
defendants would either plead guilty or resort to a defence of police mistake. The
tactical calculation was that complacent officers would leave opportunities for defence
counsel to adduce points in cross examination which proved fatal to the prosecution's
case. 27 With criminal proceedings completed, decisions could then be made on the
suitability of civil proceedings which, because the majority of police actions are for
24 See Table IX., above p.104.
25 All 36 cases examined in this study were concluded between 1990 and 1996, and arose out of
original incidents which occurred between 1987 and 1992 when police powers, the complaints process
and criminal procedure were quite different to the present.
26 McConville, M. et al(1991), pp.l'16-l59, (1994), p.160; Uglow, S. (1995), pp.l68l7l.
27 The police and CPS labelled such defences as 'ambush defences', Uglow, op. cit., p.87).
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intentional torts, are actionable within six years.28
 These tactical considerations have
been rendered obsolete by several procedural changes and reform of the law of
evidence. 29 Today, criminal solicitors are unlikely to advise clients against making
formal complaints, on the contrary, victims of police wrongdoing are advised to
complain at the police station, and, if interviewed, have their complaint tape recorded.
A final decision on whether to proceed with the complaint, or decline to co-operate
with the complaint investigation, is then postponed pending completion of criminal
proceedings. Criminal defence solicitors therefore continue to play a central part in
identifying cases which are suitable for civil proceedings, although they may not
prepare the actions.
Probably the most important factor for a prospective plaintiff to consider is whether
financial assistance is available given the financial expense involved. 17 of the
plaintiffs interviewed received legal aid and the other litigant's costs were
underwritten by his trade union. Legal aid is available for civil proceedings according
to applicants' financial means and the merits of their case, as determined by whether
the plaintiff will benefit from proceedings. The practitioners interviewed said they
very rarely advised civil action if legal aid was not awarded because of the risk of
having to pay both sides' costs in the event of losing. In contrast, there are no
financial charges for complaints and nor is legal aid available. It can be safely
assumed that police crime victims want their interests protected by the services of a
specialist and must be aware that if they proceed with a complaint any assistance from
their solicitor will be provided free of charge. Thus, taking an overall view, victims
entitled to legal aid, with or without personal contributions, will inevitably favour
police action, and those not entitled will lean towards making a complaint.
28 S.11 of the Limitation Act 1980; s.2 provides for personal injury cases arising from negligent acts or
omissions with a time limit of three years.
29 Ss.3.1(ii) and 6.1, supplemented by notes 6B and 6J, of the 1995 Codes of Practice provide for
access to free legal advice in police stations. Ss.34-37 of Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
allow for inferences to be drawn from a suspects refusals to answer questions about an alleged offence.
Ss.5 and 6 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act 1996 provide for disclosure by the defence.
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Financial considerations apart, police action solicitors interviewed considered it their
professional duty to advise clients to commence civil proceedings and, most probably,
against pursuing a complaint.
As a lawyer my role is to protect my client's interests and I advise
about both possible remedies, complaint and civil action. There are
relatively few dangers with civil action so I advise in their favour.
Solicitors singled out the amount of control exercised by the litigant as an advantage
of civil procedure:
In a police action you control the whole thing. You get all your
evidence and you decide when to issue proceedings. You
determine when witness statements are exchanged, what evidence
to bring forward.
Although some plaintiffs were satisfied with the degree of control they exercised over
proceedings, there was some difference of opinion, and it was evident that this issue
was of greater concern to practitioners. The more confident and knowledgeable
plaintiffs said they had as much control as they wanted, although they did not agree
with some of the procedures they had to follow. Others, however, felt they had no
control whatsoever and expressed frustration with the limited compensatory function
of the civil process, particularly with regard to legal aid certificates:
I didn't feel in control at all really... It just seemed to be a couple
of legal bods bantering, a bit of legal jousting and then, that was it.
Being on legal aid didn't help me to feel that I had any control
because I was basically told when the offer was made, if you say
no, legal aid will not support you, and also with paying in to court,
that I could end up paying costs.
Looking at practitioners and plaintiffs assessments of the civil and complaint
processes together, it is clear that solicitors evaluate which is the most appropriate
course of action. That is not to suggest that their clients were discouraged from
complaining, it is probable that in the absence of civil proceedings as an alternative
remedy these victims of police wrongdoing would not have taken any further action.3°
Practitioners quoted their clients objections in principle to police investigation of
complaints as grounds for non co-operation, and gave police control of the process as
a reason for their own caution:
If you put a complaint investigation in motion you can't control it,
you don't know where the police are going to go or what they are
° See below, p.111, for plaintiffs attitudes to the complaint process.
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going to do. You can't rely on their integrity and you are
vulnerable to a cover up...
In their study of the complaint process Maguire and Corbett interviewed 19 Complaint
Investigation Officers and reached an overall impression of their professionalism and
conimitment. 3 ' The police action solicitors interviewed for this study held opposite
views stating that when they had engaged in the complaint process a major practical
difficulty was ClO bias: 'My meetings with investigating officers have been so
confrontational that no dialogue has taken place with one important exception.'
Another solicitor said:
I have had to negotiate, cajole, bully and do battle with those who
make up the complaint process, from the investigating officers and
PCA members through to the particular section of the CPS which
looks at these cases and considers whether or not to bring charges.
Their client's anxieties and general vulnerability in the aftermath of a police crime
case was given as a maj or cause of concern by practitioners in their attempts to protect
them from insensitive CIOs. Solicitors referred to the responsibility enforced upon
them as lay counsellors when advising clients not to co-operate with the complaint
process, as a precaution against any possible deterioration in their client's mental
condition. And, on legal grounds, with factual issues so keenly disputed in police
actions, they could not be sure that an action may be seriously damaged as a result of
their client being confronted by an unsympathetic ClO:
One of the biggest problems for people abused by the police is that
the event is so traumatic that they exaggerate what happened. The
police seize on exaggerations as a demonstration that someone is
lying, whereas in fact it is often simply their attempt to come to
terms with what happened to them.
Recent changes to criminal procedure have had an effect on police action procedures
as have legislative changes to the complaint process and case law. 32 Prior to removal
of public interest immunity from complaint investigations, 33 solicitors stated their
standard practice was to write to CIOs requesting a written undertaking that
statements given by their clients would only be used in connection with investigation
' Maguire and Corbett, op. cit., pp.xiv, 73 and 193.
32 See below Chapters Six and Seven.
B R. v. Chief Constable of West Midlands exparte Wiley [1994] 3 All E.R. 420, see below Chapter Six
for discussion on public interest immunity, p.181.
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of their complaints. As undertakings were never forthcoming, solicitors said they
advised non co-operation with investigations and simply left complaints on record.
The removal of P11 from complaint investigations has rendered this course of action
redundant and plaintiffs are now effectively faced with two straightforward options at
the outset, either to proceed with a complaint and action in parallel or discontinue
their complaint. Despite the procedural changes the solicitors interviewed continued
to advise against co-operation, their concerns with police investigation and control of
complaints outweighing what they regarded as minor procedural changes:
Complaint procedures are frustrating for both litigators and clients,
even post- Wiley they are a closed area. Once they've made their
statement the whole thing goes outside their ambit.
Media attention to police scandals and proceedings against police officers, criminal
and civil, has fuelled the political controversy surrounding police wrongdoing.
Although specialist police action solicitors have not been prominent in public debate,
their proactive use of civil procedure has established police actions as an attractive
remedy to police wrongdoing. Solicitors interviewed emphasised police actions
political significance as a positive force for change:
• .because civil actions now have such credence and so many people
are pursuing them, there is the necessity for the complaints system
to re-establish some credibility. So it may be that an air of greater
enlightenment may waft across the Police Complaints Authority
and the Complaints Investigation Bureau at Scotland Yard and they
might realise that they need to be a bit more open.
Reaction to criminalisation
Criminalisation plays an important part in plaintiffs decisions to pursue police action
in that their initial contact with a solicitor was as a consequence of their facing
criminal proceedings, and their solicitors advising to commence civil proceedings on
acquittal. In addition, several plaintiffs specifically accounted for their decision to sue
as a result of criminal prosecution and their ordeals at criminal trial. A plaintiff who
was punched once in the face said he would have put it down to a genuine mistake if
he had not been charged with a drug offence:
From that point onwards it was very different... I had to tell
friends and colleagues and go to my employers and vicar for
references.
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After the initial shock at being charged, plaintiffs went on to describe their ordeals
while awaiting trial. Appointments with solicitors and pre-trial hearings were an
inconvenience and painfully reminded them of the initial incident, contributing to a
growing sense of indignity. For some, preoccupation with the prospect of conviction
and a prison sentence was overwhelming:
The anxiety was there for the 18 months... I believed I was going
to do time for it, regardless. I can't even say I was in suspense,
because I really believed I was going down.
What happened at criminal trial reawakened plaintiffs' thoughts of injustice. Hearing
police officers tell lies and having their own characters called in to question were
complained of. A plaintiff who was convicted by a stipendiary magistrate and
successfully appealed, conmiented after being awarded substantial damages:
At the very first court hearing the charge was dropped from assault
causing actual bodily harm, to assault, and I lost my right to jury
trial. When my case came up I felt the evidence went my way,
but... I was losing faith in the system, I felt I'd been framed and I
wasn't going to pay the fine. I've been a victim for all these years
until now, and if I'd backed out, if I hadn't brought a civil action, I
would be a victim for the rest of my life.
Then, following acquittal, plaintiffs said their thoughts turned to civil action, either
immediately:
I felt relieved because although I knew all the time that I was
innocent I knew there was a very real possibility of me going to
gaol. When I got the acquittal I had so much hatred for the police
that I just wouldn't let things go.
Or, after a period of reflection:
I just wanted to go home and enjoy what then was freedom. It was
scary, the gaolers came out just before the verdict, my heart was
pumping, and I just wanted to get home and know that I was free, I
can do whatever I want. I saw my solicitor after about a couple of
months. It took me that long to adjust, get my head straight and
decide what I was going to do next.
Attitudes to the complaint process
As mentioned in the discussion above on plaintiffs' confidence with their solicitors,
their attitudes to the complaint process can be more accurately accounted for by cross
reference with their solicitors concerns. A minority took little interest in the
complaint procedure, in some cases forwarding letters from CIOs or the PCA to their
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solicitors without reading them. In their responses to questions on the complaint
process the majority of plaintiffs deferred to their solicitors' superior knowledge and
said they had been advised against pursuing a complaint:
At the time I vaguely knew about complaints and suing the police.
I considered suing the police to have more validation than making a
complaint... I remember thinking that I'll make a complaint as
well, and at that point my solicitor pointed out that if you make a
complaint at the same time you can prejudice your case.
Plaintiffs attitudes to the complaint process closely resemble those found by Maguire
and Corbett in their study of complainants attitudes. All plaintiffs said they were
opposed to police investigation of complaints, compared to Maguire and Corbett
finding that 85% of complainants favoured independent investigation. 34 Those with
previous experience of complaints did not require persuading of the pitfalls; Maguire
and Corbett similarly found that 70% of complainants 'claimed that the investigation
had changed their view of the police for the worse.' 35 One plaintiff gave his personal
experience of CIOs negative attitudes towards him as a reason for his disinterest:
I've been involved in a number of complaints where I've been a
witness and police have interviewed me... They treated me as an
accused person, as a criminal, and showed no interest in solving the
complaints I have been involved in.
Another plaintiff who had previously complained of an assault gave the CIOs positive
attitude towards the officer complained against as a reason for his distrust:
When I was interviewed they tried to justify the officer's actions..
they were telling me he had personal problems. I thought if I'd
whacked him they wouldn't be coming up with excuses for me, I'd
be doing time. When you make a complaint against an officer they
try to minimise it.
Maguire and Corbett also found complainants believed that CIOs had 'deliberately
gone out of their way to avoid the truth' 36 Maguire and Corbett did not consider the
alternative of police action to complaint, and plaintiffs interviewed for this study who
had previously complained inevitably drew comparisons between the complaint and
civil processes, paying particular attention to the openness of police actions:
.they deal with complaints internally, and that doesn't mean
anything... At least I've heard how officers made mistakes or did
Maguire and Corbett, op. cit., p.62; from the research sample of 40 complainants whose complaints
were investigated.
35Ibid.
36 lbid., p.150.
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things wrong to do with my case... We don't get to see their
punishment, if we could see their punishment, then it would be
better.
III.	 Satisfaction with Police Actions
As one remedy to police wrongdoing, plaintiffs' satisfaction or dissatisfaction with
police actions has to be contrasted with what they might have achieved if they had
pursued a complaint, and what they hoped to achieve when they commenced their
action. Three separate elements can be identified as contributing to the 'justice' ideal,
firstly, punitive or retributive justice holds that the wrongdoer has to be held
personally liable and punished accordingly. Secondly, principles of civil justice
require that the person wronged has to be financially compensated for the damage
suffered. Thirdly, the restorative element of justice allows for the vindication of the
good name and character of a person wronged.
Retributive justice
The plaintiffs interviewed all perceived themselves to be the victims of crimes and
their psychological responses were consistent with crime victims reactions, although
they did not believe they had been recognised as such. And they were all of the same
opinion that ifjustice was to be seen to be done the officers responsible would be held
liable in criminal law for their acts. 37 However, given that they elected to take civil
proceedings in preference to making a complaint, and therefore abandoned the
possible, although statistically improbable, satisfaction of seeing the officer punished,
by criminal or disciplinary sanction, they started their police action aware that they
could only achieve second best. A plaintiff who experienced the same anxieties
throughout his civil hearing as he had at criminal trial felt that he was being re-tried
and subjected to further indignity as a an innocent man. His view was, 'If you're
going to go through all that again it should only be to hold them to account personally.
'A victim of police misconduct will usually want to see the officers involved brought to book and
measures taken to prevent a repetition.' Clayton, R. and H. Tomlinson (1991), p.16.
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They should be in the dock.' A plaintiff, who was awarded substantial damages for a
serious assault, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution stated:
I don't feel it amounts to justice in respect of the police officers,
personally. What is to stop them from going out there and doing it
again to somebody else? I can't see them being reprimanded or
anything.
Another was more particular in stating that, although he had been compensated for his
private losses, civil procedure had contributed to the suppression of public aspects of
his case: 'Nothing has been done, the matter has been covered up. In fact, if anything,
the police are less accountable. He's still employed as a police officer.' Particularly
hurtful to plaintiffs who had been maliciously prosecuted was the knowledge that if
they had been convicted, they could have received severe sentences for offences
against police officers:
Had I been convicted I would have served one or two years, I faced
the possibility of getting a maximum sentence of five years. They
face the possibility of getting investigated by other police officers,
at the most I believe police officers get a bit of a ranting at and then
sent to another police station.
The solicitors who advised of the advantages and disadvantages of the two processes
tended to measure their achievements by their failure to satisfy clients all too
reasonable wish to see police officers held liable for their criminal acts: arriving at
pessimistic conclusions:
I haven't had in all my years a single client that I can remember
who has gone away from the procedure satisfied, or happy, no
matter what the level of settlement or even the level of award when
there has been a trial. Police actions are not effective. We try to
use them, within their limits, to achieve what we can, but they are
not the answer.
So, within the limits of the civil law, how satisfied were plaintiffs with the final
outcome? Plaintiffs were again disappointed to discover that police officers are not
normally liable at civil law for their torts because liability attaches to their chief
officer for torts committed while purportedly in the performance of their police
114
Chapter Three: The Plaintiffs Perspective
function.38 With regard to plaintiffs' wishes to hold officers personally to account,
they exited the law's domain completely dissatisfied:
Why should the people pay for crimes the police committed? That
money has not been paid out of the police officers' own pockets. If
justice was to be done those police officers should have stood trial.
They should have been kicked out of the police force and whatever
possessions they have, their houses and whatever, should be sold to
cover the compensation.
Furthermore, plaintiffs expressed disillusionment with the effect of their actions on
the police service, failing to see how the police organisation accepted responsibility
for the actions of individual officers or to take the necessary steps to ensure similar
incidents do not recur.
Why is it they're giving money away? If I won my case it means
somewhere along the line a precedent has been set which says that
what the police did was wrong, and why aren't there measures after
that to make sure that situation doesn't happen again?
Plaintiffs drew parallels with good industrial and business practices which operate to
ensure that companies retain their competitiveness:
If an aeroplane clips the side of a hangar when it's parking, they
would .. change the way they direct aeroplanes and mark up
hangars so it doesn't happen again. I think an incident like this
should have the same effect on the police force, they should look at
what's gone wrong and put in force procedures to make sure it
doesn't go wrong again.
Plaintiffs who settled their claims out of court had the additional disappointment of
being denied the satisfaction of witnessing police officers directly answering their
accusations in a court of law:
They settled two days before trial. I was very tense, I was very
geared up. What I would have liked to have seen was the officer
actually defend himself in court and be shown to be a liar and a
perjurer.
On the other hand, plaintiffs who settled were spared the ordeal of reliving their
trauma and repetition of police allegations against them at civil trial:
The only difference is that I didn't have to sit in the dock in this
trial or get taken down to the cells for lunch. I still got the
38 S.48 of the Police Act 1964, now s.88 of the Police Act 1996, see Chapter Five, below p.169, for
discussion on the law of civil liability for police officers.
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psychological mental attack from the police as I got in Crown
Court, that same kind of aggression when they fire questions at you
and say you've done this and you've done that. And I still got the
butterflies when the jury made their verdict.
Thus, plaintiffs were uniformly dissatisfied with the consequences of their actions for
police officers and the police service. As well as their disappointment at having
abandoned the prospect of achieving criminal responsibility, they also believed they
failed in their efforts at civil law to have an impact against police officers or the police
institution. The deep sense of injustice they experienced at the outset, as a victim of
police wrongdoing, remained intact for the most part at the conclusion of proceedings.
Compensatory justice
The principle function of civil actions is for the defendant to make good the damage
arising from the wrong done, and, plaintiffs generally expressed satisfaction with the
compensatory element of their actions, in that they recovered financial losses
incurred:
Insofar as it can be a financial compensation, it's probably about
right. It was payment on an hourly basis at a reasonable rate for the
number of hours I spent bashing my head about this, it was fairly
easy to come up with a figure to compensate me for that.
This plaintiff assessed his compensation solely in terms of the amount of time he
spent working on his case, a standard response by interviewees who instinctively
excluded from their calculations coverage of damages for loss of liberty and to
reputation in their awards or settlements. This might be as a result of the inherent
difficulty in placing a financial value on intangible losses to constitutional rights, and,
when asked if they felt they had been fully compensated, plaintiff's assessed their
global award, including exemplary damages, as a simple figure. 39 An equally valid
reason for their reluctance to differentiate between basic and aggravated compensatory
damages for their separate causes of action and overall exemplary damages, was their
disillusionment at the failure of the civil process to have any apparent impact on those
responsible. Under these circumstances their damages were seen more as a 'payoff'
See Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 132, Aggravated, Exemplary and Rest it utory
Damages, 1993, pp.23-30 on the convergence of damages principles where there have been non-
pecuniary losses.
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for what they had suffered, '...the money helps compensate, it helps ease the pain a
bit, but I don't feel it amounts to justice in respect of the police officers.' Some
plaintiffs went further and questioned whether compensatory principles had any
relevance to police crimes:
How can somebody decide who doesn't know what it feels like to
be assaulted by the police, all the embarrassment, trauma and just
being completely destroyed. At 211 was supposed to be in the
prime of my life and my early twenties were taken away, how can
you compensate for that? You can't. But I would have had more
of a sense of justice if something had happened to those two
particular officers being sacked and then prosecuted, which is what
should have happened.
Restorative justice
Finally, there is the plaintiff's vindication, public recognition of the wrong done and it
having been made good according to due legal process, to consider. This third limb of
civil justice, after liability and quantum, was the one area with which plaintiffs
expressed general satisfaction, whether following court awards or media coverage of
statements in open court where settlement had been reached with the Commissioner
denying liability. This was probably influenced by their solicitor's expressions of
caution at the outset, and advice that vindication may be the most they would be likely
to achieve. Nevertheless, it was clear that a minimum requirement for plaintiff
satisfaction was to gain public recognition that they had wrongly suffered at the hands
of the police.
I think that was probably the thing that was uppermost in my mind,
I wanted a public vindication, not just to say that it wasn't my fault,
it was their fault and they shouldn't have done it in the first place,
to anybody.
I wanted people to know that these cops committed crimes against
me. Not only had they committed crimes against me, but they also
committed crimes against other Irish people at the Irish Festival
that day.
..the more money I got, the more people were going to think 'God,
this is awful.'
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Attitudes to police
Although several similarities can be observed in the attitudes of plaintiffs outlined
here and those held by complainants, as studied by Maguire and Corbett, 4° one area
where they diverge is in their impressions of the police as a consequence of their
action. Maguire and Corbett found that 70% of complainants thought worse of the
police following investigation of their complaint. 4 ' This was not the case for the
plaintiffs' interviewed who, while several admitted to anti-police feelings in the
aftermath of incidents or when attending court hearings, said that their attitudes to the
police were generally unchanged:
Having experienced what I did that day, for the first three months I
was definitely anti-police. But then I began to realise that they
have certain things to do and they get on with it, some of them do it
good, and some don't.
They were critical of the officers who had wronged them and the remedial procedures,
but these failing were placed in perspective alongside the thankless task of policing:
My attitudes haven't really changed because of what happened, I
think they are a bunch of people we have great need of. They're
better than many police forces in other parts of the world, but they
are corrupt, they are under great pressure to support each other and
they tend to be arrogant and bullying.
Despite their general dissatisfaction with the way that they had been treated as victims
of crimes, it is significant that successful plaintiffs concluded their actions without the
same sense of alienation that complainants appear to suffer. Financial compensation
clearly plays a major role in offsetting plaintiffs' frustrations, but it is suggested that
non-pecuniary aspects of civil procedure also play a part. The openness of police
actions and independent adjudication, culminating in public vindication if successful,
allows plaintiffs to proceed with a considerable degree of equality with the defendant,
regardless of their relatively powerless political position in society compared to the
police as a powerful institution. Two of the civil trials attended as part of this study
concluded with verdicts against liability, yet in both cases the plaintiffs did not leave
° Maguire and Corbett, op. cit.
' Four out of the five complainants in the sample of 40 who had their complaints substantiated said
they were dissatisfied with the procedure, ibid., p.59, and see above, p.1l2.
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court thoroughly demoralised, and took some consolation from seeing police officers
have to answer for their conduct in open court.42
IV.	 The Police Crime Control Problematic
In the Introduction, police crime was defined as criminal offences committed by
police officers when falsely purporting to be in the execution of their duty, with
officers alleged to have committed these offences subjected to investigation and
charge under the police complaint process. 43 The offences are also torts, and victims
have available to them a private law remedy in actions for damages. Further, police
officers are also liable to the police discipline process for their misconduct.
In Chapter Two statistical evidence of a problem with controlling police wrongdoing
was identified in the infrequency of complaint, criminal and disciplinary findings
against police officers contrasted with the increasing tendency of complainants to turn
to the civil courts. The success rate in police actions is a reflection of the inability of
the complaint process to control police wrongdoing, for criminal and disciplinary
offences. Plaintiffs who commence police actions assume personal responsibility for
achieving redress, whereas the majority of victims of crime rely on the services
provided by the police and CPS to prosecute. It is on this point that the experiences
and attitudes of plaintiffs contribute to understanding the problem of police crime, as a
particular form of wrongdoing. Victims of a special category of crimes who have to
resort to private law remedies, have unequal access to the law, and alleged offenders
who commit that category of crime are not accountable to the law the same as other
criminal suspects.
The views of the plaintiffs given in this chapter, supported by observations from
specialist solicitors, on their experiences at the hands of the police and as litigants
42 Since the plaintiffs interviewed for this study concluded their actions, recent case law has altered the
position on quantum damages and vindication, aspects of civil proceedings with which plaintiffs
expressed their greatest satisfaction, see Chapter Six, below, for discussion of recent case law.
See Introduction, above p.23.
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provide a victimological definition of police crime. As victims of wrongdoing, all of
the plaintiffs interviewed perceived themselves as victims of crimes. The
criminalisation and isolation they felt as a consequence of their contact with the
police, and non-recognition of their status as victims of crimes, contributed to
psychological responses which have been identified in other crime victims. As
victims of crimes, plaintiffs unanimously expressed their disappointment that the
police officers responsible for their suffering evaded criminal or disciplinary liability.
Plaintiffs impressions of their treatment by police officers, combined with their
assessments of the treatment of those officers, adds further doubt to the validity of the
claim that the police officer is accountable to the criminal law in like manner as the
citizen. In order to develop my thesis that this propositions holds true at the present
moment in time, I now turn to an examination of the history of the modem police to
establish how police officers were held accountable for their wrongdoing in the
nineteenth century.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Nineteenth Century Police Officer's
Accountability to the Law
The word 'constable' is derived from the Latin comes stabuli, meaning count or
companion of the stable. In ancient France the conestable was head of the household
under the old kings and later, as the connétable, had various senior responsibilities in
the Royal Court including commander in chief of the army. In Norman Britain the
constable initially continued as an officer of influential rank and then, over the years,
declined in status to a local officer subordinate to the authority of the Justice of the
Peace.' The office of constable is traced back some 750 years to the mid-thirteenth
century when constables were annually elected local officers who were responsible to
the Crown for keeping the King's peace. As a lowly official the constable had few
powers which separated him from the citizen and he was accountable to the Justices
for his conduct. In this chapter developments effecting the police officer's
accountability for his wrongdoing are traced through nineteenth century police history
commencing with the decision to retain the common law office of constable when
police forces were established by statute in the mid nineteenth century. A central
theme is that the police's assumption of powers throughout the first 100 years of their
history created the conditions under which internal administrative measures, in the
form of complaint and disciplinary procedures, replaced officers' answerability to the
law with a quasi-judicial form of accountability.
I.	 The Creation of the Modern Police
The first half of the nineteenth century saw Britain deep in the throes of revolutionary
upheaval with industrialisation transforming the geographical landscape. In the space
of under a quarter of a century British society changed beyond recognition. Until the
1 830s the main unit of social organisation was the parish with appointed justices of
the peace at the hub of local administrations and parliamentary suffrage restricted by
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land qualification. The Reform Act 1832 extended the franchise to the industrial
middle class, while retention of a property qualification excluded the mass of the
population, and the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 established elected local
authorities. Starting in 1838 the emergent working classes agitated for universal
suffrage under the banner of Chartism, and it was 1848 before political turmoil eased.2
This was the historical backdrop for the emergence of modern police forces, first
established in London by the Metropolitan Police Act 1829. Four years later ss.39-42
of the Lighting and Watching Act 1833 allowed for the appointment of serjeants of
the watch, watchmen, patrols, etc. to serve as constables in provincial towns.
Provisions were made by ss.76-86 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 for the
establishment of borough police forces. The County Police Act 1839 similarly
provided for provincial counties and the emergence of a national network of police
forces, and the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 clarified police officers powers. And
finally, with six boroughs in 1853 still without police forces and the extant
constabularies providing police to population of half the ratio in the Metropolis, 3 the
County and Borough Police Act 1856 required all councils to establish forces with the
Treasury meeting a quarter of the cost on certification of their efficiency by Inspectors
of Constabulary.4
Getting started
Various arguments have been advanced to explain the introduction of an institution
ostensibly created to prevent crime and keep the peace. Radzinowicz refers to the
introduction of the Metropolitan Police as an experimental element of Sir Robert
Peel's wider criminal law reforms, 5 and then goes on to attribute significance to the
end of transportation, effectively by 1853 and conclusively in 1857, as incentive for a
national system of policing. 6 Critchley prioritises the need for a civil force to meet the
'Critchley, 1. (1978), p.2.
2 Morton, A. (1984).
Radzinowicz, L. (1968), p.214.
Ss.15 & 16 of the County and Borough Police Act 1856.
Radzinowicz, op. cit., p.159-60.
6 Ibid., p.300.
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Chartist threat. 7 Emsley points to Peel's experiences as Secretary of State for Ireland
when the Royal Irish Constabulary was established, and his recognition that a non-
paramilitary force was required for crime prevention purposes which could also serve
to control political dissent as part of its peace keeping function. 8
 Brogden emphasises
the social control function of the police and their maintenance of boundaries which
separated middle class and lower class districts. 9
 Bittner does not provide a causally
specific explanation for the modem police's arrival. He points to the nascent police
function as being more concerned with criminals than crimes ('protecting St James's
Park by policing St Giles's') while historically locating the police organisation 'as
sequentially the last of the basic building blocks in the structure of modem executive
government." 0 There is much to support his assertion and events in Britain in the
mid-nineteenth century do not readily lend themselves to a definite causal explanation
for the emergence of the police institution. Given the intense competition between the
landed aristocracy and the industrial middle classes to protect and further their
interests, and with the massed ranks of the dispossessed fighting to establish their
rights, it is impossible to conceive of a coercive civil force with statutorily defined
responsibilities entering the fray; the creation of such an institution would have been
a cause of alarm and consternation to all parties. According to Radzinowicz, 'When
acceptance came at last, it came during a period of growing prosperity, when disorder
was becoming rarer, when Chartism had ceased to be a menace, when even the levels
of crime were believed to be falling." This can be ascribed to the need for political
stability before the police organisation could be established, as occurred when the
industrial middle classes achieved state hegemony following a series of compromises
with the landed aristocracy and the eventual defeat of Chartism.
The fact that a police force made the statute books at all during this period is widely
attributed to Peel's political acumen.' 2 He astutely avoided the controversy which
greeted Patrick Coiquhoun's call for a new force in his Treatise on the Police of the
Critchley, op. cit., p.21.
Emsley, C. (1991), pp.25-52.
Brogden, M. (1982), pp.49-62.
'° Bittner, E. (1975), p.15.
Radzinowicz, op. cit., p.301.
12 Ibid., p.158; Critchley, op. cit., p.5!; Ascoli, D. (1979), pp.74-5.
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Metropolis, published in 1797, and which had caused two previous legislative
attempts to fall by the wayside in 1785 and 1812. In his speech moving the first
reading of the Metropolitan Police Bill in the House of Commons' 3 Peel concentrated
on criminal statistics and variations in police provision in London's parishes, as
furnished by the Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis.' 4 Opposition to
the new police was founded on three principle objections; i) libertarian concern with
the imposition of a repressive force in the style of France's gendarmerie and their
surveiller methods,' 5 ii) in defence of the tradition of local autonomy against central
government tyranny' 6 and iii) the financial costs of a police force.' 7 These objections
can be separated into two parts - political and legal. On the one hand, at a time when
liberal democratic ideals were in their infancy, a major stumbling block to acceptance
of the police idea arose from concerns with who was to issue them with instructions
and how was political control to be exerted over a publicly funded coercive force?
And, on the other hand, what powers would be granted to the police and by what legal
mechanisms would police officers be held responsible for their actions? Although
these political and legal concerns are inter-related, they can be isolated for analytical
purposes and they were addressed separately at the time, the former by statutory
change and the latter predominantly by reliance on common law. The five statutes
listed above, enacted between 1829 and 1856, addressed predominantly administrative
and financial details of the new police organisation, with constables' powers and
duties left largely as defined by common law.
Five principles of organisation characterised the early police: i) subordination to
justices of the peace, ii) democratic oversight, iii) possession of few powers to
separate officers from citizens, iv) peace keeping and crime prevention duties and v)
non-military uniforms. For the Metropolitan Police, continuation of the common law
subordination of police officers to the authority of justices was initially contrived
through Crown appointment of two ex-officio justices to administrate the force under
' 
'Metropolis Police Improvement Bill,' H.C. (15 April 1829) ParL Debates (1829), n.s. vol.21, cols.
867-884.
'Report From the Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis' (H.C. 533), 1828,
Parliamentary Papers (1828), vol.6. p.1.
' Radzinowicz, op. cit., p.291; Ascoli, op. cit., p.94; Emsley, op. cit., p.25; Hobbs, D. (1989), p.39.
16 Marshall, G. (1965), Ch.4; Radzinowicz, op. cit., p.291; Emsley, op. cit., pp.52-3.
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s.1 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829. The two 'justices' were excluded from
judicial functions and their duties were restricted to 'the Preservation of the Peace, the
Prevention of Crimes, the Detection and Committal of Offenders'. The first two
Metropolitan police justices, Sir Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne, were commonly
referred to as Commissioners and s.4 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 abandoned
the pretence and re-styled them 'Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis'.'8
Nevertheless, the principle of Metropolitan police officers subjugation to the authority
of magistrates was adhered to and extended by s. 10 of the Administration of Justice
Act 1833 which provided for London's magistrates to punish police officers. 19 For
provincial town and county police forces: officers were sworn in as constables before
justices of the peace,2° had to obey justices' lawful commands, 2 ' were liable to
suspension or dismissal from duty by justices,22 recommendations on policing
requirements in the counties were made by justices to the Home Secretary 23 and
justices had responsibility for appointing and dismissing head constables subject to his
approval.24
Democratic oversight of the new police was provided for the Metropolitan Police by
s.1 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829, which allowed for the first Commissioners to
be 'from Time to Time directed by' the Home Secretary; and by the appointment of
watch committees for provincial borough forces 25 and the Home Secretary being
responsible for rules governing county forces. 26 The early police statutes, with the
exception of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 27 and the Town Police Clauses Act
1847,28 only conferred two additional powers on officers: to arrest while on duty
' Radzinowicz, op. cit., p.218; Emsley, op. cit., p26.
IS	 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1856 allowed for only one Commissioner, and it was not until the
Administration of Justice Act 1973, s.l(9) that the Commissioner was derecognised as ajustice.
19 See below, p.129.
20 S.42 of the Lighting and Watching Act 1833; s.76 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835; s.8 of the
County Police Act 1839; s.8 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847.
21 S.76 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835; s.6 of the County Police Act 1839; ss.6 & 7 of the
County and Borough Police Act 1856.
22 Ss.77 & 80 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835; s.12 of the County Police Act 1839.
23	 of the County Police Act 1839; s.1 of the County and Borough Police Act 1856.
24 S.4 of the County Police Act 1839.
25 S.77 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835.
26 S.3 of the County Police Act 1839.
27 See below, p.136.
28 This Act consolidated powers contained in local statutes.
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persons disturbing the peace and suspected of having 'evil designs' 29 or intention to
commit a felony,30 and to grant bail. 3 ' Thus, early police officers did not possess
significant powers, certainly by present standards, which separated them from
ordinary citizens. Furthermore, there remained a clear separation between their
limited executive responsibilities and their subordination to magistrates' combined
executive and judicial functions. 32 The common law peace keeping and law
enforcement responsibilities of constables were retained, and the early police
deliberately desisted from developing their potential for crime detection. 33 Finally,
police officers were issued with blue serge uniforms and black top hats. This was not
without problems as the mere existence of a uniform, partly introduced so that officers
could be easily identified to allay fears of police spies, made police forces liable for
criticism as a military force. 34 However, in principle, the only fundamental change
created by the introduction of modem police forces was the organisation of individual
constables under local bureaucratic structures.35
The quality of justice left much to be desired in the early to mid-nineteenth century.36
Parish constables and 'trading justices' were held in general disdain in their
communities for using their positions for financial gain 37 and criminal prosecutions
were conducted privately at great expense to victims. 38 Associations for the
Prosecution of Felons operated on a subscription basis, in similar style to modem
insurance companies, providing protection for legal costs and organising police
29 S.7 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829; s.41 of the Lighting and Watching Act 1833;
30 S.41 of the Lighting and Watching Act 1833; s.78 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835; s.8 of the
County Police Act 1839; s.6 of the Counties and Boroughs Police Act 1856.
31 S.9 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829; s.79 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835; s.8 of the
County Police Act 1839; s.6 of the Counties and Boroughs Police Act 1856. See Dixon, D. (1995),
p.134.
32 S.7 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829; s.41 of the Lighting and Watching Act 1833; s.78 of the
Municipal Corporations Act 1835; s.8 of the County Police Act 1839; s.6 of the Counties and
Boroughs Police Act 1856.
Ascoli, op. cit., pp.74-5; and see below on evidence to parliamentary select committees.
Radzinowicz, op. cit., p.163; Critchley, op. cit., p.52; Emsley, op. cit., p.25; and see discussion
below on criminal investigation, p.135.
For Elmsley, op. cit., p.229, this amounted to a radical departure in the case of the Metropolitan
Police - 'a large body of uniformed men answerable directly to the Home Secretary'.
36 Hay, D. and F. Snyder (1989), p36.
' Critchley, op. cit., p.18; Brogden, M. et a! (1988), pp.53-5. However, Sidney and Beatrice Webb
argue in the first volume of their history of English Local Government 'The Parish and the County'
(1906) that their standing improved in the early part of the century, in Radzinowicz, op. cit., p.219.
Hay and Snyder, op. cit., and see discussion below on police prosecutions, p.138.
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patrols in some areas; 39 by 1839 some 500 were believed to be in operation. 4° The
procedure for private prosecutions was a long drawn out affair which required the
services of a solicitor, and for many people the time, expense and emotional
considerations discouraged them from prosecuting offenders. 4 ' Due to the cost of
prosecutions, 'compounding', the return of stolen property or the victim's acceptance
of some manner of compensation, was encouraged by magistrates for misdemeanours,
but was prohibited for felonies. 42 The remnants of a feudal penal system remained in
place with reliance on public spectacles for their deterrent effect; England was one of
the last European states to abandon public executions. 43 Thus, at the time of the
formation of the police organisation, the subordination of the police officer to the
justice of the peace, a local judicial officer, was fundamental to the principle of
equality before the law as it placed police officers, with limited executive powers, on
the same footing as ordinary citizens in relation to the law. In theory, regardless of
how efficient the administration of justice was at that time, its quality was similar for
police officers and citizens alike all other factors being equal; namely, in
consideration of their class status and wealth.
Police criminal code
Following completion of two Parliamentary Select Committees in 1833 into
allegations of spying44 and the use of excessive force by Metropolitan police officers,45
both of which exonerated the police, the 1834 Select Committee on the Police of the
Metropolis was a general inquiry into police efficiency. 46 Historical significance is
Philips, D. (1989), p.145.
Lidstone, K. et al (1980), p.2.
41 Eighteenth century legislation provided for the recovery of some prosecution costs following
conviction in felony cases. The Criminal Justice Act 1826, part of Peel's reforms, extended this
provision to cover all witnesses and included some misdemeanours, notably assaults.
42 Hay and Snyder, op. cit., p38.
Hay, D. (1975).
4° 'Report from the Select Committee on the Petition of Frederick Young and others' (H.C. 627),
1833, Parliamentary Papers(1833), vol. 13, p.407. See below p.135.
4° 
'Report from the Select Committee on Cold Bath Fields Meeting' (H.C. 718), 1833, Parliamentary
Papers (1833), vol. 13, p.589. See Radzinowicz, op. cit., pp.181-184.
4° ' Report from the Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis, with the Minutes of Evidence,
Appendix and thdex' (600), 1834, Parliamentary Papers (H.C. 1834), vol. 16, p.1.
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attached to this Committee for the exposition of the police complaint procedure as
described by Commissioners Rowan and Mayne.47
The Committee was unequivocal in its praise for the new police:
• . .the Metropolitan Police Force, as respects its influence in
repressing crime, and the security it has given to person and
property, is one of the most valuable of modem institutions.48
But, the evidence to the Committee was far from unanimous, and particular mention
was made of police officers' criminal and civil liability. R. E. Broughton, a justice in
East London, commented on the difficulties facing magistrates when dealing with
allegations against the police - 'if they are charged with an assault or any offence, for
which as citizens they are liable, we grant a warrant, or more generally a summons;
but there are many little misdemeanours and misconduct on the part of the
constable.'49 The Queen Square magistrate, W. A. A. White, in reply to the question
'Are the police constables liable to actions from false imprisonment and assaults?'
answered: 'Yes; but what damages could a police constable give to a man so
imprisoned, or what kind of action could a poor labourer, who has been locked up all
night and got his head broken, bring against the police?' 50 He added, 'I think there is
no security to the poor, because I think they are very much ill treated by the police.'5'
White was of the opinion that the criminal justice process had improved with the
creation of a modem police force and, along with other magistrates, had not resorted
to complaining because he did not wish to 'be looked upon as an enemy of the Police
force.'52
These concerns with inadequate regulation of police officers' conduct, particularly the
difficulties in establishing criminal and civil liability under the common law system of
citizen prosecution or the expense of civil litigation, had been addressed the year
Maguire, M. and C. Corbett (1991), p.6.
'Report from the Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis' (H.C. 600), 1834, Parliamentary
Papers (1834), vol. l6,p.l atp.21.
49 Ibid., at p.141.
50 This is the first record I have discovered of the conflict between the modem police officer's personal
liability in civil law and his inability to meet substantial damages, as eventually resolved by
introduction of a vicarious liability rule under s.48 of the Police Act 1964, see Chapter Five, below
p.1 69.
' 'Report', op. cit., at p.150.
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before the Select Committee with provision under s. 10 of the Administration of
Justice Act 1833 for London's magistrates to determine cases of police misconduct:
[If] any Constable appointed and sworn in as herein-before last
mentioned, shall be guilty of any disobedience of Orders, Neglect
of Duty, or of any Misconduct as such Constable, and shall be
convicted thereof before Two Justices of the Peace, he shall forfeit
any Sum not exceeding Ten Pounds, and in default of immediate
Payment shall suffer Imprisonment, with or without hard Labour,
for any Time not exceeding Three Months: Provided always, that
nothing herein contained shall prevent any such Person from being
proceeded against by way of Indictment for any Offence committed
by him as Constable, so as that no Person shall be proceeded
against both by Indictment and also under this Act for the same
Offence.
This is a confusing piece of legislation for which I have been unable to trace any case
law53 and which has several implications. The clause is explained in the Report of the
1834 Select Committee as a pragmatic solution to the inconvenience that faced
complainants who had to travel to Whitehall.54 Radzinowicz makes a literal
translation referring to 'statutory provision for complaints to be heard and determined
by magistrates, who could impose fines of up to ten pounds with three months
imprisonment in default'. He goes on to mention the Commissioners' evidence to the
1834 Select Committee supporting the principle of complaints resolution by
magistrates in all cases as 'more satisfactory to public opinion'. 55 Taking issue with
Radzinowicz on this last point first, he appears to have interpreted the statute
according to contemporary assumptions on the police complaint process and not on
the basis of nineteenth century common law. The initial opinion given by Mayne in
evidence was 'that it would be preferable to send complaints much more frequently to
magistrates than to us; we conceive it to be less immediately our duty, and I think it
would be more satisfactory to the public....' 56 Mayne's doubt as to whether police
misconduct was the Commissioners' responsibility appears to show their support for
the principle of the subordination of police officers to the legal authority of
magistrates. With regard to Radzinowicz's first point, s.10 makes no mention of
complaints, and refers more generally to 'any misconduct', before distinguishing
52 Ibid., at p.151; see also H. M. Dyer at pp.l5'7-8; J. 1-lardwick at p.178; A. S. Laing at pp.182-183.
See below fn.126 for nineteenth century law reports on police wrongdoing.
'Report', op. cit., at p.9.
Radzinowicz, op. cit., p.176.
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between misconduct and criminal offences and excluding prosecution by s.1O and
indictment, the modern day 'double jeopardy' rule. 57
 This codification of police
neglect of duty and misconduct, and the marked absence of reference to complaints,
amounts to criminalisation, as opposed to its treatment by complaint resolution, by
providing for determination according to criminal procedure and sentence. This
amounted to enactment of a specific criminal code for neglect of police duty and
misconduct in similar fashion to the tradition of a separate code for assaulting a police
officer in the execution of his duty.58
Criminalisation of police neglect of duty was not purely an administrative measure,
designed to avoid inconvenience to Londoners, as suggested by the 1834 Select
Committee Report. Magistrates were given powers throughout England and Wales to
determine cases of police neglect of duty and disobedience of lawful orders. The
clause was revised by s.14 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839, restricted to neglect
of duty and with the unnecessary reference to indictments omitted. 59 Similar
provisions were made for neglect of duty and disobedience of lawful orders by
borough police officers under s.80 of the Municipal Corporations Act 183560
(magistrates were granted the additional power of dismissal), revised by s. 194 of the
Municipal Corporations Act 1882. Finally, s. 12 of the County Police Act 183961
similarly allowed for justices to hear cases of 'Neglect or Violation of Duty' 62 without
powers of dismissal. Statistics from the time reveal that the Commissioners resorted
to s. 14, indicating that criminalisation of police neglect of duty also reflected the
seriousness with which Parliament, magistrates and chief officers viewed police
56 
'Report', op. cit., at p.339.
"See Chapter Six, below p.191.
S.8 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829; s.8 1 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835; s. 18 of the
County Police Act 1839; s.51(1) of the Police Act 1964; s.89(1) of the Police Act 1996.
'..every Constable who shall be guilty of any Neglect of Duty in his Office of Constable shall be
liable to a Penalty not more than Ten Pounds, the Amount of which Penalty may be deducted from any
Salary then due to such Offender, or, in the Discretion of the Magistrate, may be imprisoned, with or
without hard Labour, for any Time not more than One Calendar Month.'
60 '..if any Constable of any Borough shall be guilty of any Neglect of Duty or of any Disobedience of
any Lawful Order, every such Offender, being convicted thereof before any Two Justices of the Peace,
shall for every such Offence be liable to be imprisoned for any Time not exceeding Ten Days, or to be
fined in any Sum not exceeding Forty Shillings, or to be dismissed for his Office, as such Justices shall
in their discretion think meet.'
61 And s.16 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847.
62 See below fn.126, Chishoim v. Holland(1886) 50 J.P. 197.
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misconduct. 164 Metropolitan police officers were charged with s. 14 type offences63
between 1842 and 1848, of which 118 were brought by private citizens and, out of the
57 convicted, 40 were charged by one of the Commissioners.M
Civil actions
The only records of early tort actions against police officers are found in law reports.
A search of false imprisonment actions with police officers as defendants reveals that
prior to the formation of the modem police forces several cases were reported of civil
actions against parish constables. These actions played a significant part in
determining constables' common law powers of arrest without warrant, on reasonable
suspicion grounds for felonies or for breaches of the peace. 65 Other actions were
brought in connection with provisions for the issue of warrants under the Constables
Protection Act 1 75066 and the exercise of reasonable force. 67 During the period when
the modem police were formed, however, remarkably few actions against police
officers were reported. I have located just one action unconnected with the
Constables Protection Act 1750;68 in Bowditch v. Balchin69 a City of London police
officer was found liable for assault and false imprisonment for arresting a suspect
without warrant on suspicion of a misdemeanour. Defendants in actions for false
imprisonment between 1830 and 1856 were primarily persons who alleged they were
victims of crimes who had caused plaintiffs to be taken into police custody. In these
cases tortious conduct was not alleged against police officers, and their only interest
63 Neglect of duty, violation of duty, misconduct as a constable and absent without leave.
'Return of Officers of the Metropolitan Police Force who have been charged with Offences before
the Magistrates during the Years 1842 and 1843', Parliamentary Papers (1844), vol.39, pp.687-691;
'Return of Police Constables and Others, Officers of the Metropolitan Police Force, who have been
charged with Offences before any of the Police Magistrates during each Year from 1844 to 1848
inclusive' (H.C. 133) 1849, Parliamentary Papers (1849), vol.64, pp.687-691, see further below,
p.146.
65 Samuel v. Payne (1780) 1 Dougi. 39, 99 E.R. 230; White v. Taylor (1801) 4 Esp. 80, 170 E.R. 648;
Lawrence v. Hedger (1810) 3 Taunt. 14, 128 E.R. 6; Hobbs v. Branscombe (1813) 3 Camp. 420, 170
E.R. 1431; McLoughan v. Clayton (1816) Hoit 478, 171 E.R. 311; Isaacs v. Brand(1817) 2 Stark. 187,
171 E.R. 609; Beckwith v. Philby (1827) 6 B. & C. 635, 108 E.R. 585; Davis v. Russell (1829) 5 Bing.
354, 130 E.R.; Lewis v. Arnold (1830)4 Car. & P. 354, 172 E.R. 737.
Theobaldv. Crichmore (1818) 1 B. & AId. 227, 106 E.R. 83 & 1538; Parton v. Williams (1820) 3 B.
& Ald. 330, 106 E.R. 684.
67 Hedges v Chapman (1825) 2 Bing. 523, 130 E.R. 408, Wright v. Court (1825) 4 B. & C. 596, 107
E.R. 1182.
68 The few cases reported primarily concerned interpretation of the Constables Protection Act 1750 -
Hoye v. Bush (1840) 1 Man. & 0., 133 E.R. 545; Gosden v. Elphick (1849)4 Ex. 445, 154 E.R. 1287.
69 (1850) 5 Ex. 378, 155 E.R. 165.
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was as witnesses. 7° This finding corresponds with the comment to the 1834 Select
Committee by the Queen Square magistrate on the difficulties involved in suing
police officers.
First discipline and complaint procedures
The 1834 Select Committee addressed the problem of police misconduct more
generally by reference to the need for an effective complaints procedure, the Report
stated:
The Committee are of the opinion that every precaution is taken by
the Commissioners in the choice of men, and in their conduct
afterwards, and it appears from the evidence that there is a
disposition on the part of the Commissioners to remedy every
inconvenience arising from this cause, of which the public has had
any just reason to complain.7'
The first Metropolitan Police Commissioners were faced with many problems in
establishing a credible police force. In addition to the external problem of public
opposition, there were internal difficulties with enforcing discipline which lasted for
many years. Commissioners Rowan and Mayne gave evidence to the 1834 Select
Committee that the Metropolitan Police was established with 2,800 officers with a
turnover of over 80% in the first 16 months as shown in Table X.
TableX. Officers departing the Metropolitan Police Force 1830-1 832
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
Source: Evidence to the 1834 Select Committee72
Drunkenness on duty was the chief cause of dismissals, amounting to 80%, and
resignations were largely attributed to the low wages of three shillings a day.74
° Cant v. Parsons (1834) 4 H. & N. 504, 172 E.R. 1339; Wood v. Lane (1834) 6 Car. & P. 774, 172
E.R. 1458; Peters v. Stanway(1835) 6 Car. & P. 737, 172 E.R. 1442; Kine v. Evershed(1847) 10 QB.
143, 116 E.R. 56; Derecourtv. Corbishley(1855) 5 E. & B. 188, 119 E.R. 450.
' 'Report from the Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis' (H.C. 600), 1834, Parliamentary
Papers (1834), vol. 16, P.1 at p.8.
72 Ibid., at p.31.
Ibid., at p.32.
Radzinowicz, op. cit., p.170.
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As ex-officio justices, the two Commissioners had responsibility for regulations and
discipline under s.5 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839. Mayne comprehensively
outlined the Metropolitan Police's complaints procedure to the Select Committee:
A party may now either write a letter to the Commissioner, upon
which he receives an immediate answer that inquiry will be made
into the subject of the complaint; his letter is then sent down to the
Superintendent of the Police at the place, who makes his inquiries
from the parties at times the most convenient to them; he calls
upon them, takes down their statement, and hears what the officer
accused has to say in answer; or sometimes the parties
complaining prefer going to the Superintendent's office on the spot
to make their statement; in that case, if the offence be trifling, it is
sometimes settled by the officer expressing sorrow and apologising
to the party, or some small fine is imposed by the Superintendent,
which is afterwards submitted to the Commissioners, as is done in
all cases, and they approve of it, or otherwise, as appears fit; or
should the party wish to come down to the Commissioners, if it be
a case which is likely to require the dismissal of a man, or nay other
reason makes him wish to come before them, he may do so, and
then a time, the most convenient to him, is appointed for the
purpose, and the case is then disposed of; or if the case be of that
importance that the Superintendent cannot settle it, and that the
parties do not choose to come down to Whitehall, the statements of
all are taken down in writing on the spot, and sent to the
Commissioners, upon which they have the man before them, and
decide the case without requiring the parties to attend. The
Commissioners think they can safely say, that they do not believe
that any complaint has been withheld from the want of facility in
having it heard and decided on the spot.75
Essentially the same complaint procedure was outlined over 70 years later to the 1908
Royal Commission upon the Duties of the Metropolitan Police.76
For borough police forces statutory provision was made for disciplining police
officers by s.77 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835. Watch committees had
responsibility for framing regulations and powers to suspend and dismiss officers who
they thought negligent in the discharge of their duties or otherwise unfit, and, in
keeping with the principle of judicial control of police officers, two justices with
jurisdiction in the borough were empowered to suspend and dismiss. For county
'Report', op. cit., at pp.420-i.
76 
'Report of the Royal Commission upon the Duties of the Metropolitan Police' (Cmnd. 4156), 1908,
Parliamentary Papers (1908) vol. 50, p.1 at pp.60-61.
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police forces the situation was different. Although responsibility for establishing
county forces rested with local justices of the Quarter Sessions, 77
 chief officers had
responsibility for discipline78 and the Home Secretary was responsible for the 'Rules
for the government, pay, clothing, and accoutrements and necessaries of such
constables as may be appointed'. 79 An amending Act followed in 184080 providing for
Rules and Regulations which, on their issue, made chief constables responsible for
force orders and regulations, subject to justices' approval, and granted them
discretionary powers to summarily hear complaints or lay an information before
justices under s.12 of the County Police Act 1839.81
To summarise the position at the time of the formation of modem police forces; the
over-riding concern of the government, the judiciary and senior police officers was to
achieve public acceptance. Police officers were in possession of relatively few
powers and operated under the judicial authority of local magistrates and the
democratic control of local authorities. The criminal offence of neglect of duty served
to exert legal control over police officers and actions for damages against officers
were rare. At this early stage in police history the internal disciplinary and complaints
procedures served limited administrative functions, and for borough forces was the
responsibility of the watch committee.
II.	 Expansion of Police Powers
Although there was no statutory requirement to establish police forces until the
County and Borough Police Act 1856, a nationwide network of police forces existed
under the provisions of the Metropolitan Police Acts of 1829 and 1839, the Municipal
Corporations Act 1835 and the County Police Act 1839. The early police forces were
beset by many problems, not least their need to overcome widespread opposition.
This required chief officers and supporters of police reform to pay full regard to
" S.1 of the County police Act 1839.
78 S.6 of the County police Act 1839.
S.3 of the County Police Act 1839. See Radzinowicz, op. cit., p263.
80 3 and 4 Vict. c.88.
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public opinion, yet also seek to influence it. Many police initiatives were in response
to public criticism, for example following the Popay and Good incidents described
below. The police also adopted a proactive approach to criminal justice by lobbying
for increased powers82 and developing their existing powers within the common law.
The police institution's expansion into two areas of the criminal justice process are
important to this study - investigation and prosecution.
The primary effect of the extension of police powers into investigation and
prosecution was to improve the quality of criminal justice in the second half of the
nineteenth century. However, an inevitable consequence of increased powers was the
trend towards separation of the police officer from the citizen. This position was
compounded by extensive codification of criminal law with the corollary of additional
powers for police officers.83 Young remarks on the Larceny Act 1861,84 Malicious
Damage Act 1861, Offences Against the Persons Act 1861 and the Licensing Act
1872: 'These Acts were so well framed and controlled the activities of the 'dangerous
classes' so decisively that they were still in operation a century later, and beyond.'85
Criminal investigation
In the 1 830s public opinion was vehemently opposed to police officers interfering in
peoples' lives and major emphasis was placed on crime prevention in preference to
detection. 86 In London, the Bow Street Runners, and lesser known private agencies,
continued to conduct criminal investigations until they were disbanded after the
Metropolitan Police Act 1839, concurrent with the decline of prosecuting associations
in the rest of the country. 87 Argument raged over the Metropolitan Police's crime
detection function as early as 1833 with the appointment of a Select Committee to
hear a petition by members of the National Political Union of the Working Class
SI Radzinowicz, op. cit., p.266-268.
82 The Metropolitan Police Commissioners lobbying for increased powers was rewarded under the
Metropolitan Police Act 1839; Uglow, S. (1988), p.50-52; Dixon, op. cit., p.136, see below p.136.
Brogden, M. (1982), p.130; Emsley, op. cit., p.70; Dixon, op. cit., p.147.
Amended 1916 and then repealed by the Theft Act 1968.
Young, M. (1991), p.262.
Radzinowicz, op. cit., Ch.5; Critchley, op. cit., p.52; Ascoli, op. cit., p118; Hobbs, op. cit., p.34.
Radzinowicz, op. cit.; Ericson, R. (1981), p1; Hay and Snyder, op. cit.; Philips, op. cit.
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alleging spying. 88 A police sergeant Popay had joined the Union under the guise of an
artist and operated as an agent provocateur. The contemporary issue of police
uniforms as a means of identification dominated proceedings. In their evidence to the
Committee, Rowan and Mayne explained that on formation all officers were required
to wear uniforms with the consequence that suspects often ran away on seeing them
approach. Following representations the Home Secretary then authorised plain
clothed duties in the interests of efficiency despite magistrates concerns that this was a
'dangerous precedent'. 89 The Select ConmiiUee Report concluded in favour of 'the
occasional employment of Policemen in plain clothes' while opposing the use of spies
as 'most alien to the spirit of the Constitution.'9°
The balance between crime prevention and detection raised its head again during
hearings of the 1838 Select Committee on Metropolitan Police Offices.9 ' On this
occasion Rowan and Mayne defended police officers against criticisms that there had
been little improvement in the detection of criminals since the introduction of the new
police.92 Firstly, they pointed to a false dichotomy between prevention and detection,
asserting, on the one hand, that a police officer who witnessed a crime as part of his
preventive function had, in effect, detected a crime, and, on the other hand, that
probability of detection was effectively preventative. Secondly, by comparison of
offences recorded in 1802 and 1837 they argued that crime prevention had avoided
perhaps as many as 6,000 felonies. And thirdly, with regard to detection, they gave
details of procedures and their outcomes while impressing the restrictions imposed by
limited legal authority. 93 The powers of Metropolitan police officers were
considerably strengthened following the government's inclusion of recommendations
by the 1838 Select Committee in the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 and the
Metropolitan Police Courts Act 1839. There was some clarification of the separate
executive functions of the police from magistrates' judicial functions by provision
'Report from the Select Committee on the Petition of Frederick Young and others' (H.C. 627), 1833,
Parliamentary Papers (1833), vol. 13, p.407. See Radzinowicz, op. cit., pp.185-189; Ascoli, op. cit.,
p.118; Hobbs, op. cit., p.39.
89 
'Report', op. cit., at p.487.
90Ibid.
°' 'Report from the Select Committee on Metropolitan Police Offices, with Minutes of Evidence' (H.C.
578), 1838, Parliamentary Papers (1837-1838), vol. 15, p.321.
Ibid., at pp.102-3 of minutes.
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under the Police Act for police officers to attend on the courts and, although court
officials continued to be sworn in as constables, their powers were restricted to court
precincts by the Police Courts Act. Thus Metropolitan police officers had sole
responsibility for serving summonses and executing warrants, in addition police
officers' powers of summary arrest were extended and 25 new offences listed.94
Rowan and Mayne's reluctance to formalise criminal investigation is largely
attributed to the Popay incident and their cautious approach to winning public
approval. 95 And it was public pressure following a 10 day delay in the arrest of a
suspected murderer which moved the Commissioners to request authorisation from
the Home Secretary to establish a detective force of two inspectors and six sergeants.96
When Edmund Henderson was appointed Metropolitan Commissioner in 1869 he
inherited 15 detectives, all stationed at Scotland Yard. 97 On 12 May 1869 their
number was increased by 27, and on 2 June 180 detectives were appointed to the
Metropolitan Police Divisions.98 Scandal hit the detective department in 1877 when
three principal officers were convicted of turf fraud and detectives were reorganised
into the Criminal Investigation Department. Thus, public opposition to police
criminal investigations and the Commissioners' reluctance to deploy detectives had
been sufficiently neutralised within 50 years so as to establish an elite squad of
officers on a higher pay scale than uniformed officers and with their own
administrative structure.'°°
Ibid., at p.103.
Radzinowicz, op. cit., pp.198-205; Uglow, op. cit., p.50-52; Dixon, op. cit., p.136.
Ascoli, op. cit., p.118.
Discovery of the body of a murdered girl in Roehampton on 6 April 1842 was followed by a public
outcry against police inefficiency, led by the Times, for failing to arrest Daniel Good who was
eventually convicted and publicly hanged. Mayne and Rowan made their request on 14 June and the
small detective force was established on 20 June as part of the Commissioners' Office. See Ascoli, op.
cit., pp.1 17-119; Klockars, K. (1985), p.70; Hobbs, op. cit., p.38.
'Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the year 1869' (Cmnd. 150), 1870,
Parliamentary Papers (1870), vol. 36, p.461 at p.463.
Ibid., at p.464.
'Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the year 1877' (Cmnd. 2129), 1878,
Parliamentary Papers(1878), vol. 40, p.384 at p.390. See Ascoli, op. cii., pp.137-i48; Hobbs, op. cit.,
p.41.
'°° 'Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the year 1877' (Cmnd. 2129), 1878,
Parliamentary Papers (1878), vol. 40, p.384 at p.390. Subsequent events indicate that early concerns
with police powers to investigate crimes were well founded. The 1929 Royal Commission on Police
Powers and Procedure singled out the C.I.D. for criticism stating 'There is, we fear, a tendency
amongst this branch of the service to regard itself as a thing above and apart, to which the restraints
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With regard to detectives in provincial forces, particular mention is made in the first
Inspectors of Constabulary annual report'°' by Major General William Cartwright,
Inspector for No. 1 District, Eastern Counties, Midlands and North Wales, suggesting
the appointment of detectives in county forces so they can liase with borough
detectives.'°2 The following year he similarly reported 'that some improvement in the
detective system is required' with the comment that certainty of punishment is better
than severity of punishment. 103 Cartwright was succeeded by Lieutenant C. A. Cobbe
in 1869 who regularly reported that approximately 50 detectives served the boroughs
in No. 1 District throughout the 1870s increasing to 60-65 in the mid 1880s.'°4 The
Inspectors for the other two regions did not report on detective strengths throughout
this period.
Criminal prosecutions
The manner by which the police assumed responsibility for the conduct of criminal
prosecutions serves as an ideal illustration of nineteenth century proactive policing.
The principal dilemma confronting the administration of justice in mid-century was
not concerned with the role of police prosecutors, it was whether there should be
public prosecutors given the reluctance of citizens to prosecute. As early as 1837
Mayne gave evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Law that Metropolitan
officers were responsible for many prosecutions in London, 105 and for the next 40
years there is evidence that the police forced the pace of change.
and limitations placed upon the ordinary police do not, or should not, apply. This error, if not checked,
is bound to lead to abuses which may grow until they bring discredit upon the whole police force'
('Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures', (Cmnd. 3297), 1929,
Parliamentary Papers (1928-29), vol.9, p.127 at p.102 of report.) Within 50 years the Commissioners
fears were borne out and Metropolitan Commissioner, Sir Robert Mark, acted by reorganising the
C.I.D. under the control of uniformed officers; Mark, R. (1978), Ch. 8.
101 Required under s.15 of the County and Borough Police Act 1856.
102 
'Inspectors of Constabulary Reports for year ending 29 September 1857' (H.C. 20), 1858,
Parliamentary Papers (1857-1858), vol.42, p.657 at p.666. No mention is made in reports of when
detectives were introduced in borough forces or their early development.
103 
'Inspectors of Constabulary Reports for year ending 29 September 1858' (H.C. 17), 1859,
Parliamentary Papers (1859), vol.22, p.399 at p.499.
'° Inspectors' of constabulary reports 1869-1890.
105 
'Third Report from the Commission on Criminal Law (Juvenile Offenders)' (H.C. 79), 1837,
Parliamentary Papers (1837), vol.31, p.1.
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In 1845 members of the Criminal Law Commission concluded in their Eighth Report
that although the principle of private prosecution by the offended party could be
defended on moral and legal grounds there were important practical reservations:
The existing law... is by no means so effectual as it ought to be: the
duty of prosecution is usually irksome, inconvenient and
burdensome; the injured party would often rather forego the
prosecution than incur expense of time, labour, and money. When,
therefore, the party injured is compelled by the magistrate to act as
prosecutor, the duty is frequently performed unwillingly and
carelessly. It cannot be well performed in any case without the aid
of an attorney, nor without greater cost and expense than is usually
allowed to the party who prosecutes. Hence it happens but too
often, that prosecutions are conducted in a loose and an
unsatisfactory manner, from want of the means and labour essential
to a just and satisfactory inquiry.
The intrusting of the conduct of the prosecution to a private
individual opens a wide door to bribery, collusion, and illegal
compromises. Independently of these obvious objections attending
such a course, it frequently happens that there is no person who can
legally be called upon to prosecute; as in cases of homicide....
The direct and obvious course for remedying such defects would
consist in the appointment of public prosecutors.'°6
In written evidence to the Criminal Law Commission a wide range of opinions on the
conduct of prosecutions was given in response to a questionnaire circulated to judges,
officers of the courts and members of the legal profession. Although many responses
outlined police practices for conducting prosecutions, none supported the police's
assumption of the power. Evidence was given that in Lancashire relatives of deceased
persons seldom prosecuted, and in the event of a police officer being bound over to
prosecute he would guard against personal expense by preparing the case carelessly to
avoid legal costs.'°7 Similar reports came in from Lincoinshire, Devon and
Hertfordshire on the practices of the police in conducting prosecutions. A submission
came from the Recorder of Leeds, T. F. Ellis, on the local practice which he
understood to have been developed from the Liverpool system of appointing a police
officer as a nominal prosecutor. In Leeds there was not a stipendiary magistrate:
the justices always bind over the head of the police as prosecutor,
and the conduct of the prosecutions has been intrusted to two
106 
'Eighth Report of the Her Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law' (H.C. 656),1845,
Parliamentary Papers (1845), vol. 14, p.16 I at pp.184-185.
Ibid., at p.319.
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attorneys. Two, I understand, were named in order that the
appointment might not be made the subject of party contest;... since
the plan was carried into effect, [there has been] a very great
improvement in the conduct of the prosecutions which have come
before me in the borough of Leeds.'°8
Ten years later, discrepancies between minuted evidence to the 1854-5 Select
Committee on Public Prosecutors and the Committee's Report suggests a fiercely
partisan debate on the merits of police conduct of prosecutions with an apparent
willingness for exaggerated claims and omissions as the legal profession sought to
defend its interests against the police. In giving evidence to the Committee the Under
Secretary of State at the Home Office, Horatio Waddington, categorically refused to
criticise Metropolitan Police officers for their role in the conduct of prosecutions and
went to some lengths to commend the police:
Though it certainly would appear that it is a very loose mode
indeed of conducting the criminal business of the country, yet I am
not prepared to state from any complaints which have come to my
knowledge, that the cases are so badly conducted as to lead to any
decided failure of justice. I may also add, that in the great number
of cases which are brought under the review of the Secretary of
State, which are tried at the Central Criminal Court and at the
Middlesex Sessions, in which we always see either the depositions
or a printed report, it does not seem to me, from reading those, that
there is frequently any great want of care in getting up the case; the
evidence generally seems to be tolerably well arranged, and the
proofs are of very much the same nature as we find in the cases
which are tried at the assizes, where they are, generally speaking,
got up by attorneys.'09
However, in the Committee's Report published the following year Waddington's
evidence was not outlined and misrepresented by mention only of his acceptance that
police involvement in the preparation of prosecutions was highly irregular."°
T. F. Ellis the Leeds Recorder again gave evidence, stating that one of the two police
superintendents in charge of the Leeds force had responsibility 'to keep the witnesses
together and see that they are forthcoming, and he generally does that by the
'°8 lbid., at p.313.
'° 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors' (H.C. 48), 1854
and 1855, Parliamentary Papers (1854-1855), vol. 12, p.8 at p.168.
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instrumentality of the policeman who has seen most of the case." A practice which
by then had been adopted in London according to the Chief Clerk to the Lord Mayor
at the Mansion House; 'all that the constable has to do is to take his instructions and
to marshal his witnesses, to see that they are at the indictment office door and come
up to the clerk of indictments." 2 On the other hand, Crown Draughtsman, R. M.
Straight thought Metropolitan officers 'too eager to convict' and was suspicious that
police officers took a cut for themselves when claiming expenses for witnesses they
had marshalled." 3 J. H. Preston, a solicitor, thought it entirely improper that police
officers should play a part in a case in which they were not witnesses." 4 Another
solicitor, F. Hobler, betrayed his personal interests when he commented 'It interferes
with the duties of a professional man very much, and gives the police a power and
authority which I do not think is consistent with their duty simply as police." 5 Sir
Alexander Cockburn, the Attorney General and a member of the Committee, made
one of the most critical submissions against the police:
I do not think it is consistent with the proper administration of
public justice, in a great country like this, that you should have a
subordinate officer, who is merely the keeper of the prisoner,
clothing himself with the functions of a public prosecutor. I think
it has, also, this further mischievous effect. I have observed after,
and have had occasion to notice it in court, how policemen became
over-zealous in the conduct of prosecutions. I can quite account for
it now; what we have heard throws light upon it. I was not aware
of the circumstances... that the promotion of policemen is made to
depend upon the prosecutions which they successfully conduct.
• . . .policemen should be kept strictly to their functions as policemen,
as persons to apprehend, and to have the custody of prisoners, and
not as persons who are to mix themselves up in the conduct of a
prosecution, whereby they acquire a bias."6
'° 'Report from the Select Committee on Public Prosecutions; with the Proceedings and Minutes of
Evidence' (H.C. 206), 1856, Parliamentary Papers (1856), vol 7, p.347 at p.350.
' 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors' (1-IC. 48), 1854
and 1855, Parliamentary Papers (1854-1855), vol. 12, p.8 at p.31. This conforms to an embryonic
description of the present day police practice of appointing an 'officer in the case' or 'case officer' who
prepares cases for prosecution and liases with the CPS.
112 Ibid., at p.178.
Ibid., at pp.6 I-62.
114 Ibid., at p.98.
" 5 lbid, at p.141.
' 16 Ibid, at p.194.
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The Report of the Select Committee on Public Prosecutions concluded by
recommending the appointment of salaried public prosecutors to each county court
district with at least seven years experience and accountable to the Home Secretary."7
During the course of the next two decades the tide of legal opinion turned so that
when Parliament next debated the subject of public prosecutions in the 1 870s the
major cause of concern was the additional expenses which would be incurred.
According to Edwards, 'With an efficient police it was considered that crimes rarely
passed undetected or unprosecuted and that the existing system was already adequate
to deal with the great majority of criminal prosecutions which involved
straightforward cases." 8 Where difficult cases were concerned, the police forces of
England and Wales had adopted the practice of referring them to the Treasury
Solicitor, responsibility for which eventually passed to the Director of Public
Prosecutions, created by the Prosecution of Offences Act 1 879." In spite of
determined opposition from members of the legal profession and government
ministers the police played a central part in the transformation of prosecution
procedure. The various reports quoted indicate that as officers throughout the country
increasingly resorted to their common law powers, police forces co-operated to perfect
their prosecution procedures.
By the end of the nineteenth-century the criminal justice process had been radically
altered, primarily at the design of the police. The mid-century police practice was to
take suspects under arrest directly before magistrates for 	 The police's
117 
'Report from the Select Committee on Public Prosecutions, with the Proceedings and Minutes of
Evidence' (H.C. 206), 1856, Parliamentary Papers (1856), vol 7, p.347 at p.354.
118 Edwards, J. (1964), p352.
"9 lbid., pp.354-360; Hetherington, T. (1989), p11.
120 Police officers were in the difficult position of often having to choose between conflicting
interpretations of their powers. The 1834 Royal Commission on the Police of the Metropolis advised
officers to cease questioning and releasing drunk suspects on their own authority, with one magistrate
asserting 'I do not think them altogether the class of persons to whom such a discretion should be
confided'; 'Report from the Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis, with the Minutes of
Evidence, Appendix and Index' (1-l.C. 600), 1834, Parliamentary Papers (1834) vol. 16, p.! at p.157.
On the other hand, in 1845 in written evidence to the Criminal Law Commission, Denman L.C.J. was
critical of police officers who cautioned suspects on arrest and then made no further comment on the
case until appearing in court by which time crucial evidence had been lost; 'Eighth Report of Her
Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law, with Appendix', (H.C. 656), 1845, Parliamentary Papers
(1845), vol. 14, p.161 at p.391. See also, Radzinowicz, op. cit., pp.194-5; Uglow, op. cit., p.52.
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assumption of responsibility for criminal investigation and the conduct of
prosecutions granted comprehensive control over pre-trial stages of the criminal
justice process, so that by the latter part of the century suspects arrived before
magistrates with police officers already having established a prima facie case against
them. The expansion of police powers was at the expense of the magistracy, who had
been opposed to their intervention in criminal justice from the outset.' 2 ' Two
consequences of this shift in power were i) a fundamental change in relations between
police officers and magistrates with the police having executive responsibility and
magistrates an entirely judicial function' 22 and ii) the restructuring of the
administration of justice in the lower courts. In his History of Criminal Law in
England, written in 1883, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen succinctly outlined the change
when observing that justices' responsibilities for the detection and apprehension of
offenders passed to police officers:
By degrees, however, their position became that of preliminary
judges, and the duties which they had originally discharged
devolved upon the police, who have never been intrusted with any
special powers for the purpose of discharging them. It was thus by
a series of omissions on the part of the legislature to establish new
officers for the administration of justices as the old methods of
procedure gradually changed their character, that English criminal
trials gradually lost their original character of public inquiries.'23
By explaining the decline in magistratic powers by reference to the increase in police
powers, Stephen alludes here to the problem which plagued the administration of
justice for the next 100 years - how to regulate the police officer's exercise of
undefined conMnon law powers? The police's extension of their common law powers
into investigation and prosecution, and the absence of 'special powers for the purpose
of discharging them' was to create confusion among all those concerned with the
administration ofjustice. Some 20 years after Stephen's observations, the Lord Chief
Justice wrote a letter in October 1906 giving advice to the Chief Constable of
121 Ascoli, op. cit., p.94; Brogden, op. cit., p.130; Dixon, op. cit., p.151.
122 Radzinowicz, op. cit., pp.194-5.
123 Stephen, J. (1883), P
.497. The shift in the balance of power between the police and magistracy in
criminal procedure was reflected in local government statutes in the 1 880s. Justices powers to suspend
and dismiss borough police officers were limited to suspension under s.191(4) of the Municipal
Corporations Act 1882. Justices' administrative responsibilities for county forces were reduced by
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Birmingham following his request on how police officers were to proceed when
questioning suspects. The Chief Constable's concern was that one of his officers had
been criticised in court for cautioning a suspect while another had been censured for
failing to do so. Following similar requests for advice from around the country, the
Judges of the King's Bench Division drafted four rules in 1912 which were
complemented by another five in 1918 before nation-wide circulation by the Home
Office to police and criminal courts.' 24 The nine Judges' Rules legal standing was
described in R. v. Voisin:'25
These Rules do not have the force of law, they are administrative
directions, the observance of which the Police authorities should
enforce on their subordinates as tending to the fair administration
of justice. It is important that they should do so, for statements
obtained from the prisoners contrary to the spirit of these Rules
may be rejected as evidence by the Judge presiding at trial.
It was to take nearly 70 years before police powers of investigation were properly
codified under PACE, and the following year the police's common law responsibility
for prosecutions was removed by the creation of the CPS under s. 1 of the Prosecution
of Offences Act 1985.
III.	 The Police Officer's Accountability for his Wrongdoing
Having noted the implications of the expansion of the police's responsibilities into
criminal investigation and prosecution for the regulation of the police officer's
powers, it remains to be seen whether these developments also effected his
accountability to the law for his wrongdoing.' 26 One consequence of police
creation of joint standing committees consisting of county councillors and magistrates under s.9 of the
Local Government Act 1888, see Critchley, op. cit., pp.133-139.
124 
'Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure' (Cmnd. 3297), 1929,
Parliamentary Papers (1928-1929), vol.9, p.127 at p.69 of report.
125 [1918] 13 C.A.R. 89
126 In the absence of a body of case law on police wrongdoing the legal paradigm is confronted with
major difficulties for establishing the impact of extended police powers. I have discovered two law
reports of police officers charged with neglect of duty, the first of which was under statute predating
formation of the modem police. In Honey v Rogers (1860) 2 L.T. 171, a local poor relief official
prosecuted a Metropolitan police officer under s.6 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 for failure to arrest a man
suspected of neglecting to support his wife. The magistrate's dismissal of the summons, deciding the
officer had no grounds of arrest without warrant as he had not witnessed an offence, was upheld on
appeal. In Chisholm v Holland (1886) 50 J.P. 197, a Stafford County police officers appeal against
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expansion, which was one aspect of the professionalisation of policing, was
improvement of the administration of criminal justice. Other aspects of
professionalisation included development of an espirit de corps, improved discipline,
training and efficiency, not to mention growing acceptance and eventually community
support. Fewer criminal prosecutions of police officers would be expected as police
forces established themselves, and available statistics show this trend. Unfortunately
a full statistical picture is not available because of erratic records of prosecutions,
however, detailed returns submitted to Parliament by the Metropolitan Police
commissioners in 1844, 1849 and 1889 on officers prosecuted, supplemented by
figures in annual reports between 1869 and 1881, are examined below. The general
situation is described in Table XI., showing the fall in annual numbers of officers
prosecuted, convicted and departing the force as a consequence of disciplinary action
over a period of nearly 50 years.
conviction for neglect of duty under s.12 of the County Police Act 1839 was dismissed. He had
accepted a gratuity of one shilling and sixpence when collecting licensing fees from a publican
contrary to rules and regulations drawn up by the County Chief Constable. One year earlier the officer
had been disciplined following a similar incident and expressly forbidden to accept gratuities. On
conviction magistrates fined him 40 shillings, pIus 15 shillings costs, to be paid immediately or raised
by sale of possessions, failing which he was sentenced to 14 days hard labour. With regard to civil
liability, again, few cases were reported during this period and it must be assumed that few actions
were brought. In Hogg v Ward(1853) 3 H. & N. 417, 157 E.R. 533, an action for false imprisonment
was brought against a county of York police superintendent by a butcher following his arrest for theft
of horse traces. The officer arrested the butcher without warrant on the word of the owner of the
traces, which had been stolen the previous year, in spite of the butcher giving a full explanation for his
possession of the traces. The butcher was detained in custody overnight before the charge was
dismissed by the magistrate the following morning. At the civil hearing, the Judge rejected the defence
submission to enter verdict for the superintendent on grounds of reasonable suspicion and the question
of fact was put to the jury along with determination of damages. In disallowing the superintendent's
appeal it was ruled that the officer was liable as the law allowing arrest without warrant required a
reasonable charge and suspicion which the facts in the case did not support.
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Table Xl. Metropolitan police officers charged, convicted and dismissed/required to
resign: 18421848;1V 186O1881; 125
 and 1887/8.'
	
Charged before	 Convicted	 Dismissed from	 Required
	
magistrate	 the force	 to resign
1842	 132	 41	 304	 -	 n/a
1843	 117	 33	 273	 n/a
1844	 120	 29	 288	 n/a
1845	 105	 26	 270	 n/a
1846 _______	 94	 32	 311	 - - -.	 n/a
1847	 64	 22	 238t	 n/a
1848	 71	 10	 _____ 187	 n/a
	
Charged before	 Convicted	 - Dismissed from	 Required
	
magistrate	 the force	 to resign
1860	 20	 11	 182	 37
1861	 18	 12	 233	 72
1862	 20	 13	 291	 -	 99
1863	 17	 14	 208	 69
1864	 13	 6	 224	 105
1865	 15	 7	 246	 101
1866	 24	 18	 .•	 259	 98
1867	 9	 7	 229	 110
1868	 23	 20	 288	 187
1869	 I	 20	 16	 263	 144
1870	 21	 17	 247	 162
1871	 '	 14	 10	 236	 194
1872	 35	 .	 31	 234	 207
1873	 17	 12	 - 234	 171
1874	 n/a	 n/a	 201	 176
1875	 n/a	 n/a	 177	 187
1876	 14	 12	 172	 229
1877	 15	 -	 12	 167	 '	 136
1878	 19	 14	 158	 137
1879	 11	 7	 153	 86
1880	 15	 10	 140	 117
1881	 5	 :	 115 1..
	
Charged before	 Convicted	 Dismissed from	 Required to
	
magistrate	 the force (1887)	 resign (1887)
1887/8 130	 46	 5	 .	 124	 -	 72
Sources: Parliamentary Returns and the Metropolitan Commissioner's annual reports.131
127 
'Return of Officers of the Metropolitan Police Force who have been charged with Offences before
the Magistrates during the Years 1842 and 1843', Parliamentary Papers (1844), vol.39, pp.687-691;
'Return of Police Constables and Others, Officers of the Metropolitan Police Force, who have been
charged with Offences before any of the Police Magistrates during each Year from 1844 to 1848
inclusive' (H.C. 133) 1849, Parliamentary Papers (1849), vol.64, pp.687-691.
" Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis annual reports, 1869-1881.
129 
'Return of all Cases in which Metropolitan Police Constables have been Charged before
Metropolitan Police Magistrates, or upon Indictment, during the past Twelve Months...',
Parliamentary Papers (1888) vol. 82, p.65 1.
130 Dismissal and required to resign figures for 1887 from Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
Annual Report for 1887 (Cmnd. 5539), 1888, Parliamentary Papers (1888) vol.9 1, .349.
I See above fnn.l27 and 129.
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The above prosecution figures contained in the Commissioner's annual reports were
presented for the years 1860-1868 in a table appendixed to the 1869 report, without a
breakdown of the prosecutions.' 32 The figures between 1869 and 1881 have been
taken from the text of reports, and some details are available for between 1869 and
1873 (see Table XV. below). The most comprehensive statistics are for 1842-1848
and 1887/8, with the Parliamentary Returns indicating whether prosecutions were
brought privately or by the police, with descriptions of charges.
Table XII. Metropolitan police officers charged before magistrates;
1842-1 848 and 1887/8.
	
Charged by police	 Convicted Charged privately 	 Convicted
1842	 27	 15	 105	 41
1843	 15	 12	 102	 33
1844	 14 ....-29
1845	 23	 -	 15	 82	 26
1846	 21	 18	 73,	 32
	
11	 ....22'
1848	 4	 4	 67	 10
Totals	 121	 87	 582	 183
	
Charged by police	 Convicted . Charged privately !
	
Convicted
1887/8	 11	 3 .	 36	 2
Source: Parliamentary Returns.133
The 'Charged by police' figures for 1842-8 in Table XII. were listed in the
parliamentary returns according to whether the officer was charged by the
commissioners or by individuals, whereas the 1887/8 return named the individuals
responsible for each charge, with 10 officers charged by named police officers. This
assumes some importance if the police's assumption of responsibility for prosecutions
is taken into account. In the 1 840s, when private prosecutions were the norm, the
number of charges preferred by the commissioners was appreciably lower than by
citizens. By 1887/8 police officers were regularly preparing prosecutions, yet the
majority of prosecutions against police officers were still brought privately.
132 Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Annual Report for 1869 (Cmnd. 150), 1870,
Parliamentary Papers (1870), vol.36, p.461 at p.485.
133 See above fnn.127 and 129.
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A clearer picture can be obtained by examination of the types of charges police
officers faced; Tables XIII. and XIV. show the charges brought against Metropolitan
police officers by police officers and citizens between 1842 and 1848, respectively.
Table XIII. Metropolitan police officers charged by police by offence;13'
1842-1848.
S.141
9
1	 4
10
3	 9
9
0	 8
I _I ____ I
9	 50
AssauIt*	 Convicted
1842	 2 ______ 2
1843	 3 ______
1844	 3
1845	 4 ______
1846	 0 ______
1847	 0
1848	 ____	 1
Totai 1 	 3
Source: Parliamentary Returns.137
	
Convicted	 Other	 Convicted
	
8	 16	 7
	
4	 10	 8
	
8	 8	 ______
ut
	
8	 12	 10
7_L	 3,
	
1	 3	 3
	
4f	 64	 44
Table XIV. Metropolitan police officers charged privately by offence;
1842 -1 848.	 ____________________ ____ _____
	Assault Convicted	 S.14	 Convicted4_	 Othert Convicted
1842	 40	 14	 35	 2	 49I-9
1843	 33' _____ 6	 15	 2J_	 57	 13
1844	 32	 6	 29	 3	 40j
	
10
1845	 I	 29	 7	 27 ______ 3	 27	 2
1846	 31	 l2f	 17	 2	 30	 5I
1847	 20	 6	 17	 2 ______l6t	 5
1848	 22 _1 _26	 3	 21T
	
2
Totals	 217	 52	 166	 17	 - 240	 45
Source: Parliamentary Returns.1
Of the 127 officers charged by the commissioners in Table XIII., 10.24% faced
charges of violence and 41.32% were charged with s. 14 type offences. On closer
analysis, of the thirteen assault charges brought, eight were alleged against police
officers, and half (32) of the other charges were drink related. Charges of violence
against a colleague, neglect of duty and drunkenness are each relevant to the efficient
running of a police force and, according to this evaluation, on 74.38% of the occasions
when the commissioners invoked the criminal law between 1842 and 1848 it was to
serve this purpose. This compares with private prosecution figures in Table XIV. of
In Tables XIII. - XVI., the number of charges brought and not the number of officers charged are
counted.
The assault columns in Tables XIII. to XVI include all offences of violence.
136 S.14 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839. The statistical returns, see above fnn.127 and 129,
describe offences without reference to statutes. The s.14 columns in Tables XIII. to XVI include
offences of neglect, violation and absence from duty, and misconduct.
See above fn.127.
148
Chapter Four: The Nineteenth Century Police Officers Accountability to the Law
32.29% for offences of violence and 24.11% for neglect of duty type offences. Of the
240 other types of charges brought by citizens, 88 were connected with improper
police conduct when arresting or charging suspects, or failure to make an arrest, and
44 were complaints of improper, abusive or threatening language.' 39
 Taken together
the offences of violence against members of the public, improper arrest or charge,
failure to arrest and improper language accounted for 5 9.97% of private prosecutions.
From these figures, there emerges a clear pattern in the early days of the Metropolitan
Police of the first commissioners' use of the criminal law as a management resource,
while citizens sought to hold officers to account for their alleged crimes by
prosecuting themselves.
Turning now to the combined figures in Tables XIII. and XIV., 34.14% of charges
were brought for offences of violence by the police and citizens, and 38.12% for
neglect of duty and drink related offences in the 1 840s. This pattern changed
considerably over the next quarter century with figures in the Commissioner's annual
reports for 1869-1873, shown in Table XV., showing that assault charges dropped to
15.96% of the total, and neglect of duty and drink related charges increased to 74.47%
of all cases.
Table XV. MetroDolitan Dolice officers charged by offence; 1869-1 873
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
Totals
Source
Assault charges	 S.14 charges	 Drik charges	 Other charges
4	 10	 2	 2
7 {13 charged with s.14 or drunk on duty} 	 2
2	 9	 5	 0
1	 12	 io	 3
1	 5	 4	 2
15	 70	 9
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis annual reports 1869-1873.
For 1869 through to 1873 the most frequently used charge against police officers was
s.14 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839. In the 1840s it had been extensively used
by the commissioners with a conviction rate of above 80%, and on average 25
members of the public charged officers with neglect of duty each year, although with
138 Ibid.
139 27 were felony charges.
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a much lower 10% success rate. But, as revealed below in Table XVI., only two
officers were charged, and convicted, for neglect of duty in 1887/8.
Table XVI. Metropolitan police officers charged by offence; 1887/8
	
Assault	 Convicted	 S.14	 Convicted	 Other	 Convicted
By police	 9	 1	 - 2	 2	 0	 0
Privately	 33	 2	 0	 0	 7	 2
Source: Parliamentary Returns.14°
The 1887/8 figures do not help demonstrate a detailed statistical trend, however, as
the last detailed statistics available on prosecutions of police officers they do suggest
the police officer's diminishing answerability to the criminal law. Of the nine officers
prosecuted for offences of violence by police officers in 1887/8, in eight of them the
prosecuting officer was the alleged victim. Thus, only three of the police officers
charged in 1887/8 were prosecuted by police officers in an independent capacity, and
two of those were charged, and convicted, for withdrawal from duty. And, the 33
private prosecutions for offences of violence confirms that members of the public
assaulted by police officers had to rely on their own efforts. The 1 840s (see tables
XIII. and XIV.) and 1877/8 figures indicate that the public service provided by police
officers when prosecuting offenders did not apply when the suspect was a fellow
officer, citizens had to resort to private prosecution. Further, the conviction rate for
police officers appears to have plummeted by the late 1880s compared to the 1840s
figures (see Table XI.))4'
With regard to nineteenth century police discipline, although figures are available for
the numbers of officers departing forces (see Metropolitan Police figures in Table
XI.' 42), regular disciplinary statistics were not published until 1925. The only
140 See above fi.129.
"" To complete the statistical picture, the Metropolitan Police presented figures to the Royal
Commission upon the Duties of the Metropolitan Police of officers prosecuted in 1906 in connection
with arrests. Eight officers were summonsed in four cases; six for assault and two for perjury. One
officer was ordered to pay a complainant 30s compensation and 2s costs in lieu of conviction for
assault, and the charges were dismissed against the other seven; 'Appendix A to the Report of the
Royal Commission upon the Duties of the Metropolitan Police' (Cmnd 4261), 1908, Parliamentary
Papers (1908), vol. 51, p.1 at pp.673-674.
142 Limited statistics available in Inspectors of Constabulary annual reports between 1876 and 1899
show a similar fall in dismissals from over 800 down to under 200 by the turn of the century with
police strength in the provincial forces increasing from 18,228 in 1876 to 27,719 in 1899; taken from
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complaints statistics available for this period were provided by the Metropolitan
Police to the 1908 Royal Commission upon the Duties of the Metropolitan Police,
which considered complaint procedures under its terms of reference to inquire into the
policing of drunkenness, disorder and solicitation.' 43
 The complaint figures covering
1903 to 1906 were restricted to complaints of improper charging which had been
followed by disciplinary action,' 44 and are not reproduced here, as they are unsuitable
for general analysis.'45
V.	 On the Threshold of a New Era
The Report of the 1908 Royal Commission upon the Duties of the Metropolitan Police
is of major interest to this discussion for its failure to mention s.14 of the Metropolitan
Police Act 1839. This is a remarkable omission in a Report which otherwise outlines
the statutes, regulations and orders for dealing with police misconduct in detail.'46
The last official record I have been able to trace of the use of s. 14 was the conviction
of two officers in 1887/8. The last contemporary reference I have found to the other
neglect of duty statutes is the 1886 Chishoim v Holland' 47 judgment on s.12 of the
County Police Act 1839.148 Moreover, the Report of the 1919 Committee on the
Police Service (Desborough Committee), which covered some of the same ground as
the 1908 Royal Commission Report, also made no mention of the neglect of duty
Inspectors of Constabulary Reports for years ending 29 September 1876 and 1899, (H.C. 23) and
(H.C. 181), respectively.
'Report of the Royal Commission upon the Duties of the Metropolitan Police' (Cmnd. 4156), 1908,
Parliamentary Papers (1908), vol.50, p.1, at p.10.
' 'Appendix A to the Report of the Royal Commission upon the Duties of the Metropolitan Police'
(Cmnd. 4261), 1908, Parliamentary Papers (1908), vol.51, p.1 at pp.667-672 and 675-680.
Details of two cases do give anecdotal insight. In July 1904 an officer who truncheoned a prisoner
was convicted by magistrates and fined 40 shillings, or sentenced to a month imprisonment with hard
labour. He was suspended from duty and fined two days pay, reprimanded, cautioned and transferred
to another division on his return (Ibid. at p.6'70). Following an incident on 3 August of the same year a
man commenced civil proceedings after he was assaulted with a truncheon. The officer responsible
was 'severely reprimanded, strictly cautioned and to pay £5 towards the cost of action' (Ibid. at
p.671).
' 'Report of the Royal Commission upon the Duties of the Metropolitan Police' (Cmnd. 4156), 1908,
Parliamentary Papers (1908), vol.50, p.1 at pp.60-61.
(1886) 50 J.P. 197, see above fn.126.
' I have not found a reference to the borough police neglect of duty statute since s.80 of the Municipal
Corporations Act 1835 was revised by s.194 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882.
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statutes.' 49 Many of the Desborough Committee's recommendations were concerned
with standardisation of police conditions of service throughout the country, duly
enacted under s.4 of the Police Act 1919 allowing for the Home Secretary to set
regulations by statutory order.' 5° Given that police officers throughout England and
Wales were subject to similarly worded neglect of duty statutes, this makes the
Committee's omission all the more surprising.
The disappearance of the neglect of duty criminal offences from public record since
1888 suggests that at some stage close to the turn of the century it became police
policy not to prosecute officers for neglect of duty.' 5 ' Figures available on
prosecutions of Metropolitan police officers since its early history, when officers were
frequently brought before magistrates, lend support to this contention. It is evident
from the 1 840s statistics that the Commissioners primarily invoked the criminal law
in the force interest, displaying an early managerial approach to the problem of police
wrongdoing. Section 14 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 evidently played an
important part as a means of controlling officers conduct. The majority of private
prosecutions, on the other hand, were brought by citizens who alleged they were the
victims of police criminality.
Prosecutions of Metropolitan police officers declined as the police institution won
acceptance as the authority responsible for criminal investigation and the conduct of
prosecutions. It is suggested that criminal prosecutions of police officers were
avoided as managers turned to internal discipline procedures to determine complaints
made by members of the public in preference to legal proceedings.' 52 It is apparent
from the 1860/1 870s figures that neglect of duty charges continued to be brought (see
Table XV.). However, it was an offence which would be expected to quickly fall into
disuse if the police ceased to prosecute, as there were few private prosecutions
'Report of the Committee on the Police Service of England, Wales and Scotland. Part I.' (Cmnd.
253) 1919, Parliamentary Papers (1919) vol.27 p.'709; 'Report of the Committee on the Police Service
of England, Wales and Scotland. Part II.' (Cmnd. 574) 1920, Parliamentary Papers (1920), vol. 12,
p.539.
'° Police Regulations 1920, S.R. & 0. 1920/1484.
' The neglect of duty statutes were eventually repealed with other nineteenth century police statutes
under Sch. 10 of the Police Act 1964, see below Chapter Five.
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brought. It is suggested that this is what happened in tune with professionalisation of
the police service, and with time there was no longer any need to refer to the neglect
of duty statute.
The demise of the neglect of duty statutes reflected the evolving balance of power in
the late nineteenth-century criminal justice process between police officers and
magistrates. Their discontinuation was part of the process described by Stephen,
during which judicial and executive powers separated with the outcome that the police
emerged to play a dominant role in the administration ofjustice.' 53 It has already been
recounted how this created difficulties for the regulation of police powers, and it is
apparent that similar problems emerged with police officers liability to the criminal
law. The transfer of responsibility for holding police officers responsible for neglect
of duty from magistrates to senior police officers serves as a practical example of the
changing balance of power in this period.
To conclude, this chapter makes two contributions to the thesis that the modern day
police officer is not accountable to the law for his wrongdoing in like manner as the
citizen. Firstly, police officers used to be accountable to the law in like manner as the
citizen, in the office of constable and by practical example, although predominantly in
criminal proceedings. Secondly, the police's extension of their powers in the mid
nineteenth century was a contributory factor to annual reductions in the numbers of
police officers prosecuted. It is held that the expansion of police powers into criminal
investigation and prosecution was the principal causal factor for the police officer's
declining accountability to the law. However, despite the question marks emerging
concerning the validity of the office of constable, there is no evidence to suggest that
the police officer was technically separated from the citizen in his accountability to
the law when the first Police Discipline Regulations were introduced in 1920.
152 Practices which were eventually formalised by the introduction of a quasi-judicial discipline process
under the first Police (Discipline) Regulations in 1920, see above fn. 150.
' See above p.143.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Sections 48 and 49 of the Police Act 1964
Accommodation of the common law office of constable by the nineteenth century
statutes which created modern police forces was outlined early in Chapter Four before
one of its elements, the police officer's accountability to the criminal law for his
wrongdoing, was considered in detail. This chapter continues to trace developments to
the police officers accountability to the law, however, there is a shift of emphasis back
to constitutional issues allowing for a reappraisal of the office of constable and the
doctrine of constabulary independence. The reason for this is so that underlying
problems with the police's constitutional position can be discussed along with
exploration for causes of the police officer's diminishing accountability to the law for
his wrongdoing. Therefore, the discussion below focuses on the police officer's
liability to the criminal and civil law, and pays particular attention to ss.48 and 49 of the
Police Act 1964. It is argued that codification of the police complaint process under
s.49 caused the police officer to be separated from the citizen in his accountability to the
criminal law for his wrongdoing, and the introduction of a vicarious liability rule under
s.48 caused substantial damage to his accountability to the law in civil proceedings.
The corollary of my proposal that s.49 of the Police Act 1964 was responsible for the
legal separation of the police officer from the citizen is nullification of the office of
constable. This represents a departure from the conventional view that the office of
constable rests at the heart of the present constitutional position of the police as the
basis for the doctrine of constabulary independence. Therefore, after discussion on s.49
and then s.48 of the Police Act 1964, I reconsider this normative analysis of the police's
constitutional position by pointing to the inherent conflict between the office and
doctrine.
The Police Act 1964 represents a defining moment in recent police history by its
provisions for the control of the police under the tripartite arrangement between chief
officers, police authorities and the Home Secretary. The 1964 Act implemented many
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of the recommendations of the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police, 1 which is highly
significant in its own right for setting the terms for debate on policing to the present
day. Central to the Commissioners' argument was the need for police officers to be in a
position to perform what they described as their 'quasi-judicial' law enforcement duties
independently and impartially, subject to legal authority and a chief officer's
instructions.
We entirely accept that it is in the public interest that a chief
constable, in dealing with these quasi-judicial matters, should be free
from the conventional processes of democratic control and influence.2
This degree of autonomy was only deemed permissible on the basis that police officers
are accountable to the law. The Commissioners considered separately the problem of
democratic control of the police for their other responsibilities and rejected ACPO's
submission3 that their legal accountability was sufficient:
• .the chief constable should .. be subject to more effective supervision
than the present arrangements appear to recognise. The problem is to
move towards the objective without compromising the chief
constable's impartiality in enforcing the law in particular cases.4
This prioritisation of the police's law enforcement function, 5 and the widely perceived
failures of both the Royal Commission and the Police Act 1964 to satisfactorily address
the problem of establishing accountability over the police's entirely non-judicial
functions, has dominated subsequent debate on policing. 6 It is argued here that the
Royal Commission's definition of the police's law enforcement powers as quasi-judicial
Its tenns of reference were to review the constitutional position of the police throughout Great Britain, in
particular:
(1) the constitution and the function of police authorities
(2) the status and accountability of members of police forces, including chief officers of police;
(3) the relationship of the police with the public and the means of ensuring that complaints by the public
against the police are effectively dealt with; and
(4) the broad principles which should govern the remuneration of the constable, having regard to the
nature and extent of police duties and responsibilities and the need to attract and retain an adequate
number of recruits with the proper qualifications.
(Pay and conditions were dealt with in an Interim Report (Cmnd. 1222), 1960.) Final Report of the Royal
Commission on the Police (Cmnd. 1728), 1962, p.1.
2 Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Police (Cmnd. 1728), 1962, p.30.
Supported by the Home Office, see Marshall, G. (1965), pp.66-69.
4 Final Report, op. cit., p.32.
An emphasis which Scarman did not share when declaring that in the event of a conflict between law
enforcement and peace keeping needs, the latter is paramount, The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981
(Cmnd. 8427), 1981, para. 4.57.
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rests at the heart of their proposals on police accountability. It is contended that this
notion served as a rhetorical device to overcome difficulties with precise definition of
the police's powers which impinge on judicial functions. 7 In this way semantics has
played some part in excusing the police from external controls, legal and political, to
such a degree that by the 1980s police autonomy emerged as a political problem.8
The police institution is a part of the executive branch of government and police powers
are commonly regarded as executive powers. Ironically, prior to formation of modern
police forces the justice of the peace wielded both executive and judicial powers, hence
their capability for tyrannical rule. In these circumstances the fears expressed for civil
liberties at the prospect of a police force would appear to have been in opposition to an
organised body holding excessive powers as against being in the hands of an individual.
Preoccupation with police impartiality in law enforcement can be traced back to this
moment in history and was responsible for the separation of powers insisted on when
the police finally entered the statute books. Retention of the common law office of
constable under the control of the justice gave some semblance of a separation of
powers with the police restricted to largely administrative tasks. However, concurrent
with the police's replacement of the magistracy as the institution responsible for pre-
trial criminal procedure, as outlined in Chapter Four, police authorities assumed many
of the justice's responsibilities for police administration. The 1962 Royal Commission
attributed the confusion in the constitutional position to these developments 9 and
identified the police as a branch of the executive with quasi-judicial law enforcement
powers unsuited to standard administrative controls.
At common law the police's law enforcement powers are defined as discretionary
executive powers. However, the landmark judgment by Lord Diplock in Holgate-
Mohammed v. Duke does not assist with a generic definition as it is limited to ruling on
6 In addition to constitutional texts, Christian, L. (1983); Fine, B. and R. Millar (1985); Spencer, S. (1985);
Baxter, J. and L. Koffman (1985).
This difficulty has also been obfuscated by reference to the police officer as a ministerial officer, Fisher v.
Qidham Corporation [1930] 2 K.B. 364 at 369 per McCardie J., McArdle v. Egan (1934) 150 L.T. 412 at
413 per Lord Wright.
Brogden, M. (1982); Jefferson, T. and R. Grimshaw (1984); also see above, fii.6.
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the lawfulness of an arrest, and declared police powers to be subject to the Wednesbury
principles.' 0 Further exploration of police powers reveals a lacuna between the
executive and judicial functions with regard to criminal investigation, which was hinted
at but not developed by Lord Diplock)' Continuing with the broad sweep of history,
the Judges Rules were introduced to overcome confusion with where police powers
ended and the jurisdiction of the courts commenced; namely the questioning of
suspects.' 2 With codification of police powers under PACE, and replacement of the
Judge's Rules by Codes of (developed by recent case law' 4) the police's
powers of interrogation have not been separately defined as they have been considered
as subordinate elements of powers of arrest and detention, self evidently executive
powers. As far as other investigation powers are concerned, for example stop and
search, seizure of property, body sampling and surveillance operations, these are also
clearly of an executive nature as part of the preparation of a case against a suspect
which may go before the courts for adjudication. Where there is insufficient evidence
to charge on the evidence collected by these methods, it is largely dependent on what
happens during interrogation whether or not judicial proceedings commence.' 5 There
are four alternative outcomes; firstly, no further action will be taken if an investigation
does not uncover sufficient evidence of a criminal offence. Secondly, a suspect may be
offered and accept a caution. Thirdly, if a suspect admits to a criminal offence and
decides to enter a guilty plea, the case is unlikely to proceed to full trial although he will
be required to attend court for sentencing. And, fourthly, a suspect is charged and the
case proceeds to trial. It is solely at this interrogation stage, a pivotal moment in the
criminal justice process that the police function defies precise definition, for it is here
that a qualitative change in the investigation occurs. What distinguishes the
interrogation from other elements of criminal investigation is that it approximates to a
judicial hearing, something akin to a rehearsal, conducted in the absence of an
Final Report, op. cit., pp.29-30.
I° Holgate-Mohammedv. Duke [1984] 1 A.C. 437, at 443, see Chapter One, above fn.64.
Ibid., at 441-442, 'arrest' is defined as a 'continuing act' lasting from the moment of restraint to release
from custody by a police officer or a magistrate's 'judicial act.'
12 See Chapter Four, above p.146.
S.66 of PACE
' See Castorina v. Chief Constable of Surrey (1988) New L.J. 180.
Lustgarten, L. (1986), p.9.
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independent adjudicator.' 6 The charging of a suspect and the conduct of a prosecution
by the CPS are also executive functions' 7 and further questioning of the defendant about
the alleged offence is prohibited outside of ajudicial hearing.
Thus, my argument is that the police's power to interrogate is the only executive
function which is problematic, but can it be termed quasi-judicial? I believe not, as a
consequence of an interview being conducted, whatever the protections for the suspect,
as part of the pre-trial stage of the criminal justice process where the primary function is
determination of whether or not to proceed to trial. Without provision for adjudication
of disputed facts between the police and suspect or arbitration between the parties, even
in cases where the accused accepts a caution, 18 the fundamental judicial element is
absent. Therefore, the special powers available to the police to perform their law
enforcement function can only be generally described with any accuracy as pertaining to
the pre-judicial stages of the criminal justice process. The only accurate use of the term
quasi-judicial can be where tribunals assume a judicial form in that an independent
arbiter, for example a chief officer hearing a charge against police discipline, decides on
procedures and facts. However, description of police powers as quasi-judicial by the
1962 Royal Commission on the Police lent considerable authority to the argument that a
form of constitutional accountability appropriate for members of the judiciary when
exercising their judicial functions should also apply to the police when performing their
law enforcement functions.
It is not claimed that when enforcing the law the police should be subject to political
controls, however, if the police officer's accountability to the law is going to be relied
upon as sole authority for the exercise of his powers, it is imperative that his
accountability to the law is demonstrable, in principle and in practice. The Police Act
1964, broadly on the recommendations of the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police,
16 On the eve of the Birmingham Six's final appeal Lord Scarman considered this critical moment in a letter
to the Times suggesting greater judicial involvement in criminal investigation, quoted in Zander, M. (1993),
p.239.
' Also referred to as quasi-judicial functions without explanation; Bradley, A. and K. Ewing (1994), p.402.
Case law on prosecution decision-making discussed in Chapter One, above p.32, demonstrates that the
autonomy enjoyed by the police when prosecuting has been significantly reduced for the DPP.
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addressed the issue of the police officer's accountability to the law for his wrongdoing
in a package of what were essentially administrative measures. Firstly, by making chief
officers vicariously liable for civil police wrongs under s.48. Section 49, in codifying
the police complaint process, also provided for criminal procedures to investigate and
charge police officers. It is my contention that this pragmatic approach to police
wrongdoing, instead of improving the administration of civil and criminal justice, was
responsible for a developing crisis in policing the police. In keeping with the
convention that the criminal sanction takes precedence over civil punishment, I consider
the consequences of s.49 for the police officer's criminal liability before examining
s.48.
I.	 Criminal Liability
Irrespective of whether infrequently prosecuted, prior to the Police Act 1964 police
officers were subject to the criminal law the same as the citizen. Codification of the
complaint process under s.49 of the Act ended that by introducing a separate procedure
for alleged offences committed by police officers:
(1) Where the chief officer of police for any police area receives a
complaint from a member of the public against a member of the
police force for that area he shall (unless the complaint alleges an
offence with which the member of the police force has been
charged) forthwith record the complaint and cause it to be
investigated and for that purpose may, and shall if directed by the
Secretary of State, request the chief officer of police for any other
police area to provide an officer of the police force for that area to
carry out the investigation.
(3) On receiving the report of an investigation under this section the
chief officer of police, unless satisfied from the report that no
criminal offence has been committed, shall send the report to the
Director of Public Prosecutions.
With s.50, which required police authorities and inspectors of constabulary to keep
themselves informed of the manner in which chief officers dealt with complaints, this
See Uglow, S. (1995), p.108.
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was the extent of codification of the complaint process. Today, after considerable
amendment by the Police Act 1976, PACE 1984 and the Police and Magistrates' Courts
Act l994,' 19 sections, ss.65-83, of the Police Act 1996 provide for that process.
This study holds that s.49 damages the police officer's accountability to the criminal
law under sub-section (1) by defining criminal offences as complaints. All allegations
of wrongdoing against police officers are classified together, regardless of whether they
concern criminality or incivility. 20 Comparison for police officers and citizens can be
made by paraphrasing the section - a complaint by a member of the public against a
member of the public made to the police which alleges criminality is a notifiable
criminal offence and will be recorded as such. Under identical circumstances such an
incident involving a police officer will be recorded as a complaint. There is an attempt
to minimise interference with the criminal law by exempting from the complaint
process cases where an officer has been charged with an offence prior to official receipt
of a complaint. 2 ' However, this does not alter the fact that crimes first reported to the
police by members of the public against police officers are not subjected to the same
process for those made against fellow citizens.
This problem of definition was overlooked while the Police Bill progressed through
Parliament and has been exacerbated by the imposition of complaint procedures, both in
the 1964 Act and subsequent legislation,22 designed to reassure the public that
complaints are properly investigated and adjudicated, and without consequence for
substantive law. Provision for investigation of a complaint by a police officer from
another force under s.49(1) and referral of cases where there is evidence of a criminal
offence to the DPP under s.49(3) were introduced to the1964 Act for this purpose. Prior
' In addition, complaint and discipline regulations were revised in 1977 and 1985, and new regulations will
be introduced on 1 April 1999.
20 Section 49 was augmented by Part IX of PACE which introduced under s.84(4) the defmition -
"complaint" means a complaint about the conduct of a member of a police force which is submitted - (a)
by a member of the public, or (b) on behalf of a member of the public and with his written consent;' and the
parenthesised provision in s.49 was updated by s.84(5). To be covered by ss.65 and 67(5) of the Police Act
1996, respectively, from 1 April 1999.
21 The Metropolitan Police Commissioner recorded prosecutions of Metropolitan officers under this
provision separately between 1965 and 1978, with a total of 121 officers prosecuted without reference to
the DPP of which 67 were convicted; Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis annual reports, 1965-1978.
22 Police Act 1976, PACE and Police and Magistrates Courts' Act 1994.
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to formation of the CPS, Williams argued that as a result of s.49(3) 'corrupt and violent
policemen are not brought to book when ordinary people would be.' 23 He suggested the
public interest would be better served if police officers were prosecuted if the DPP
believed them guilty, and not by application of a sufficiency of evidence test.24
Lustgarten goes further by referring to s.49(3) as the DPP's 'veto' over prosecutions of
police officers which was not available to citizens at that time. 25 He urges that the
criminal law does not operate as an effective restraint on police misconduct, concluding:
'The present position is a flagrant violation of the rule of law, in effect creating by
executive action immunities for criminal conduct when a favoured class of official is
involved. ,26
Discipline by statute or regulation?
There were good practical reasons for codification of the complaint process in 1964, as
problems with police complaints and discipline continued to confront police
administration after introduction of Police Regulations in 1920.27 Although s.4 of the
Police Act 1919 provided for a quasi-judicial discipline process, belief in self-regulation
underpinned official thinking until scandal rocked the police in the 1950s. The
Inspectors' of Constabulary annual report for 1959 declared:
It is inherent in the character of the police service and in the nature of
the duties of those who serve in it that discipline must be to a
considerable degree self imposed. Police discipline is to a large extent
founded on faith and confidence in the members of the service.
Because he so often functions alone, every member of the police force
bears a heavy personal responsibility for ensuring that nothing
happens to besmirch the good name of the service, either by a breach
of trust or a failure to discharge his duties in good faith.28
23 Williams, G. (1985) p.1 16.
24 Ibid. What was then known as the '51% rule' has been replaced by a 'realistic prospect of conviction'
test to reflect difficulties with quantification of evidence; Explanatory Memorandum to the Code for Crown
Prosecutors (1994), para. 4.14.
25 Lustgarten, op. cit., p.139.
26 Ibid, p.140.
27 S.R. and 0. 1920/1484.
28 
'Inspectors of Constabulary Report for 1 October 1958 to 31 December 1959' (H.C. 257), 1959-60,
Parliamentary Papers (1959-60) vol.20, p.185 at p.14 of Report.
161
Chapter Five: Sections 48 and 49 of the Police Act 1964
Throughout the mid twentieth century disputes over responsibility for discipline dogged
borough police forces. A major cause of the problem can be traced back to the
Municipal Corporations Act 1835,29 which granted local authorities a considerable
measure of democratic control over policing and made them the disciplinary authority
for borough forces. 3° This placed borough chief constables in the anomalous position of
not being responsible for discipline whereas their contemporaries in the Metropolitan,
City of London and county forces were, and the government failed to act on the
Desborough Committee's recommendation to make borough chief constables the
disciplinary authority for their forces. 3 ' This oversight mitigated against Parliament's
intended standardisation of police conditions under s.4 of the Police Act 1919. The
uniform police regulations introduced in 1920 contained separate discipline regulations
for borough forces as governed by s. 191 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882.32
The conflict between statute and regulation gave rise to a small body of case law on
discipline in borough forces, which remained unresolved until repeal of s. 191 by
Schedule 10 of the Police Act 1 964.
It was not long before the Court of Appeal was called upon to rule on the relation
between disciplinary statutes and regulations. In Wallwork v. Fielding34 an action for
damages by a police officer against his watch committee for lost wages when suspended
from duty was dismissed. The Court of Appeal ruled there could be no implied repeal
of s.191 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 by s.4 of the Police Act 1919.
Leading judgment on the relationship was given in the later case of Cooper v. Wilson.36
29 Ss. 76-81, replaced by ss.190-195 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882.
° S.77 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, replaced by s.191 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882.
'Report on the Committee of the Police Service of England, Wales and Scotland. Part II.' (Cmnd. 574)
1920, Parliamentary Papers (1920) vol.12, p.539 at p.548.
32 Regulations 12-26 of the Police Regulations, 1920; S.R. & 0., 1920/1484. Regulation 20 consisted of
two sub-sections detailing procedural arrangements; the first for the Metropolitan police and the second for
borough forces.
" The Desborough Committee held the view that a watch committee's responsibility for discipline was in
conflict with officers subjection to the orders of the chief constable; 'Report', op. cit., at p.548. Further,
while watch committees had responsibility for discipline borough forces were not under the direction and
control of their chief constable, as introduced by s.5 of the Police Act 1964, a situation which precluded
common law authority for the doctrine of constabulary independence until after the 1964 Act.
[1922] 2 K.B. 66.
Ibid., at 71 per Lord Sterndale MR.
36 [1937] 2 All E.R. 726.
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On determining that a Liverpool officer who had resigned could not subsequently be
dismissed it was ruled that the power to dismiss rested solely with the watch
committee.37 Affirming Waliwork Greer L.J. went on to interpret the effect of
regulations on statutory authority: 'The regulations, in my judgment, must be read as
applying to the way in which the watch committee are to exercise their powers in a
borough...' 38 Therefore, s.191(4)39 provided watch committees with the authority to
dismiss police officers irrespective of the language used in regulations.4°
Liverpool Assizes heard the similar case of Kilduff v. Wilson, 4 ' involving the same
police force, in February 1938. Police sergeant Kilduff had unsuccessfully appealed to
his watch committee after dismissal from the force by his chief constable for disobeying
orders and making false statements. Included among the causes of action were that the
defendant chief constable did not have the power to dismiss the plaintiff, and damages
for unlawful dismissal and libel. Tucker J. expressed regret that he was bound by
Cooper in ruling for the defendants; he found it was immaterial whether the dismissal
went to the watch committee for confirmation or by way of appeal, the important factor
being that the committee heard the case on its merits. 42 Scott L.J. gave the Court of
Appeal's judgment upholding Tucker J.'s decision.43
A remarkable feature of the 1950s, known as the 'Golden Age' of the police, when
police professionalism was highly regarded, was that discipline was gravely
problematic. 44 Of the cases which gained notoriety, in 1956 the Chief Constable of
On a subsidiary point it was ruled that the hearing before the watch committee was held in a manner
which was contrary to the natural course ofjustice, ibid., at 735-6 per Greer L.J,
38 Cooper v. Wilson [1937] 2 All E.R. 726, at 730 per Greer L.J.
'The watch committee, or any two justices having jurisdiction in the borough, may at any time suspend,
and the watch committee may at any time dismiss, any borough constable whom they think negligent in the
discharge of his duty, or otherwise unfit for the same.'
4° McNaghten., J., displayed a more pragmatic approach in his dissenting judgment, arguing that i) s.4(1) of
the Police Act 1919 required every police authority to comply with regulations, ii) in providing chief
constables with powers of dismissal the Home Secretary had only conferred under regulations an authority
which it was within a watch committee's power to delegate and iii) that such an interpretation was
consistent with the county chief constables powers. Cooper v. Wilson [1937] 2 All E.R. 726, at 746.
41 [1939] 1 All E.R. 429. Tucker i's trial judgment reported with Court of Appeal judgment.
42 Ibid. at 443 per Tucker J.
43 Ibid., at446.
See Reiner, R. (1992), pp.37-8.
163
Chapter Five: Sections 48 and 49 of the Police Act 1964
Cardiganshire was disciplined for failing to run an efficient force, 45
 and the following
year the county force was amalgamated with neighbouring Camarthen. 46
 In 1957
criminal proceedings were brought against Brighton's Chief Constable and two serving
senior officers; the Chief Constable was acquitted and the other two were convicted and
imprisoned.47 In the same year the Chief Constable of Worcester was imprisoned for
fraud and in Thurso, Scotland, there was a government inquiry into the improper
investigation of a complaint regarding an assault on a youth. 48 In 1959 a dispute arose
between the Nottingham Chief Constable and his watch committee with the Home
Secretary refusing to support the committee's suspension of the chief constable for lack
of impartiality, although his reinstatement was shortly followed by his retirement.
Finally, controversy surrounded the case of Garratt v. Eastmond and the Metropolitan
Police's payment of £300, with liability denied, as settlement for an action brought by a
Mr Garratt against PC Eastmond for assault and false imprisonment, and the
Commissioner's decision not to take any action against the officer. It was during a
parliamentary debate on the case that the Home Secretary proposed the need for an
independent inquiry 49 and the Royal Commission on the Police was duly appointed in
January 1960.°
One of the incidents leading up to the Royal Commission on the Police involved
prosecutions of the chief constable and two senior officers of Brighton who were
suspended from duty when charged in October 1957. The chief constable was acquitted
of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice in February 1958 and his colleagues
convicted. When sentencing the trial judge suggested that their chief constable had
failed to provide proper professional and moral leadership. No evidence was offered
'Report of Enquiry into the Administration and Efficiency of the Cardiganshire Constabulary and the
State of Discipline in the Force' (Cmnd. 251), 1956-7, Parliamentary Papers (1956-7), vol.18, p.281.
46 
'Report of Inquiry into Proposed Compulsory Amalgamation of the Police Forces of the County of
Camarthen and the County of Cardigan (Cmnd. 374), 1957-8, Parliamentary Papers (1957-8), vol.17,
p.303.
See below, Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66.
'The allegation of assault on John Walters' (Cmnd, 718), 1958-9, Parliamentary Papers (1958-9),
vol.16, p.439.
'Garrattv. Eastmond', 18 November 1959 Parl. 613, H.C. Deb., 5th Ser., cols. 1,239-1303, at 1256.
° See Critchley, T. (1978), pp27O-274 for further details on the series of scandals. In the four years
between the appointment of the Royal Commission on the Police and enactment of the Police Act 1964
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against the chief constable the following month on a second charge of corruption,
although the trial judge passed comment on his suitability for office. The day after, on
6 March 1958, the Brighton watch committee unanimously agreed the summary
dismissal of their chief constable in his absence, without having laid a charge and
without notification. The chief constable appealed against dismissal to the Home
Secretary under the Police (Appeals) Act 1927, while reserving the right to contest the
validity of the watch committee's 6 March decision. A majority of the watch committee
confirmed their decision at a special meeting on 18 March with three members changing
their minds after representations by the chief constable's solicitor. The Home Secretary
dismissed the chief constable's appeal on 5 July 1958, and he commenced an action
claiming that his dismissal was void later that year. Judgment in Ridge v. Baldwin5'
was finally handed down by the House of Lord's that the dismissal was invalid as a
consequence of the watch committee's failure to adhere to principles of natural justice.52
Although the case was substantively different from those cited above its progression
through the courts during the final stages, and immediately after the Royal Commission
on the Police was sifting, demonstrated the need for statutory change and clarification of
chief constable and watch committee powers.
Codification of complaints
Complaints and discipline were considered by the 1929 Royal Commission on Police
Powers and Procedure53 and the 1949 Committee on Police Conditions of Service
(Oaksey Committee)54 By 1929 the Metropolitan Police had adopted the practice of
referring criminal prosecutions of police officers to the DPP 55 and the Royal
Commission rejected empowering the DPP to investigate police officers. 56 A major
further incidents involving Metropolitan and Sheffield police officers were further evidence of the failings
of the complaint and disciplinary procedures, see Marshall (1965), Ch.8.
[1963] 2 All E.R. 66.
52 Ibid, at 80 per Lord Reid.
'Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure' (Cmnd. 3297), 1929, Parliamentary
Papers (1928-1929), vol. 9, p.127.
Report of the Committee on Police Conditions of Service (Part II) (Cmnd. 7831), 1949.
On which s.49(3) of the Police Act 1964 was based at the recommendation of the Royal Commission of
the Police; Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Police (Cmnd. 1728), 1962, p.127.
56 A minority report of the Savidge inquiry recommended extending the DPP's powers to include
investigation of allegations against police officers. 'Inquiry in regard to the interrogation by the police of
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concern of the Commissioners was with the constitutional position - 'alleged offences
against the law of the land committed by policemen ought not to be treated differently
from offences committed by other citizens.' 57
 Twenty years later, the Oaksey
Committee disregarded the developing case law on police discipline, and did not follow
the Desborough Committee in recommending reform of the discipline process in the
boroughs by replacement of the watch committee with the chief constable as discipline
authority.58
That the 1962 Royal Commission was particularly interested with the constitutional
relation between chief officers, police authorities and central government 59 is clearly
indicated by the reasons given for recommending repeal of the nineteenth century
discipline statutes. The need for reform of what were described as 'nineteenth century
policing statutes' was emphasised on dual grounds of the decline in the justice's
authority over the police 60 and in consideration of the powers that should be available to
police authorities. 6 ' Repeal of s.191 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 was not
proposed after qualitative assessment of the different complaint and discipline processes
in operation, it was on the basis that the watch committees' personnel responsibilities
were an anomaly which applied to only 30% of police officers in England and Wales.62
With regard to their remit on police complaints, 63 the Commissioners stressed that the
absence of legal controls over police activity was offset by the operation of a strict code
of discipline, and it was to the chief officer that they looked as the most effective
Irene Savidge under Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921' (Cmnd. 3147), 1928, Parliamentary Papers
(1928), vol.12 p.87.
' 'Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure' (Cmnd. 3297), 1929, Parliamentary
Papers (1928-1929), vol. 9, p.127 at p.107 of Report.58 Report of the Committee on Police Conditions of Service (Part II) (Cmnd. 7831), 1949, p.25. The 1962
Royal Commission on the Police incorrectly states that the Oaksey Committee endorsed the Desborough
Committee's recommendation, Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Police (Cmnd. 1728), 1962,
p.6!. The Committee was at a loss to explain statistical returns which revealed 'surprisingly large'
disciplinary figures for borough police forces; thus an opportunity may have been missed to examine the
comparative efficacy of existing procedures in borough and county forces, ibid., p.25.
See terms of reference, above fn. 1.
60 Final Report, op. cit., p.29.
61 Ibid., p. 58.
62 Ibid., pp.60-61.
63 See above, fn. 1.
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disciplinary authority.TM The only consideration given to complaints which may give
rise to criminal proceedings in England and Wales was in two paragraphs; the
Metropolitan police practice of referring cases to the DPP was described in one, and it
was recommended for general adoption in the second. 65 Complaints which do not lead
to legal proceedings of any description take up a further 39 paragraphs focussing on
procedures for recording and investigating complaints, the conduct of disciplinary
hearings and notification of outcomes to complainants. 66 With a minority of three
Commissioners recommending a Commissioner of Rights or police ombudsman to
oversee complaints, 67 the majority concluded:
We have no reason to think that the police are unfit to deal with
complaints: on the contrary, we are satisfied that complaints are dealt
with thoroughly and impartially. If the complaint is of conduct
amounting to a crime the question of prosecution will have been
decided by the Director of Public Prosecutions in England and
Wales... If it amounts to a civil wrong the complainant will be entitled
to sue.. Hence the only clear field in which disposal of a complaint
will still be dependent on the unaided decision of a chief constable
will comprise complaints either not so serious as to give rise to legal
action, or in which the complainant for reasons that may appear
reasonable to him does not wish for a prosecution or is unwilling to
sue... we think that the interests of the public can be best served by
resisting any innovation which may weaken the strength and resolve
of the police in their fight against crime.68
This passage epitomises the Royal Commission's approach to police wrongdoing which
has become the accepted orthodoxy. The police officer's criminal and civil liability are
assumed a priori leaving less serious complaints to be resolved under the discipline
process. The minority recommending an 'ombudsman' also adhered to this view by
restricting their proposal to independent oversight of complaint investigation without
interfering with the police's entitlement to investigate or chief officers as the
disciplinary authority. This sub-division of police wrongdoing into three separate
categories depending on whether suitable for criminal prosecution, civil action or
64 Final Report, op. cit., p34.
65 Ibid., pp.126 and 127.
Ibid., pp.127-139.
67 Ibid., p.138.
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disciplinary proceedings implies that each type has an appropriate remedy. But there is
no material basis for such an assumption, and presentation of the issue in this form
contains the inherent danger of substituting administrative procedure for due legal
process, as warned at committee stage by one MP:
I hope complaints are going to be dealt with purely and simply as
complaints that have been raised against the police in the exercise of
their duty, and not as another means of investigating crimes that have
been committed.69
Although this was already the practice prior to enactment of s.49, the difference
codification made was to formally separate the police officer from the citizen with
regard to their liability to the criminal law by provision of different procedures for
investigation and charge. In the same way that s.49 introduced two independent
procedural elements to reassure the public, the subsequent trend has been for the
government to respond to criticism of the complaint process by procedural
modification, primarily the introduction of lay elements by creation of the PCB under
s.1 of the Police Act 1976 and then by the PCA under s.83 of PACE. There have been
no attempts to re-examine the principles upon which that process is based nor by re-
evaluation of the constitutional position. It is a case of pragmatism over-riding
principle, which has resulted in the substitution of internal police complaint process for
some aspects of the police officer's accountability to the criminal law. A corollary has
been that the introduction of procedural 'improvements' has increased the gap between
constitutional principle and practical reality so that when new discipline procedures are
introduced on 1 April 199970 investigation and criminal charge of police officers will
not be contained in the same statute as for citizens.71
68 Ibid. The same argument was presented by the Home Secretary at the Committee Stage, Police Bill,
1963 (Standing Committee Debate) Standing Committee D, 6 February 1963, col. 704.
69 Contribution to debate by Mr Winterbottom MP, Standing Committee Debate, op. cit., 13 February 1963,
col. 725.
70 Home Office News Release, 23 March 1998, 107/98, Home Secretary Acts on Police Complaints and
Discipline; available on the internet at www.coi.gov.uk .
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II.	 Civil Liability
The police officer's liability for his tortious acts under Fisher v. Oldham Corporation72
was overturned by s.48(1) of the Police Act 1964 which provided for chief officers'
vicarious liability:
The chief officer of police for a police area shall be liable in respect of
torts committed by constables under his direction and control in the
performance or purported performance of their functions in like
manner as a master is liable in respect of torts committed by his
servants in the course of their employment, and accordingly shall in
respect of any such tort be treated for all purposes as a joint tortfeasor.
Some explanation is required for how Parliament managed to sustain the principle of
police accountability to the law after this interference with the officer's liability in civil
law. The reasoning for the decision in Fisher that the defendant local authority was not
liable for the police officer's false imprisonment of the plaintiff can be separated into
two limbs. Firstly, the police officer's exercise of an independent authority when
performing his law enforcement and peace keeping duties and, secondly, the absence of
a master/servant relationship between police officer and local authority. 74 The first
element defines the office of constable and the second pertains to the law of civil
liability, leaving police officers personally liable for their actions when in the execution
of their duties. This separation of Fisher into two parts is a useful analytical tool for
examining the interaction between constitutional principle and practical application, and
revealing how the position advanced in Fisher has been interfered with by subsequent
events. On this point I am in disagreement with Marshall and Lustgarten's criticism of
Fisher in acknowledgement of its consistency, 75 with the two limbs complimenting each
other, and the principle that police officers' personal liability for their tortious acts
served as an important check on their exercise of discretionary powers.
Police Act 1996 and PACE, respectively.
72 [1930] 2 K.B. 364, see Chapter One, above p.37.
Now s.88(1) of the Police Act 1996.
[1930] 2 K.B. 364 at 377.
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Discretionary liability
As a matter of practice, the police officer's personal liability for his torts was seriously
dented just one year after Fisher. The 1931 Police Council for England and Wales
decided that officers subjected to civil proceedings would be reimbursed out of Police
Funds if found liable for torts committed when acting in good faith, reasonably and with
proper regard to instructions. 76 The civil actions issue had been raised at the Council by
the Police Federation, which sought to establish a general purposes fimd raised by
voluntary subscription.77 It was concerned to represent its members interests by
providing support to police officers subjected to criminal and civil proceedings arising
from their actions when engaged in the execution of their duties. A Police Council
committee concluded on the Federation's submissions:
• . every member of a police force should be able to carry out his
duties in the confidence that if he acts in good faith, with reasonable
exercise of his judgment and regard to instructions he has received, he
will be accorded the support of those in authority over him and that if
his action proves to have been wrong and he is involved in expense in
defending proceedings brought against him, he should be reimbursed
his reasonable expenses and, in proper cases, the amount of any
damages awarded against him... It is plainly not in the interests of the
orderly and well-disposed sections of the public that the police should
be influenced to avoid taking action which ought to be taken by any
fear that they may thereby incur a risk of being cast in damages or
costs.78
It is suggested that the Police Council's decision to indemnify officers was designed
more to reach a compromise with the Police Federation than to comply with the spirit of
the law. 79 Adherence under Fisher to the principle of independent authority carries the
assumption that criminal and civil liability serve to regulate police action for the very
purpose of restricting officers' conduct within the limits of the law. In these
circumstances, as an independent officer of the Crown denied the protection afforded by
" Clayton, R. and H. Tomlinson (1992), p.36.
76 Report of the Committee on Police Conditions of Service (Part II) (Cmnd. 7831), 1949, p.75.
Established by s.1 of the Police Act 1919, the Police Federation did not have fund raising powers and
was excluded from involvement in cases of discipline and promotion. See also Judge, A. (1968), p.24.
78 Quoted in Report, op. cit., p.74.
There is evidence that this was the Metropolitan Police practice as early as 1904 when an officer's
punishment following a disciplinary finding included an order to pay £5 towards the cost of an action; see
Chapter Four, above fn.145.
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the vicarious liability of his employer, the police officer's liability for his torts will have
a preventative effect. A cautious approach to their exercise of discretionary powers will
be required so that they avoid taking unlawful action. In accordance with this reasoning
it follows that police officers should not be excused the consequences of any action that
may later be found unlawful. Otherwise, law enforcement officers would be in a
position to take any action they deemed necessary in the full knowledge they would be
protected from the rule of law in flagrant contradistinction to their constitutional
position
The Police Council's decision to cover financial expenses incurred in actions for
damages from the Police Fund provided for indemnification at the discretion of the
police authority. The Police Council undermined Fisher by allowing for discretionary
liability, according to application of limited vicarious liability principles, 80 thereby
introducing an inequality: a plaintiff could not proceed with an action against the police
authority, but the authority was in a position to indemnify defendant police officers.
Consequently, practical benefits of vicarious liability were available to defendants but
not to plaintiffs. 8 ' A defendant's recourse to a Police Federation fund would have been
more in accordance with principle as the tortfeasor's membership of the Federation, and
payment of subscriptions, would ensure his contribution to damages and costs, albeit at
reduced personal expense. On balance, the Council's opposition to such a change
would have taken into account the increase in Police Federation powers accompanying a
legal defence role and possible consequences for both police management practices and
the constitutional position. Police Federation disappointment with the 1931 decision
was exacerbated by police authorities in England and Wales deferring decisions on
reimbursement until the conclusion of civil proceedings, thus leaving officers in a state
of uncertainty for the duration.82
° For outline of vicarious liability see Atiyah, P. (1967), Ch. 1.
See below, p.173.
82 Police solicitors did assume responsibility for preparing defences to action however, Report, op. cit.,
p.75.
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Thus it can be observed from the outset, although the cornerstone of constitutional
principle, Fisher was not strictly applied by those responsible for defending tort actions
and the introduction of a vicarious liability rule was a pragmatic measure to tighten the
ad hoc and unsatisfactory procedures then in place. However, the existing arrangements
were of a discretionary nature and did not directly interfere with the law, 83 s.48 of the
Police Act 1964, in contrast, required a theoretical accommodation of the constitutional
position.
Section 48 of the Police Act 1964
The 1960-62 Royal Commission on the Police had recommended that police authorities
be made liable for officers tortious conduct, consistent with their responsibility for the
Police Fund and therefore their obligation to meet damages and costs in the event of
successful or settled actions. 84 This proposal undermined both limbs of Fisher and the
government sought legal advice 85 before introduction of what was clause 47 of the
Police Bill. Home Secretary Henry Brooke informed the House of Commons at the
Bill's Second Reading 'There are objections to placing this liability on the police
authority, which is not in direct control of the constable; so the clause instead provides
for the liability to attach to the chief officer of police.' 86 During parliamentary
committee proceedings the Home Secretary elucidated further, 'The chief officer or
chief constable is very much closer than the police authority to being in any sense at all
an employer of the police constable.' 87 A government measure to buttress the
constitutional position was by carefully wording the statute so as to restrict it to a purely
administrative function by reiteration of the fact that the police officer is not in a
subservient master/servant relationship with his chief officer. The final section - 'and
accordingly shall in respect of any such tort be treated for all purposes as a joint
tortfeasor' - was a government amendment introduced to remove any potential
When the Crown Proceedmgs Act 1947 made the Crown liable for torts committed by government
officers s.2(6) restricted application to officials paid out of parliamentary funds, thereby excluding police
officers in accordance with their independent status.
Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Police (Cmnd. 1728), 1962, pp.63-65.
85 Royal Commission on the Police (Report), 9 May 1963, Parl. 677, H.C. Deb., 5th Ser., col. 687.
86 Police Bill, 1963 - Second Reading, 26 November 1963, Parl. 685, H.C. Deb., 5th Ser., col. 95. This
made the vicarious liability rule consistent with s.5 of the Police Act 1964 (now s.1O of the Police Act
1996) which placed police forces under the direction and control of chief officers.
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misunderstanding. In fine belt and braces tradition it is stressed that the police officer is
not like a servant of the chief officer, for any purpose other than actions for damages.88
Parliament's intentions in restricting s.48 to an administrative function were soundly
argued in tune with the Royal Commission's initial reasoning. 89
 Four major practical
advantages90 were raised in support of vicarious liability which, it was contended,
struck the necessary balance between the rights of both citizens and police officers, and
the over-riding requirement that police forces be in a position to perform their peace
keeping and law enforcement duties. Firstly, plaintiffs would be able to proceed with
actions for damages against the chief officer for a police area in cases where
identification of the officer responsible for the alleged tort was not possible. Secondly,
sufficient funds would be available to pay damages and cover costs. 91 Thirdly, the
removal of any uncertainty that police officers faced under existing discretionary
arrangements as to whether they may incur financial expenses if found liable for torts
committed while they believed themselves to be acting in the execution of their duty.92
And, fourthly, police officers would be unfettered by the threat of legal action when
performing their duties.
Vicarious liability
Vicarious liability may be at variance with constitutional principle, but in fact s.48
facilitated the emergence of police actions as a viable legal remedy for victims of police
Bill, 1963 (Standing Committee Debate) Standing Committee D, 4 February 1964, cot. 586.
For parliamentary debate on the wording see Ibid, 6 February 1964, cols. 59 1-597.
89 For recommendations and parliamentary debates see; Final Report of the Royal Commission on the
Police (Cmnd. 1728), 1962, p.64, para. 200 Police Bill, 1963 - Second Reading, 26 November 1963, Part.
685, H.C. Deb., 5th Ser., cot. 95; and Police Bill. 1963 (Standing Committee Debate) Standing Committee
D, 4 - 6 February 1963, cots. 581-626. See also Marshatt, op. cit., Chs. 6 and 7, for summary of Royal
Commission evidence and recommendations, and of parliamentary debates.
9° These three benefits accredited to the introduction of vicarious liability are not restricted to the police;
see Atiyah, op. cit., Ch. 2, for a detailed discussion on vicarious liability, and Rogers, W. (1994), p. 622.
91 S.48(2Xa) of the Police Act 1964 (now s.88(2)(a) of the Police Act 1996) allows for damages and costs
to be paid for out of the police fund. However, s.48(2)(b) (s.88(2)(b)) requires the police authority's
approval for the settlement of any claim, and retention of an element of discretion in similar manner to that
exercised prior to statutory change.
92 S.48 brought police officers in line with government officers covered by statutory vicarious liability, see
above fn.83.
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wrongdoing.93 General principles of vicarious liability attract similarly ambivalent
responses from theoretical purists who tend to criticise the rule as an unjustified
interference in the laws of tort despite admitting to legally and morally sound practical
consequences. 94 The primary function of the laws of tort is to compensate the plaintiff's
claim for damages for the wrong committed by the tortfeasor. Vicarious liability serves
to facilitate satisfaction of his claim in cases where the tortfeasor is acting under another
person's authority, so liability vicariously attaches to that 'other' person. An inherent
by-product of compensation is that the defendant, in paying damages, suffers a financial
loss, so there is always a punitive component to damages. In exceptional cases, where
the plaintiff suffers as a result of arbitrary, oppressive or unconstitutional conduct by
government servants, or the profit gained by the commission of the tort is financially
greater than the damage sustained by the defendant, exemplary damages may be
awarded so as to punish or as a deterrent or as a mark of disapproval. 95 For the sake of
completeness here, a third element of tort law is the plaintiff's vindication on securing
damages or a settlement from the defendant.96
The root of the problem with vicarious liability lies in the separation of the tortfeasor
and defendant which can allow tortfeasors to escape responsibility for their torts and
require defendants to satisfy damages even when entirely innocent and without
benefit. 97 For vicarious liability to attach to an action there are two basic requirements.
Firstly, the necessity of establishing a relationship between tortfeasor and defendant in
the form of, for example, master to servant, employer to employee or principal to agent.
And, secondly, the requirement that the tortfeasor's acts or omissions fall within the
course of his employment. The first requirement, although highly problematic in
principle because of its imposition, is not of major interpretative importance in police
See Graph I. and Table II., Chapter Two, above pp.62 and 63.
Atiyah, op. cit., for a detailed analysis, and Rogers, op. cit., for a brief appraisal.
Rookes v. Barnard[1964] A.C. 1129. See Chapter Six, below p.219.
Plaintiffs' attitudes to these three elements of tort law were presented in Chapter Three.
97 Lloydv. Grace, Smith& Co [1912]A.C. 716.
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actions as the application of a quasi master/servant relationship is statutorily defined by
s.48.98
Atiyah points out as a matter of general principle that there is little difficulty with
meeting the 'course of employment grounds' test in negligence actions because at issue
is normally the way in which something has been done rather than an act in itself?
However, wilful acts are an entirely different matter 100 and the intentional torts which
make up the vast majority of police actions are of this type.'°' Police powers at
common law and statute allow police officers to perform their peace keeping and law
enforcement duties, thereby exempting them from criminal and civil proceedings when
in the execution of their duties. In addition, reasonable suspicion protects police
officers from liability when exercising their discretionary powers. Police officers are
liable to civil proceedings when they stray from their lawful duties, when an officer is
not in the performance of his police function, although he may believe that to be the
case, hence reference to the purported police function in s.48. However, a police officer
found to have committed a tort will have committed the same tort regardless of whether
he was under the mistaken impression that he was acting within the scope of his
authority' 02 or acted with deliberate disregard for the law.'° 3 A chief officer's vicarious
liability attaches to a police officer's torts under both these circumstances and, although
this clearly interferes with the constitutional position by undermining the individual
police officer's personal accountability to the law, this can only be acceptable on the
basis that strict conditions apply. Firstly, the practical advantages afforded by s.48
outweigh the abeyance of constitutional principle, as long as it is confined to police
action procedure. Secondly, the success of this compromise between practice and
98 The only two reported cases I am aware of smce 1964 where vicarious liability has not attached in police
actions are Makanjuola v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1989) 2 Admin. L.R. 214, and Farah
v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 1 All E.R 289, see below p.180.
Atiyah, op. cit., 258, although gross negligence is more problematic.
'°° Ibid., 262. In the nineteenth century the courts took the view that it could not apply; Croft v. Allison
(1821), 4 B. & AId. 590; The Druid(1842), 1 Wm. Rob. 391.
°' See Table III., Chapter One, above p.65.
102 Wershofv. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1978] 3 All E.R. 540.
103 White v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1989) Times, 23 April; Treadaway v. Chief
Constable of West Midlands (1994) Times, 29 July.
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principle, which is advantageous to all parties,'° 4 is premised on a policy of consistent
application of the vicarious liability rule. It is important that there is no confusion
between practice and principle, between administrative function and constitutional
position, otherwise principles of equality before the law will be sacrificed to unilateral
decisions taken by chief officers, possibly in collaboration with their police
authorities.'05
III. The Office of Constable Undermined
The Police Act 1964 placed major emphasis on chief officers' operational independence
in the arrangement between chief officers, police authorities and the Home Secretary for
controlling police forces. Statutory effect was given to chief police officers
constitutional responsibilities for law enforcement under s.5(l),b06 which provided for
police forces to be under the direction and control of a chief officer appointed by the
police authority subject to the approval of the Home Secretary. Consistent with the
move to increase chief officers responsibilities for their police forces, the ss.48 and 49
'police wrongdoing package' was designed with the intention of compensating victims
and punishing offenders fairly under the authority of chief officers.
The form of words 'direction and control' in s.5(l) established the chief officer's
authority consistent with the doctrine of constabulary independence and accommodated
the independence of his subordinates under the office of constable. However, the
distinction between an officer who is subject to his superior's direction and control and
an employee is not easily explained,' 07 at the very least there is an inference that the law
of agency applies.' 08 If the legal relation between chief officer and police officer as
established by the office of constable is put to one side for a moment, and their
'° Plaintiffs, police officers and in the interests of efficient policing.
105 Given police authorities responsibilities under s.88(4) Police Act 1996 for authorisation of settlements.
106 Now s.1O(1) of the Police Act 1996.
107 See discussion above on the construction of s.48 of the Police Act 1964; cf. R. v. Chief Constable of the
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary ex pane Hay [1996] 2 All E.R.7 11 at 724 per Sedley J.
Clayton, R. and H. Tomlinson (1992), p.39, see below p.183.
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respective positions as public servants is considered according to their duties, the chief
officer conforms to the description of his subordinate's employer. As a consequence of
the Police Act 1964 'package', s.48 made chief officers responsible in civil law for
police officers wrongs and, as discipline authority, resolution of complaints against
them under s.49. Section 49 also gave chief officers responsibility for criminal
investigation and charge of police officers, a duty they also have at common law under
the doctrine of constabulary independence. This left the police officer liable for his
wrongdoing in criminal and civil law, and under the disciplinary code, through the
office of his chief officer.
If this position is re-examined by reference to the office of constable - prior to
enactment of ss.48 and 49, the police officer was liable for his own tortious conduct and
to the criminal law the same as the citizen, consistent with the office of constable. After
s.48 he was no longer held responsible to the civil law for his wrongdoing and, as a
consequence of s.49 he was subject to different criminal procedures to the citizen. Both
reforms effected by statute are inconsistent with the principle that the police officer is
accountable to the law for his wrongdoing in like maimer as the citizen, as required by
the office of constable.
However, ss.48 and 49 are entirely consistent with the doctrine of constabulary
independence in that they do not impinge on chief officer's responsibilities for law
enforcement. This tension between the office of constable and the doctrine of
constabulary independence is evidence that, although the latter is used to define the
present constitutional position, the reality is more complex as the doctrine does not lend
itself to formulaic definition and displays a peculiarly dynamic character. Although the
common law doctrine of constabulary independence was derived from the police
officer's accountability to the law, as provided by the office of constable, the two
constitutional principles are not entirely compatible. Identification of their
inconsistency is made easier if accountability to the law is not considered as an abstract
principle but in real terms as a form of control exerted by an independent arbiter over a
subject. In the early period of police history the police officer's accountability to the
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law under the office of constable was given substance by his subjugation to the justices.
Under the doctrine of constabulary independence, in contrast, the police's accountability
to the law amounts to an assertion of principle, an abstract quality in the absence of a
judicial officer to whom the police officer can be held accountable.'°9
It is proposed that a more comprehensive definition of the police's constitutional
position needs to refer to the balance between four principles; i) Dicey's equality before
the law, ii) the police officer's independent authority under the office of constable,"°
iii) police discretion in the execution of their powers' 1 ' and iv) constabulary
independence."2 Their inter-relation, their consistency or inconsistency with each
other, can be diagrammatically outlined as in Figure III.
Fiaure III. The constitutional balance
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By cross-referencing it can be observed how the constitutional position has changed
over the years. The situation in the early part of the century was of the office of
constable conforming to principles of equality before the law, prior to increasing
acceptance of the discretionary nature of police powers. In later years police discretion
and constabulary independence combined to form the cornerstone of the present
constitutional position, in conflict with the principles of equality before the law and
officer independence. It is my argument that the failure of the Police Act 1964 to
establish a proper balance between legal and political controls disturbed the
constitutional equilibrium so that police autonomy became a serious political problem
'° See comment on R. v. Oxford, ex parte Levey (1986) Times 1 November, Chapter One, above fn.68.
"°Fisher v. Oldham Corporation [1930] 2 K.B. 364.
"I Holgate-Mohammedv Duke [1984] 1 A.C. 437.
112 R. v. Metropolitan Commissioner of Police exparte Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 118.
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which, it is suggested, peaked during the 1984-5 Miners Strike and was dramatically
reinforced by a succession of quashed convictions commencing with the release of the
Guildford Four in 1989.113 This situation did not arise solely on the basis of inadequate
political controls, it is constitutionally rooted in the 1964 Act's interference with the
police officer's accountability to the law by introduction of a vicarious liability rule and
codification of the complaint process.
The value of this balanced approach to the police's constitutional position, which
centres on the relation between the office of constable and the doctrine of constabulary
independence, with the former reflecting the principle of equality before the law and the
latter expressing executive discretion, is its flexibility. Instead of a doctrinaire approach
to police governance, it is possible to look at the office and the doctrine as two elements
which, although interdependent, are capable of existing independently. 114 Thus,
disavowal of the office of constable at common law does not mean that the doctrine of
constabulary independence has to be abandoned.
Fisher revisited
The significance of s.49 of the Police Act 1964 for the police officer's accountability to
the law has escaped the notice of most commentators, it is suggested on account that it
made small practical difference to the numbers of police officers prosecuted and the
focus of subsequent debate on the complaint and discipline processes." 5 However, this
did not prevent the need for further police complaints reform under the Police Act 1976
and PACE. The rickety structure of s.48, on the other hand, designed with preservation
of the office of constable in mind, was more vulnerable to exposure, as the statute had
been drafted with the intention of assisting litigation and would be subject to common
law reform. In principle, the statute did no more than make chief officers joint
tortfeasors for the purpose of defending police actions and left police officers equally
liable to claims for damages. However, only a few months before the Act received the
113 See above fnn.6 and 8.
114 This interpretation of the constitutional position is consistent with Lawton L.J. 's judgment in R. v. Chief
Constable of Devon and Cornwall ex parte Central Electricity Generating Board [1982] Q.B. 458, see
Chapter One, above p.40.
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Royal Assent, the House of Lords' ruling on exemplary damages in Rookes v
Barnard" 6 was to have the effect of discouraging plaintiffs from naming police officers
as joint defendants. Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion on the case law of police
wrongdoing, including exemplaiy damages and principles of vindication in police
actions. Here, I consider what appear to the only two reported cases in which vicarious
liability has not attached to chief officers since implementation of the Police Act
1964;" Makanjuola v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis" 8 and Farah v.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis."9
In Makanjuola, Henry J. awarded £8,000 damages for assault, including buggery, and
intimidation against the second defendant, a police officer who was the tortfeasor, after
ruling that the Commissioner was not liable on grounds that the officer had been 'acting
on a squalid adventure of his own." 2o After establishing that the off duty officer had
sexually assaulted the plaintiff, Henry J. applied a 'purported performance of police
functions' test in preference to a 'course of employment' test to determine whether the
Commissioner was vicariously liable under s.48. His reason was that the course of
employment test ascribes an artificial business to the Commissioner, whereas the
purported performance test reflects 'the fact that the police officer is exercising many
powers independently by virtue of his status under common law statute (sic), and
exercising those powers with the freedom that his constitutional position requires and
permits." 2 ' There is nothing in the Parliamentary debates on s.48 to suggest that it was
the statutory intention to distinguish between liability in police actions and other civil
actions. On the contrary, it was recognised that the vicarious liability rule was
inconsistent with the office of constable and, rather than reflect the constitutional
position, the statute was cobbled together to do minimal damage to it. Therefore, the
115 See argument developed above in Chapter Two.
116 [1964] A.C. 1129, see below Chapter Six discussion on exemplary damages.
117 In both cases regret was expressed in the judgments not to apply s.48. Makanjuola v. Commissioner of
Police of the Metropolis (1989) 2 Admin. L.R. 214, at 233 per Henry J.; Farah v. Commissioner of Police
of the Metropolis [1997] 1 All E.R 289 at 304 per Hutchinson L.J.
(1989)2 Admin. L.R. 214.
119 [1997] 1 All E.R 289.
120(1989)2 Admin. L.R. 214, at 252.
121 Ibid., at 246.
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only relevance that can be given to the word 'purported' is its assistance with definition
of tortious conduct by a police officer.122
Vicarious liability and the independent authority of the police officer are mutually
exclusive concepts which manage to uncomfortably coexist only if the chief officer's
liability is restricted to an administrative function, in other words, s.48 suspends the
constitutional position of the office of constable for the purposes of the law of tort. In
Makanjuola, Henry J. distances himself from this position by applying contradictory
principles of vicarious liability and independent authority coterminously, by seeking to
reflect the constitutional position in a decision on tortious liability.' 23 It is held that he
should have put the constitutional position put to one side and applied a 'course of
employment' test.
It is interesting to note that there is no record of Makanjuola having been relied upon by
chief officers when defending police actions. The plaintiff also made a complaint which
resulted in the conviction of the tortfeasor for disciplinary offences and his dismissal
from the MPS,' 24 and it is suggested that the judgment leaves police officers liable for
double punishment where they have been convicted of a disciplinary offence. This is
contrary to the spirit of the ss.48 and 49 package, which was a compromise drafted to
benefit plaintiffs, tortfeasors and defendants. Under these circumstances non-
application of the vicarious liability rule disturbs the underlying consensus required
between chief officers and their subordinates.
In the more recent case of Farah' 25 the Commissioner applied to the Court of Appeal to
strike out the plaintiff's claim for damages for unlawful racial discrimination' 26 for
disclosing no cause of action. Firstly, on grounds that police officers do not provide
122 An officer who mistakenly believes he is in performance of the police function purports to be executing
his duty whereas, in fact, he behaves unlawfully.
123 (1989) 2 Admin. L.R. 214, at 247.
124 Makanjuola v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1992] 3 All E.R. 617 at 619 per Lord
Donaldson M.R.
125 The plaintiffs alleged they were assaulted, falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted after seeking the
police's assistance, [1997] 1 All E.R289.
126 Treated as tortious conduct for the purpose of civil proceedings; s.57(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976.
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public services, and secondly that he could not be held vicariously liable because
officers exercise an independent authority. Judgment was that individual police officers
are liable for unlawful racial discrimination in their provision of a public service, and
that chief officers are not vicariously liable. This affirmation of the common law
position in Farah makes unlawful racist behaviour unique in the laws of police actions.
In response to a submission on behalf of the defendant that police officers do not
provide services but exercise powers of investigation, detection and the bringing of
offenders to justice, which entail the exercise of discretion and judgment, Hutchinson
L.J. ruled' 27 that the plaintiff's call to the police for assistance and protection was
arguably a request for a service 128 and that police officers do provide a service within
the meaning of s.20(2)(g)' 29 of the Race Relations Act l976.'° The approach adopted
here, although not concerned with vicarious liability, is quite different to Henry J. 's in
Makanjuola. Hutchinson L.J. does not attempt to reflect the police officer's
constitutional status in consideration of the police function, and his conclusion that
police officers provide a public service overcomes Henry J.'s concern that a 'cause of
employment' liability test ascribes an artificial business to the Commissioner.
Vicarious liability did not attach in Farah on account of an exclusionary clause under
s.53(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976:
Except as provided by this Act no proceedings, whether civil or
criminal, shall lie against any person in respect of any act by reason
that the act is unlawful by virtue of a provision of this Act.
Although s.20 of the Race Relations Act 1976 prohibits racial discrimination, a claim
for damages cannot be made against a chief police officer as s.48(l) of the Police Act
1964' s ' does not apply because the proceedings are not provided for by the 1976 Act.
In other words, actions for damages against chief police officers for acts of unlawful
127 Farah v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 1 All E.R. 289 at 294.
' 28 Amjn v. Entry Clearance Officer, Bombay [1983] 2 All E.R. 864 at 873 per Lord Fraser; judgment on the
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 establishing as a test of a service 'an act that may be done by a private
person'.
129 
'the services of any profession or trade, or any local or public authority.'
130 Farah v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 1 All E.R. 289, at 300.
'' Now s.88(1) Police Act 1996.
182
Chapter Five: Sections 48 and 49 of the Police Act 1964
racial discrimination by officers under their direction and control cannot be pursued. It
was submitted on the plaintiff's behalf that it could not have been Parliament's intention
to exclude s.48's application in this manner. It was alternatively argued that in addition
to the imposition of vicarious liability under s.48 ordinary vicarious liability applies by
virtue of the relationship between the Commissioner and his officers or authority
conferred.' 32 The point was taken from Clayton and Tomlinson' 33 that police officers
are agents of their chief officers by virtue of being under their direction and control
under s.5(1) of the Police Act 1964, which suggests the subordination of the constable's
original authority to that of their chief officer.' 34 Hawkins v. Bepey' 35 was cited as
further evidence of the application of the law of agency to the police, a case where it
was judged that a police inspector in prosecuting an offender did so on behalf of his
chief officer. Hutchinson L.J. rejected these arguments, as did Otton L.J.,' 36 affirmed
Fisher and distinguished Bepey. With s.48 statutorily excluded, the constitutional limb
of Fisher was applied in ruling that police officers exercise an original authority, that in
the instant case the officers were not acting as the Commissioner's agents and that
liability did not attach to the defendant for the unlawful racial discrimination alleged. 137
Bepey was judged not to be in conflict with Fisher as it is a case of express authority in
which the inspector acted as a representative of the police force in instituting criminal
proceedings such that on his death those proceedings could not be discontinued.
Reading Farah, the value of my 'balanced' model of the constitutional position is
apparent as the judgment reflects the conflict between the office of constable and the
doctrine of constabulary independence. In similar fashion to the manner in which the
term 'direction and control' in s.5(1) of the Police Act 1964 presumes a balance
between the office of constable and constabulary independence' 38 so does their use in
s.48. Although a chief officer's vicarious liability negates the originality of the police
132 Farah v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 1 All E.R. 289, at 302.
' See above fn.108.
'i" Farah v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 1 All E.R. 289, at 303.
'" [ 19801 1 All E.R. 797.
136 Farah v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 1 All E.R. 289 at 304-306 per Hutchmson
L.J.
137 Ibid., at 303.
138 See above p.176.
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officer's powers under Fisher it is not at all inconsistent with constabulary
independence. On the contrary, a chief officer's responsibility for the wrongdoing of
those under his direction and control is entirely compatible with a doctrine which makes
him responsible for law enforcement in his area. Furthermore, if he was to be made the
employer of the officers presently under his direction and control this would not create
problems for the doctrine, although it would consign the office of constable to the
dustbin of history. The significance of the inter-relation between the office and the
doctrine of constabulary independence to the constitutional position is that a weakening
of the office corresponds with a strengthening of the doctrine. In Farah, the absurdity
of this situation was exposed with Hutchinson L.J. bound by the office of constable in
ruling that a chief officer is not liable for acts of unlawful racial discrimination although
he is liable under s.48 for police conduct generally. He had no option but to affirm an
authority dating back nearly 60 years which had been overturned by statute 30 years
previously. Farah appears to maintain the balance in the constitutional position by re-
emphasising the office of constable, however, the cost of sustaining the principle has
created an anomaly of unlawful racial discrimination in the law of police actions. It is
suggested that here lays a conundrum in the constitutional position. Vicarious liability
in the laws of tort is incompatible with the office of constable and it was likely that case
law would cause damage to the integrity of the constitutional position by interfering
with the relation between chief officers and their subordinates. In Chapter Six this
theme will be developed by demonstrating that the case law on the retributive and
restorative elements on of police actions have widened the gulf between the office of
constable and the doctrine of constabulary independence.
Further cause for complaint
Sections 48 and 49 of the Police Act 1964 have differently effected the balance in the
police's constitutional position, although with the same consequence of strengthening
the doctrine of constabulary independence at the expense of the office of constable.
Introduction of quasi-judicial police discipline regulations in 1920 provided safeguards
for police officers charged with disciplinary offences, ' later supplemented by
Police Regulations 1920, S.R. and 0. 1920/1484.
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provisions under the Police (Appeals) Act 1927. Thus, for disciplinary proceedings
arising from a complaint made by a member of the public, the discipline process
provided procedural protections for accused officers without countervailing rights
available to the complainant.' 40 The complainant was dependent on the impartiality of
chief officers for the satisfaction of seeing the officer held to account. Until the 1962
Royal Commission on the Police it would appear that independent investigation of
complaints and determination of disciplinary proceedings had rarely been considered,'4'
and nor had the need for representation of complainants in either process. Yet,
parliamentary debate on s.49 focussed on these issues with four opposition amendments
defeated.' 42 In summary, they had been drafted with the aim of providing for i)
complainants' rights of access to complaint investigation reports and notes of
disciplinary hearings,' 43 ii) involvement of an independent solicitor in the
investigation' and iii) an independent appeals procedure which could be brought by
complainant or defendant.'45
In standing committee the Home Secretary put s.49 into constitutional context in terms
of the government's general aims - 'we are putting on the chief constable direct
responsibility for the efficiency and behaviour of his force',' 46 and, in the event of
failing to maintain an efficient force, he could be required to retire. 147 The statutory
effect of empowering chief officers to investigate alleged criminal offences under the
140 See discussion on police discipline case law above; also, Hogg v. Scott [1947] 1 All E.R. 788. In
Merricks v. Nott-Bower [1965] 1 Q.B. 57 it was ruled that two Metropolitan police officers had a cause of
action in their claim for a declaration that there had been a breach in regulations which was contrary to
principles of natural justice, and damages for libel, after their transfers to other duties were effected outside
of the disciplinary procedure.
141 The 1929 Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure rejected giving the DPP investigatory
powers (see above fh.56) and recommended chief officers should interview a complainant before disposing
of their complaint. In reaching this conclusion the Commissioners' expressed their concern with the
constitutional position - 'alleged offences against the law of the land committed by policemen ought not to
be treated differently from offences committed by other citizens.' 'Report of the Royal Commission on
Police Powers and Procedure' (Cmnd. 3297), 1929, Parliamentary Papers (1928-1929), vol. 9, p.127 at
pp.107-108 of Report.
142 Police Bill, 1963 (Standing Committee Debate) Standing Committee D, 6 - 13 February 1963, cols. 626
- 736 at 729-732.
" Ibid., 6 February 1963, col. 628.
'Ibid.
145 Ibid., col. 629.
' Ibid., col. 704.
" S.5(4) of the Police Act 1964, now s.1 1(2) of the Police Act 1996.
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complaint process, with adjudication under the discipline process, did not undermine his
common law responsibility for law enforcement. Rather, statutory provision augmented
his common law powers by providing for complaint resolution as an alternative to
criminal charge when dealing with police crime. This established that the police
officer's liability for his wrongdoing need not be according to the due process of
criminal law but by administrative process. As a consequence, the character of the
office of constable changed. Prior to the Police Act 1964, the major significance of the
office of constable was the officer's original authority and personal liability for his
wrongdoing.' 48 This status entitled him to common law criminal protections if
suspected of an offence, and similar safeguards were available to him under the quasi-
judicial discipline process. After s.49, these protections for the officer against his
chief's disciplinary and law enforcement powers became the principal function of the
office of constable.' 49 Given the infrequency of criminal prosecutions of police officers,
the significance of the office of constable has, therefore, become largely restricted to
police administrative affairs, and the doctrine of constabulary independence reigns
supreme in the law enforcement domain.
To conclude, it is held that s.49 of the Police Act 1964 seriously damaged the principle
that the police officer is accountable to the law by making the police officer accountable
to the criminal law in a different manner than for the citizen. Section 48 also
undermined the office of constable, but did not have the same impact as s.49 on account
of attempts by the government to restrict its purpose to the laws of tort. In the longer
term, however, the main damage caused to the constitutional position of the police was
by the failure of the assumptions resting at the heart of the ss.48 and 49 package to
materialise. My interpretation of the Royal Commission's recommendations and the
parliamentary debates is that it was believed that joining allegations of criminal
wrongdoing together with lesser complaints for the purpose of investigation under s.49
would not interfere with the fair administration of justice. It was thought that
desegregation would automatically occur at a later stage on the basis that criminal, civil
148 Fisher v. Oldham Corporation [1930] 2 K.B. 364, see Chapter One, above p.37.
These protections are provided by the quasi-judicial discipline process which have been targeted for
reform since March 1993, see Chapter Seven, below p.242.
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and disciplinary procedures are available.' 50 In practice, this has not proved to be the
case, and the reality has been that the only meaningful segregation has been between
s.48 actions and s.49 complaints. The control of police wrongdoing by these two
remedies have had the consequence of making chief officers responsible for police
wrongdoing as the defendant in civil proceedings and the discipline authority for
complaint resolution. The police officer's accountability to the law for his wrongdoing
does not attach in either process, which leaves the office of constable in a fictional state.
150 See above, p.167.
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CHAPTER SIX.
A Developing Area of Law
Three propositions were put in Chapter Five. Firstly, as a matter of principle s.49 of
the Police Act 1964 separated the police officer from the citizen in his accountability
to the criminal law for his wrongdoing. Secondly, at the heart of the constitutional
position of the police there is a balance between the office of constable and the
doctrine of constabulary independence. Thirdly, as a consequence of ss.48 and 49 of
the Police Act 1964 the office of constable has little practical value today other than
as a protection for police officers rights, which allowed the doctrine of constabulary
independence to emerge as the dominant element of the constitutional position.
This third proposition was put primarily with regard to the police officer's criminal
liability and subjugation to his chief officer in disciplinary matters. Although the
officer's civil liability was considered briefly in two cases,' police actions are a
developing area of law and it will be argued below that the major significance of s.48
for the constitutional position of the police has emerged in recent case law. However,
instead of restricting discussion in this chapter to police action case law, I consider the
case law of police wrongdoing more generally in order to demonstrate how s.48
police actions and s.49 complaints have had an important influence on each other at
common law.2 With the complaint process codified on the premise that more serious
complaints would be subject to criminal or civil proceedings, and the subsequent
infrequency of prosecutions of police officers, it was inevitable that complaints and
actions would compete with each other after the 1964 Act. By looking at early case
law on complaints and discipline I intend to demonstrate how recent judgments on
police actions have been influenced by earlier decisions on s.49 complaints.
The chapter examines five separate areas of case law commencing with rulings in the
Divisional Court on issues of fairness in connection with disciplinary and criminal
proceedings, primarily following applications for review of decisions by chief
Makanjuola v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1989) 2 Admin. L.R. 214 and Farah v.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 1 All E.R. 289, see Chapter Five; above p.180.
2 Case law on judicial review of the DPP's decisions not to prosecute police officers and three criminal
cases discussed in Chapter One, at pp.13 and 27, respectively, are not reconsidered in this chapter.
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officers. Although such cases had no direct bearing on police actions, the concerns of
chief officers and the courts to apply safeguards for accused officers are likely to have
discouraged complainants from relying on the statutory process. The second area of
interest concerns coverage of police complaints statements with class public interest
immunity (P11). In the landmark case of Neilson v. Laugharne, 3 the Court of Appeal
ruled that a plaintiff pursuing civil proceedings under s.48 was not entitled to
disclosure of statements taken under s.49. The effect of the judgment was to
encourage complainants to reject the statutory complaint process in favour of civil
proceedings as a means of securing redress to police wrongdoing.
In the early 1990s something of a sea change is observable in judicial thinking on
police wrongdoing. P11 was making a mockery of the law and was overturned by the
House of Lords in R. v. Chief Constable of West Midlands ex parte Wiley. 4 This
change was effected after the judiciary overcame some of its reluctance to interfere in
policing affairs by ruling in R. v. Edwards5 that police officers apparently disbelieved
by juries could be cross examined by the defence in subsequent criminal proceedings.
This allowed for criminal proceedings to serve as an alternative to disciplinary
findings as a gauge of police officers credibility, and the case law on evidence
relevant to police officers credit is the third area discussed below. It is suggested that
developments in the above three areas of case law place in context the emergence of
police actions as a popular remedy to wrongdoing. The Metropolitan Police
Commissioner sought to recover some of the ground lost in ex parte Wiley and
Edwards by asking the Court of Appeal to limit the opportunity for plaintiffs to be
awarded substantial damages following incidents where complaints had not been
made. Exemplary damages, and the introduction of guidelines in Thompson and Hsu
v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 6 is the fourth aspect of case law
discussed. The discussion on Thompson and Hsu focuses on s.48's significance for
exemplary damages in that the defendant who is responsible for damages is not the
tortfeasor who is deserving of retributive justice. The separation of defendant and
tortfeasor has also been prominent in the final series of cases examined, where
[1981] & All E.R. 829.
[1994] 3 All E.R. 420.
(1991)93 Cr. App. R. 48.
6 [1997] 2 All E.R. 762.
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objection has been made to naming police officers in open court following the
Commissioner's settlement of actions.
I.	 Fairness of Disciplinary Proceedings
The importance of the protections granted police officers at both common and
statute law to the operation of a fair disciplinary process was put succinctly by Lord
Donaldson M.R.:
"Unfairness" in this context [of the quasi-judicial discipline
process] is a general concept which comprehends prejudice to the
accused, but can also extend to a significant departure from the
intended and prescribed framework of disciplinary proceedings or
a combination of both.7
Continuing the pattern established prior to the Police Act 1964 in Ridge v. Baldwin,8
the courts were called on to rule on chief constables' adherence to principles of
natural justice in cases unconnected with the discipline process, although discipline
regulations may have been circumvented. 9 The Court of Appeal ruled that a duty to
act fairly existed where steps were taken to compulsorily retire an officer on health
grounds under pension regulations because it involved a quasi-judicial decision.'°
The House of Lords determined that a chief constable should have informed a
probationary constable of his concerns with the officer's personal circumstances
before exercising his discretion to discontinue his employment." In R. v. Chief
Constable of the West Midlands Police ex parte Carroll' 2 it was ruled that a
probationer was entitled to a disciplinary hearing where he contested allegations
made against him with the counter claim that colleagues had engaged in a
conspiracy to discredit him.'3
R. v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police exparte Merrill [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1077, at 1085.
[1963] 2 All E.R. 66.
Cf. Merricks v. Nott-Bower [1965] 1 Q.B. 57; the Court of Appeal ruling two police officers had an
actionable case for declaration of a breach in principles of natural justice and damage for libel where
their transfer to other duties may have been in lieu of disciplinary action ainounting to the Metropolitan
Police Commissioner's misuse of the power to transfer.
'°R. v. Kent Police Authority exparte Godden [1971] 2 Q.B. 662.
"ChiefConstable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1155.
12 (1994) Admin. L.R. 45.
' Ibid, at 54 per McCowan U.
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In Chapter Two it was argued that the over-riding concern of those responsible for
police complaints with maintaining force morale had the effect of undermining public
confidence.' 4 Causes for this interference in the balance between force morale and
public confidence can be identified in two particular aspects of case law on the rights
of police officers in disciplinary proceedings - application of the double jeopardy rule
and abuse of process due to delay.
Double jeopardy
The doctrine of double jeopardy is normally associated with the principle that a
criminal suspect cannot be prosecuted twice for the same offence. A similar rule
was introduced to the police discipline process under s. 11 of the Police Act 1976 to
safeguard officers from prosecution for a disciplinary offence as an alternative to
criminal prosecution. It has been a long running sore ever since its introduction'5
with the PCB arguing that the so-called rule, along with the Home Secretary's
circular for guidance, 16 undermined its authority in its first full annual report.' 7 The
PCB strictly adhered to the guidelines maintaining it was precluded from directing a
chief officer to prefer disciplinary charges following a decision by the DPP not to
initiate criminal proceedings on grounds that the charge relied on the same evidence
determined insufficient for a criminal prosecution. A semblance of reality was
restored in R. v. Police Complaints Board ex parte Madden and Rhone, a joined
application for review by two complainants.' 8 The Divisional Court ruled the PCB's
practice an unlawful abdication of its statutory duty to initiate disciplinary charges
under s.3(2) of the Police Act l976.' Giving judgment, McNeil! J. declared that the
PCB had confused its responsibility to be fair to the officer who was the subject of a
complaint with the double jeopardy rule. 2° Double jeopardy precludes charging an
' See Chapter Two, above p.75;
15 The rule, as amended by s.104 of PACE, was repealed by s. 37(f) of the Police and Magistrates
Courts Act 1994, which will eventually be effected on 1 April 1999.
16 Home Office Circular No. 63/1977, reprinted in part as Appendix B, Report of the Police Complaints
Board! June-31 December 1977 (H.C. 359), 1978, p.9.
' Report of the Police Complaints Board /978 (H.C. 4), 1979, p.12.
[1983] 2 All E.R. 353; both complainants also commenced police actions with Mr Rhone having
been awarded damages for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution by the time of the review
hearing, Ibid, at 366.
' The Metropolitan Commissioner, Sir Kenneth Newman, had the fmal word on proceedings in Rhone
reporting that after the PCB directed the Deputy Commissioner to prefer disciplinary charges, the
officers were acquitted; Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the Year /983
(Cmnd. 9268), 1994, p.34.
20 R v. Police Complaints Boardexparte Madden and Rhone [1983] 2 All E.R. 353, at 371.
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officer with the same offence twice, but a decision by the DPP not to commence
criminal proceedings can have no bearing on the PCB's duty to be fair to the officer
when deciding if a disciplinary prosecution should be brought. Whether or not there
is evidence that an offence against discipline has been committed has to be decided
on the facts as detailed in the complaint investigation report.2'
It is, perhaps, of significance that the early PCB reports 22 were the first opportunity
for informed independent analysis of the complaint process, and it is interesting to
note that double jeopardy was immediately problematicised. The introduction of a
double jeopardy rule serves as an ideal example of the shift in emphasis in the
function of the office of constable from maintaining the police officer's
accountability to the criminal law to sustaining criminal protections in discipline
proceedings.23 There is a clear implication, endorsed by McNeill J.s ruling in
parte Madden, that the Home Secretary's 1977 guidelines on double jeopardy
emasculated the PCB and neutralised the introduction of an independent element to
the police complaint process so vehemently opposed by chief officers. For the
potential complainant, on the other hand, application of a broad interpretation of
double jeopardy before cx parte Madden was an early sign of the comparative
advantages of police action. By engaging in a separate procedure to the complaint
process he would be unaffected by a rule which served to cancel out criminal and
disciplinary liability against each other.
Abuse of process
Further evidence of judicial neglect of the balance between force morale and public
confidence is evident in cases where delays in initiating proceedings have been ruled
an abuse of process. Lord Donaldson M.R. gave leading judgments in the Court of
Appeal on delay in R. v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police cx parte
Calveley24 and R. v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police cx parte Merrill.25
21 Thus, as far as the Home Secretary's guidelines were concerned, it was only necessary for the PCB
to 'have regard' for them, it was not obliged to follow them, Ibid., at 374.
22 The 1977-80 Triennial Report analysed the complaint process, difficulties with investigations of
criminal assault allegations and alternatives to police investigation, Police Complaints Board Triennial
Review Report 1980 (Cmnd. 7966), 1980.
23 See Chapter Five, above p.1 86, this situation was recognised by repeal of the rule under the Police
and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, see above fn.15.
24 [1986] 1 Q.B. 424.
25 [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1077.
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Six factors were common to both review applications - i) complaints were made
against police officers by persons charged with criminal offences; ii) complaint
investigations were suspended pending the outcome of criminal proceedings; iii)
complainants were acquitted of all charges, iv) complainants also pursued police
actions; v) officers were served with regulation 7 notices26 when they were
interviewed by complaint investigation officers; and vi) officers were charged with
disciplinary offences.
In the first case the chief constable found five officers guilty of abuse of authority,
falsehood and prevarication after a full disciplinary hearing and dismissed them
from the force or required them to resign. 27 The officers subsequently appealed
against his decision under s.37 of the Police Act 1964 and applied for judicial
review. The Divisional Court refused the review application on grounds that it was
premature pending conclusion of the appeal process. The Court of Appeal heard that
the chief constable ruled at the disciplinary hearing that the two year delay in serving
regulation 7 notices had been unavoidable as a consequence of awaiting the
conclusion of criminal proceedings, and then in anticipation of the complainants
commencing civil actions. The Master of the Rolls ruled that the requirement to
serve notice on the officer provides an 'essential protection for police officers facing
disciplinary charges' which does not require that all the evidence must first be
collected and considered. 28 He concluded that the applicants had been prejudiced by
the delay. Going on to consider judicial review as an appropriate remedy prior to
exhaustion of the appeal process, fundamental importance was attached to the
integrity of the disciplinary process:
.against the background of the requirement of regulation 7 that the
applicants be informed of the complaint and given an opportunity
26 For exparte Calveley Regulation 7 of Police (Discipline) Regulations 1977, S.I. 1977/580 required:
'The investigating officer shall, as soon as is practicable (without prejudicing his or any other
investigation of the matter), in writing inform the member subject to investigation of the report,
allegation or complaint and give him a written notice - (a) informing him that he is not obliged to say
anything concerning the matter, but that he may, if he so desires, make a written or oral statement
concerning the matter to the investigating officer or to the chief officer concerned, and (b) warning him
that if he makes such a statement it may be used in any subsequent disciplinary proceedings.' For ex
parte Merrill the identical regulation 7 under the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985, S.I. 1985/5 18
applied.
2 Calveley v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police [1989] 1 All E.R. 1025, at 1028 per Lord
Bridges.
K v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police ex parte Calveley [1986] 1 Q.B. 424, at 431-2 per
Lord Donaldson M.R.
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to reply within days rather than weeks, the applicants had no
formal notice of the complaints for well over two years. This is so
serious a departure from the police disciplinary procedure that, in
my judgment, the court should, in the exercise of its discretion,
grant judicial review and set aside the determination of the Chief
Constable.29
Moving on to ex parte Merrill, the Merseyside chief constable bore ex parte
Calveley in mind when deciding at a preliminary hearing that the 16 month delay in
serving a regulation 7 notice on DC Merrill, some 11 weeks after the complainant's
Crown Court acquittal, did not amount to abuse of process. He then adjourned
proceedings to allow the officer to seek judicial review; an application dismissed by
the Divisional Court. On appeal Lord Donaldson M.R. declared that the chief
constable did not need to rule on abuse of process, it was within his discretion to
discontinue proceedings if he was satisfied that it would be unfair to the accused to
continue.30 The disciplinary proceedings were quashed on grounds that the time for
serving a regulation 7 notice commenced with the appointment of the investigation
officer, not after the completion of criminal proceedings. The greater the delay the
greater the prejudice to the accused, which had to be justified by the CIO.3'
The Divisional Court has also determined that inordinate delay in serving regulation
7 notices amounts to abuse of process in criminal proceedings. Two cases connected
with the policing of a demonstration on 24 January 1987 as part of the long running
29 Ibid., at 435. May L.J., at 439, ruled that judicial review should only be granted in procedural delay
cases where the delay amounted to an abuse of process. The officers were reinstated in December 1985
with back pay covering the period from dismissal to reinstatement and went on to claim damages
against their chief constable for anxiety, vexation and injury to reputation, and special damages for loss
of overtime. Along with other Merseyside and Greater Manchester officers engaged in two separate
civil actions they took their cases to the House of Lords where Lord Bridge delivered a somewhat
dismissive judgment in Calveley v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police [1989] 1 All ER. 1025.
He ruled that regulation 7 served as a procedural protection for officers and the idea that parliament
could have intended it to give rise to a cause of action for economic loss was 'too fanciful to call for
serious consideration' (at 1029). Nor was negligence arising from a breach of statutory duty for failure
to adhere to investigation procedure arguable in the likelihood that it would be contrary to public policy
for a citizen acquitted of a criminal offence to claim such damages (at 1030); cf. Elguzouli-Daf v
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] 1 All E.R. 833.
30 R. v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police exparte Merrill [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1077, at 1085.
' Ibid., at 1086-1087. The influence of exparte Calveley and Merrill can be observed on the practice
of specialist criminal solicitors when advising their clients not to make complaints as described in
Chapter Three. The requirement for serving regulation 7 notices as soon as possible after
appointment of a ClO discouraged potential complainants fearful that they would be alerting
prosecution witnesses of their defence and place officers in a position to preclude a complaint
investigation by redoubling his efforts to obtain a conviction.
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News International industrial dispute at Wapping, East London, 32 R. v. Bow Street
Stipendiary Magistrate exparte DPP and exparte Cherry, 33 were heard jointly. The
DPP challenged the magistrate's decision to discharge six Metropolitan police
officers after declining jurisdiction to hear charges against them as to do so would be
an abuse of process, and a police officer so charged challenged the decision by a
different magistrate. Watkins L.J. gave the judgment of the Divisional Court,
dismissing the DPP's challenge and finding for the applicant in exparte Cherry. In
the first mentioned case the six officers appeared before the magistrate to face
charges of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice by making false entries in their
note books and statements in relation to the arrests of three men. At the magistrates'
court hearing the ClO sought to justify delays in serving regulation 7 notices 11 to
12 months after the incident as a result of the magnitude of the overall complaint
operation. Altogether 2,538 witness statements, 4,109 other documents, 695
photographs, 23 hours of video film and a radio log had to be analysed. 34 However,
the magistrate concluded that the notices were served too late constituting an abuse
of process,35 a decision with which the Divisional Court could find no fault. 36 Under
similar circumstances the magistrate in the second case concluded differently and
ruled that delay in serving regulation 7 notices did not amount to an abuse of process
and committal proceedings were commenced against Cherry for unlawful
wounding. 37 Quashing the proceedings, the Divisional Court ruled that he suffered
'extreme delay from which prejudice could properly be inferred.'38
In contrast to these 1980s cases, Sedley J. in R. v. Chief Constable of the Devon and
Cornwall Constabulary ex parte Hay, 39 considered a separate category of case
regarding officers evasion of disciplinary proceedings through retirement on health
grounds. In this case, the judgment stresses the need for chief officers to maintain a
32 A total of 122 complaints from 62 complainants were eventually investigated under supervision by
the PCA. 35 reports were considered by the DPP who decided that 26 officers should be prosecuted for
offences including assault, conspiracy to pervert the course ofjustice and perjury; Annual Report of the
Police Complaints Authority for the year 1988 (H.C. 307), 1989, p.1 8.
(1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 283.
Ibid., at 285 per Watkins L.J.
35 Ibid. at 289.
36 Ibid., at 298.
S.20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
38 R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte DPP and ex part e Cherry (1990) 91 Cr. App. R.
283, at 300 per Watkins L.J., despite sufficient evidence to charge him by the end of April 1987 he was
not served with a regulation 7 notice until the following February, and a summons in January 1989.
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proper balance between officers and complainants rights in discipline proceedings.
Ruling was that, although a chief officer is not technically a police officer's employer,
he is in a position to refuse to retire an officer if the police or public interest in
requiring the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings outweighs the case for
retirement.4°
To conclude this discussion on fairness, three of the above mentioned cases, cx parte
Calveley, Merrill and DPP, gave notice of complainants readiness to resort to civil
proceedings in the event of their failure to gain satisfaction through the complaint
process. It is stated in cx parte Calveley that out of five defendants charged with
being drunk and disorderly three made complaints alleging assault. Magistrates
subsequently acquitted all five and civil proceedings were initiated. 4 ' The judgment
does not say how many plaintiffs commenced proceedings, what the causes of action
were and how the actions concluded. More details are available in cx parte Merrill,
where one complainant acquitted of reckless driving settled his action for damages for
assault and false imprisonment (and most probably malicious prosecution). Two
other complainants who were arrested but not charged also settled their cases out of
court with no mention of their causes of action. 42 Although details of actions brought
by the complainants in the DPP's failed review application arising from the Wapping
disturbance are not contained in the judgment, the three men settled actions for
assault, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution for £87,000 with the
Metropolitan Police Commissioner offering a full and unreserved apology. 43 Finally
on this issue, substantiation of a complaint and dismissal of the officers involved does
not guarantee complainant satisfaction. Seven Metropolitan police officers who failed
in their attempt to discontinue disciplinary proceedings as an abuse of process were
[1996] 2 All E.R. 711.40 Sedley J.'s pronouncement is consistent with concerns expressed by the PCA on early retirement for
the past decade, see PCA annual reports - 1988 (H.C. 307), 1989, p.15; 1991 (no H.C. ref.), p.24; 1992
(H.C. 611), 1993, p.13; 1993 (H.C. 305), 1994, p.34. And now by the Home Affairs Select Committee
in its First Report, Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I., pp.xlvi-li.
' R. v. Chief Constable of Merseyside Police ex parte Calveley [1986] 1 Q.B. 424, at 430 per Lord
Donaldson M.R.42 R. v. Chief Constable of Merseyside Police ex parte Merrill [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1077, at 1082-3 per
Lord Donaldson M.R.
Guardian, 25 June 1993. Further damage will have been caused to the credibility of the complaint
process when Lord Taylor CJ. named one of the officers involved in exparte DPP, PC Terence Chitty,
as a witness who had been disbelieved by a jury in a separate case in R. v. Baptiste (1993) unreported,
24 May, see below, p.213.
R. v. Police Complaints Authority exparle Wells [1991] C.O.D. 95.
196
Chapter Six: A Developing Area of Law
dismissed from the service for discreditable conduct by the Home Secretary at the
conclusion of the appeal process. The complainant went on to settle his action against
the Commissioner and the officers, who denied liability, for assault and false
imprisonment.45
II.	 Public Interest Immunity
Having noted above how the efficacy of the complaint process was undermined by
concerns for the rights of police officers, it will be demonstrated in this section how
concerns by the Court of Appeal for the procedural integrity of the complaint process
had a similar effect. It is in this area of case law that there is a distinct conflict
between ss.48 and 49 of the Police Act 1964, with the granting of what amounted to
judicial supremacy to s.49 over s.48 in Neilson v. Laugharne.46
Although debate on P11 has focused on the Matrix Churchill prosecution47 and the
Scott Inquiry,48 much of the case law has been on attempts by litigants engaged in
police actions to secure disclosure of police investigation documents. 49 Sandwiched
between the furore accompanying revelations that P11 certificates might have caused
Guardian, 5 July 1994. After the three week disciplinary hearing the Guardian newspaper
interviewed Gary Stretch, who was the victim of an alleged assault by the seven officers, his father and
a witness, who both complained of the officers conduct. The three expressed acute dissatisfaction with
the three years that the case took to reach a disciplinary hearing and their treatment under cross-
examination, without legal representation, by counsel for the seven officers, Guardian, 10 November
1990. Cf. Maguire, M. and C. Corbett (1991), p.163 on successful complainants dissatisfaction, see
Chapter Three, above p.112.
[1981] 1 All E.R. 829.
Customs and Excise discontinued the prosecution of three company executives for deception in
obtaining export licenses in November 1992 after the trial judge had partially quashed P11 certificates
signed by four government ministers at an earlier hearing and government knowledge that machine
tools were intended for arms manufacture in Iraq was revealed by the Trade and Industry Secretary
under cross examination. See Leigh, D. (1993); Leigh, I. (1993); Tomkins, A. (1993); Zuckerman, A.
(1994); Ganz, G. (1995); and Scott, R. (1996).
Report of the Inquiry in to the Erport of Defence Equipment and Dual Use Goods to Iraq and
Related Prosecutions (H.C. 115), 1995-96.
49 Auten v. Rayner [1960] 3 All E.R. 566; Merricks v. Nott-Bower [1965] 1 Q.B. 57; Conway v. Rimmer
[1968] 1 All E.R. 874; Neilson v. Laugharne [1981] 1 All E.R. 829; Hehir v. Commissioner of Police
of the Metropolis [1982] 2 All E.R. 335; Cornery v. Jacklin [1985] Crim. L.R. 234; Peach v.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1986] 2 All E.R. 129; Evans v. Chief Constable of Surrey
Constabulary (Attorney General intervening) [1989] 2 All E.R. 594; R. v. Commissioner of Police of
the Metropolis ex parte Hart-Leverton [1990] C.O.D. 240; Makanjuola v. Commissioner of Police of
the Metropolis [1992] 3 All E.R. 617; R. v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands exparte Wiley [1994]
3 All E.R. 420; Taylor v. Anderton (Police Complaints Authority intervening) [1995] 1 W.L.R. 447;
o 'Sullivan v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1995) Times, 3 July.
197
Chapter Six: A Developing Area of Law
a serious miscarriage of justice and publication of the Scott Report, the House of
Lords overruled the 14 year old decision in Neilson, which covered statements
connected with police complaint investigations with immunity as a class. It is
suggested that the timing of R. v. Chief Constable of West Midlands exparte Wiley50
was important. With intense debate on the constitutional implications of P11 ignited
by the Matrix Churchill case, 51 there was broad agreement for removing class
protection from police complaint statements, 52 however, within a year the Court of
Appeal attached class immunity to police complaint investigation reports in Taylor
v. Anderton.53
Neilson v. Laugh arne
Neilson had practical consequences for both s.48 police actions and s.49 complaints,
and established a direct connection between the two remedies for police
wrongdoing. 54 The plaintiff claimed damages for trespass and damage to property,
assault and false imprisonment from the Chief Constable of Lancashire after officers
with a search warrant entered his home while he was on holiday. On his return he
called the police and accompanied officers to the station where he remained for
several hours before release without charge. On receiving a letter before action the
chief constable recorded a s.49 complaint and, on their receiving a report of the
complaint investigation, the DPP and the PCB decided there should be no criminal
or disciplinary proceedings. The chief constable then objected to the plaintiff's
request for disclosure of statements taken for the complaint investigation on dual
grounds that to do so would be against the public interest and, as defence statements
in civil proceedings, they were covered by legal professional privilege. The plaintiff
appealed the decision by a county court judge to overrule a recorder's order for
disclosure. In their judgments Lord Denning MR. and Oliver L.J. (Connor L.J.
50 [1994] 3 All E.R. 420.
See Leigh, I., op. cit.; Tomkins, op. cit.
52 By the time ax parte Wiley reached the House of Lords all the parties were agreed that class
immunity, which the lower courts had sought to uphold, was unsustainable, at 429. Zuckerrnan op. cit.,
p.714 and Ganz, op. cit., p.419, agree the Scott Inquiry looms large over exparte Wiley.
[1995] 1 W.L.R. 447. The protection was also applied by Butterfield J. in the High Court to cover
preliminary police reports to the CPS in O'Sullivan v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1995)
Times, 3 July.
s The PCA has regularly devoted space to the repercussions of P11 for the credibility of the complaint
process. See PCA annual reports for 1988 (H.C. 307), 1989, p.23; 1989 (H.C. 365), 1990, p.22; 1993
(H.C. 305), 1994, p.50, 1994/5 (H.C. 530), 1995, pp.44-45; and triennial reviews for 1985-1988 (H.C.
466), 1988, pp.16-18; 1988-91 (H.C. 352), 1991, pp.21-23; 1991-94 (H.C. 396), 1994, pp.13-14.
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agreeing) expressed the opinion that the dominant purpose of the statements was
investigation of the s.49 complaint, not to defend litigation, and, therefore, legal
professional privilege could not apply. 55 With the Master of the Rolls dismissing the
plaintiff's application as a fishing expedition, 56 Oliver L.J. surmised on how
disclosure might effect witnesses willingness to give statements to complaint
investigations. He concluded that the use of confidential statements for some
purpose other than that for which they were intended might deter potential witnesses
and impede the efficacy of the statutory complaint procedure. PT! was granted as a
class to s.49 statements in civil proceedings to protect the complaint process and
enable CIOs to conduct their investigations safe in the knowledge that their
endeavours could not be alternatively used to further police actions. 57 However, the
judgment did not prohibit the use of s.49 statements, to form the basis of cross-
examination for example.58
Although Neilson was intended to preserve the efficient investigation of police
complaints it had the opposite effect of deterring plaintiffs from engaging in the
statutory process. By denying plaintiffs access to relevant information held by the
defendant the judgment created an imbalance which disadvantaged those plaintiffs
whose claims were also investigated as a s.49 complaint. But, Mr Neilson had not
made a complaint, the chief constable had taken it upon himself to record a
complaint59 and, as pointed out by Oliver L.J., plaintiffs are under no obligation to
co-operate with complaint investigations. 60 Neilson had practical repercussions for
both sides involved in police actions. For the Metropolitan Police, it was revealed in
Hehir v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 6 ' that standard procedure when
defending actions had been to disclose s.49 statements 62 and that the Attorney-
General or Home Secretary's authority was required 63 for P11 claims . M After
Neilson v. Laugharne [1981] 1 All E.R. 829 at 834 per Lord Denning MR., and at 837 per Oliver U.
56 Ibid., at 836.
Ibid., at 840.
58 Ibid, at 839 per Oliver L.J..
In its 1983 Triennial Report the PCB advised against necessarily recording a civil claim as a s.49
complaint, Police Complaints Board Second Triennial Review Report 1983 (Cmnd. 8853), 1982-1983,
p.9.
60 Ibid., at 839.
61 [1982] 2 All E.R. 335.
62 Conway v. Rimmer [1968] 1 All E.R. 874.
63 Auten v. Rayner [1960] 3 All E.R. 566.
Hehir v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1982] 2 All E.R. 335, at 337 per Lawton L.J.
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Neilson disclosure of complaint statements was discontinued, without reference to a
higher official, although they continued to be used for the purpose of defence
preparation. In Hehir, difficulties emerged for the defendant when the plaintiff said
something different in evidence to what he had said when interviewed for the
complaint investigation. The trial judge ruled that PT! could be waived allowing
counsel for the Commissioner to cross-examine the plaintiff on the discrepancy,
with proceedings adjourned pending appeal. However, Lawton L.J. found it
impossible to distinguish Neilson and allowed the appeal, ruling that as P11 protected
s.49 witnesses from having their statements used against them in civil proceedings
the Commissioner did not have the option of waiving class immunity. 65 The
principle was extended in Makanjuola v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis66
to cover transcripts of a police disciplinary tribunal, 67 with the Court of Appeal also
ruling that P11 attached irrespective of whether witnesses consented to disclosure of
their statements.68
Whereas the police services were in a position to incorporate common law
developments on P11 as a matter of force policy, plaintiffs, as a heterogeneous
collection of individuals, were not equally placed to accommodate change.
However, over time it is evident that solicitors representing victims of police
wrongdoing took up Oliver L.J.'s suggestion in Neilson:
There is no compulsion on the complainant to co-operate in the
inquiry. Having made his complaint, he may refuse to give a
statement to the investigating officer, and he is, I should have
thought, very much more likely to do so if he thinks that any
statement which he makes may be quoted aainst him in any civil
proceedings which he has in contemplation.6
Police action solicitors adopted the practice of writing to CIOs after a complaint had
been recorded to request a written undertaking that statements given by their client
65 Ibid., at 340.
[1992] 3 All E.R. 617. Ministers relied extensively on Bingham U's ruling in Makanjuola as
authority that they were duty bound to claim P11 in the Matrix Churchill case, see Tomkins, op. cit.,
pp.662-665.
67 Makanjuola v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1992] 3 All E.R. 617, at 621 per Lord
Donaldson M.R., and at 623 per Bingham L.J.
68 Ibid., at 622-3 per Bingham Li. Cf. Peach v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1986] 2 All
E.R. 129, at 137, Fox Li turned a blind eye to Neilson. The Court of Appeal ordered disclosure of
police statements after determining that the dominant purpose of an investigation was to ascertain cause
of death, and not of a s.49 complaint. See also ex parte Coventry Newspapers LId. [1992] W.L.R. 916,
below p.184.
69 Neilson v. Laugharne [1981] 1 All E.R. 829, at 839.
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as part of a s.49 investigation would be used solely for the purpose of that
investigation. 70 With CIOs unable to give such an undertaking solicitors advised
their clients not to co-operate with the complaint process 7 ' and, in time honoured
fashion, persons given a straightforward choice whether or not to engage in a
blatantly unfair procedure voted with their feet.
Neilson amounted to judicial pronouncement favouring the supremacy of the s.49
complaint process over s.48 police actions as a remedy to police wrongdoing such
that internal police procedures were accorded priority over due legal process. The
judgment also reflected on chief officers' resolve to protect their services from
outside interference, including assertion of their statutory responsibility for
controlling police wrongdoing under 4972 This is on account of s.48 plaintiffs
effectively mounting a collateral challenge to chief officers as discipline authorities
for their forces, and their prising open the police service for external review in court
proceedings.
R. v. Chief Constable of West Midlands ex parte Wiley
Plaintiffs requests for written undertakings from CIOs eventually brought matters to
a head in ex parte Wiley after two victims of alleged police wrongdoing successfully
challenged refusals by the chief constables of West Midlands and Nottinghamshire.
The chief constables appealed Popplewell J.'s declaration that they had acted
unlawfully in refusing Messrs Wiley and Sunderland's requests and an injunction
granted to Mr Sunderland restraining the Nottinghamshire chief constable from
using s.49 documents to defend his police action. 73 At the Court of Appeal the chief
constables conceded that s.49 complaint files could not be used i) to assert a positive
civil case, ii) as a basis for cross-examination or iii) to justify pleadings, but
maintained they should be available for other purposes in civil proceedings. 74 The
° See Chapter Three, above p.109.
Bingham Li ruled in R. v. Police Complaints Authority r parte Chief Constable of Avon and
Somerset Constabulary [1989] C.O.D. 325, that non co-operation with a s.49 investigation pending
completion of civil proceedings was grounds for the chief constable to dispense with his responsibility
to investigate a recorded complaint pursuant to the Police (Anonymous, Repetitious, Etc. Complaints)
Regulations 1985, SJ. 1985/672.
72 In Hehir v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1982] 2 All E.R., at 338, Lawton L.J.
comments on the difficulties judges face trying police actions as a consequence of Neilson.
' R. v. Chief Constable of West Midlands exparte Wiley [1994] 1 All E.R. 702; [1994] 3 All E.R. 420.
" R. v. Chief Constable of West Midlands exparte Wiley [1994] 1 All E.R. 702, at 714 per Staughton
L.J.
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appeal was dismissed on grounds that the chief constables' submission for a 'half
way' house accommodation was illogical with the Court granting leave to appeal to
the House of Lords as the decision extended P11 to prevent the use of documents as
well as disclosure. 75 As mentioned above, by the time the House of Lords heard ex
parte Wiley all the parties were agreed that class immunity for s.49 statements was
inappropriate allowing Lord Woolf to duly declare Neilson76 incorrect and, after
examination of the cases which followed the deviation, Hehir and Ma/wnjuola
also. 77 With class P11 removed from s.49 statements the respondents no longer
required written undertakings to protect against their statements being used against
them, nor was Mr Sunderland's injunction necessary, and the appeal was allowed.78
Lord Woolf s criticisms of Oliver L.J.'s Neilson judgment can be broken down into
three areas. 79 Firstly, he read too much into Parliament's intentions, particularly as
s.49 did not provide for P11, and that an insubstantial affidavit by a deputy chief
constable was poor grounds for granting class immunity in order to protect Oliver
L.J.'s interpretation of the statutory purpose of s.49. I wish to go further than Lord
Woolf on this point. Oliver L.J. ' s opinion that disclosure of s.49 statements for civil
proceedings would undermine the statutory complaint process bore little
resemblance to Parliament's intentions. The Home Secretary made it clear at the
committee stage of the Police Bill that there were three alternative means of redress
to police wrongdoing, not that criminal, civil and disciplinary liability were three
competing procedures. 8° Sections 48 and 49 were a package designed to improve
access to justice for the victims of police wrongdoing, safeguard the rights of police
suspects and empower chief officers to effectively deal with indiscipline. If priority
were to be accorded the different processes, convention dictates that the criminal
sanction is more serious than a civil liability finding followed by a disciplinary
For example, as the basis of cross-examination, see above fn.58. The inequality for plaintiffs arising
from police use of s.49 documents was noted by Nolan J. in R. v. Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis ax parte Hart Leverton (1990) Times, 8 February, quoted in ax parte Wiley [1994] 3 All
E.R. 420, at p.442 per Lord Woolf.
76 Ibid., at 430.
77 Ibid., at 446.
78 Ibid., at 446-7.
79 Ibid., at 434-43 5.
80 
'If a man has offended against the law, there is a remedy in the courts by civil or criminal
proceedings. If he has offended not against the law but against discipline, he should be required to
attend an inquiry under regulations'; Police Bill, 1963 (Standing Committee Debate) Standing
Committee D, 6 February 1963, col. 704.
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award, despite the possibility that the latter might have the most serious
consequences for the wrongdoer. This was certainly the view of the 1962 Royal
Commission on the Police, which justified its recommendation for adjudication of
complaints by chief officers on grounds that more serious allegations would be dealt
with by the criminal or civil courts. 8 ' Yet, in Neilson, Oliver L.J. did not seek to
balance the statutory purpose of s.49 complaints against s.48 actions. This oversight
is also relevant to Lord Woolf's second area of concern - that, although Oliver L.J.
accepted confidentiality could not exclude s.49 statements from disclosure in
criminal or disciplinary proceedings, he somehow managed to conclude that class
immunity was necessary in civil proceedings on the grounds of the threat to co-
operation caused by breach of confidentiality. Here, Oliver L.J.'s prioritisation of
the complaints process over civil proceedings is manifestly at fault. Finally, Lord
Woolf reasoned, Oliver L.J.'s decision favouring immunity on a class rather than a
contents basis, which he thought would impose an 'immense burden on police
authorities', disregarded the regularity with which the police applied to the courts for
content immunity, to protect informers for example.
Following consultation on the Scott Report the Attorney General announced in the
House of Commons that ministers would no longer divide P11 claims on a class or
content basis, with the suggestion that the same approach could be applied by public
services. 82 However, in the short period between ex pane Wiley and the Attorney
General's statement, the Court of Appeal granted blanket immunity for police
complaint reports in Taylor v. Anderton. 83 It remains to be seen whether chief police
officers, and the PCA, will desist from class immunity claims in light of the
Attorney General's statement.84
81 See Chapter Five, above p.167.
82 Flansard. H.C. Deb.18 Dec 1996, cots. 949-950. See Supperstone, M. and J. Coppell (1997), for a
brief assessment of the Attorney General's statement
83 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 447, at 465 per Sir Thomas Bingham M.R., and in O'Sullivan v. Commissioner of
Police of the Metropolis (1995) Times, 3 July.
In Kelly v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1997) unreported, 27 July, the Court of Appeal
upheld a decision by the trial judge to attach class P11 to do reports, with comment made by Kennedy
L.J. inviting the Commissioner to take a more open approach to disclosure in light of the government's
decision.
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III. Evidence Relevant to Police Officers Credit
By the early 1 990s public confidence in the police and the administration of justice
reached crisis proportions after a succession of high profile miscarriage of justice
cases, commencing with the overturning of the convictions of the Guildford Four in
October 1989. Also, in August of that year the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad
(WMSCS) was disbanded one month after the Court of Appeal quashed a robbery
conviction; 85 a case for which four police officers were prosecuted for conspiracy to
pervert the course ofjustice. 86 By the end of 1990 a team of 28 West Yorkshire police
officers conducting a PCA supervised inquiry were investigating 754 arrests between
1 January 1986 and 14 August 1989 and had served regulation 7 notices on a total of
198 West Midlands officers. 87 Following decisions by the DPP in 1992 not to
prosecute officers the PCA reviewed 79 cases by 97 complainants88 and the
investigation was finally concluded on 14 January 1993.89 The PCA announced that
seven former WMSCS officers were to face 28 disciplinary charges of falsehood or
prevarication,90 a further 10 officers would have faced 20 charges had they not
resigned or retired and 102 officers were to be given words of advice. 9 ' By May 1992
the Court of Appeal had quashed 11 convictions based on WMSCS investigations92
and the scandal was leaving its imprint on the common law.
Although the involvement of WMSCS members had no material bearing on ex parte
Wiley, the scandal was reflected in the earlier decision by the Court of Appeal to
allow P11 to be set aside in ex parte Coventry Newspapers Ltd 93 In that case, P11
coverage of complaint investigation documents, which had been instrumental to the
quashing of a conviction, was waived to assist a local newspaper defend a libel
85 R. v. Parchment (1989) unreported, 17 July.
86 Acquifted at Oxford Crown Court in June 1990, Guardian, 20 May 1992;
Report of the Police Complaints A uthority for 1990 (H.C. 351), 1881, p.15.
Report of the Police Complaints Authority for 1992 (H.C. 611), 1993, p.25.
89 Guardian, 15 January 1993. However, earlier complaints against WMSCS officers concluded with
disciplinary charges proved, leading up to the decision to disband the squad.
9° Para.5, sch.1 Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985, S.!. 1985/5 18.
' Annual Report of the Police Complaints Authority for 1992 (H.C. 611), 1993, p.25.
92 Guardian, 20 May 1992, gives brief details of the 11 cases (not including the Birmingham Six
judgment, K v. Mcllkenny and others (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 133). I am aware of a further ten since
that date - R. v. Bromell (1992) unreported, 22 June; R. v. Horobin and Wilcox (1993) unreported, 7
April; K v. Lindo (1993) unreported, 11 October; K v. Williams and Smith (1994) Times, 27 January;
R. v. Rasheed (1994) Times, 20 May; R. v. Meads (1996), unreported; R. v. Treadaway (1996)
unreported, 18 November; R. v. Clancy [1997] Crim. L.R. 290.
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action by two WMSCS officers. When ruling to lift the obstacle to disclosure Lord
Taylor LCJ. attached significance to:
• .the grave public disquiet understandably aroused by proven
malpractice on the part of some at least of those who served in the
now disbanded West Midlands Serious Crime Squad. '
Public opinion of the scandal was founded on adverse media coverage of
disbandment, widespread complaints and quashed convictions. But, could the same
cumulative effect also be taken into account in criminal proceedings, an issue the
Court of Appeal had been asked to address in the earlier case of R. v. Edwards.95
Throughout this thesis mechanisms for controlling the police officer in his
enforcement of the law have been put to one side so as not to confuse issues arising
out of the unlawful exercise of police powers, to which criminal liability does not
normally attach, and police crime. However, both aspects of police wrongdoing are
present in Edwards, which represents a radical departure by the judiciary for the
manner in which Lord Lane L.C.J. allowed court verdicts to be taken as an alternative
to disciplinary findings to assess a police officer's veracity. This thesis attributes
major significance to the Edwards ruling,97 after what amounted to the judiciary's
intervention in policing affairs after the collapse in the criminal justice infrastructure
in the West Midlands. Four points are briefly mentioned at this moment by way of
introduction to this section. Firstly, Edwards offers protection against the threat of
extremist policing arising from the degree of autonomy the police enjoy under the
doctrine of constabulary independence; comparison can be made with provision for
the exclusion of unfair evidence under s.78 of PACE. 98 Secondly, in this regard the
judgment reintroduces some balance to the constitutional equation in light of the
declining significance of the office of constable. Thirdly, this development at
common law represents an external challenge to police autonomy, of a similar nature
[1992] 3 W.L.R. 916.
Ibid., at 927 per Lord Taylor L.C.J.
(1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 48.
See Smith, J. C. (1994), and Chapter One, above fnn.1 14 and 119.
As a civil rights activist the author relied upon Edwards when advising lawyers on several Stoke
Newington cases, see below, and in 1995 established Defendants' Information Services to provide
information to criminal defence and police litigation solicitors on cases where the Edwards principles
arply, see Smith, G. and R. Miller (1995).
On which there is a large body of case law; Zander, M. (1995), pp.238-247.
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to that posed by police actions, as allegations of police wrongdoing can be made in
open court irrespective of disciplinary findings. Finally, as a consequence of the
above three points, Edwards serves as a warning against resorting to conspiracy
theories or historical determinism when discussing policing problems, as it is largely
inconsistent with recent trends. The judgment and its practical effect in connection
with the early 1 990s corruption scandal at Stoke Newington, North London, are
considered in some detail below.
R. v. Edwards
John Edwards was convicted of robbery and possession of a firearm at Birmingham
Crown Court in December 1988 on the evidence of a co-defendant and WMSCS
officers; as part of his defence he claimed three police statements had been
fabricated.' 00 On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that the conduct in other
cases of officers involved in the instant case was relevant to their reliability.
Accordingly, the defence should have had the opportunity at trial to cross-examine
police officers on the system of 'tampering with and fabricating evidence' which
squad members operated, as subsequently emerged, and was entitled to call
supporting evidence. In particular it was argued that i) criminal and disciplinary
findings against officers, ii) progress in complaint investigations, criminal and
disciplinary proceedings and iii) the outcomes of connected criminal proceedings
were relevant.'0'
Edwards follows the standard distinction between matters going to the issue in the
instant case and the credibility of witnesses, which is a collateral issue, to ensure that
the question before the jury is not lost sight of among a morass of secondary issues.
The general rule is that matters effecting witnesses' credibility can be raised under
cross-examination but independent evidence can not be called.' 02 It was ruled that
an officer could be cross-examined on criminal or disciplinary offences proved but
not on i) incomplete complaint investigations, criminal or disciplinary proceedings
In that police actions allow matters of a disciplinary nature to be publicly aired which would
otherwise be resolved internally according to the discipline process; see comment above, p.201, on
police actions as a form of external review.
'°° 1?. v. Edwards (1991)93 Cr. App. R. 48, at 53 per Lord Lane CJ.
'° Ibid. at 54-55.
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or ii) findings that discredited colleagues.' 03 An officer could be cross-examined on
previous cases:
• .where there was sufficient connection between the evidence
given by the officers and the eventual outcome of the trial to entitle
the defence to cross-examine the officers concerned about these
matters upon the question of their credibility in the instant case.'°4
But, the defence could not i) call evidence to contradict officers denials under cross-
examination because they only went to credit, a collateral issue, or ii) call evidence
to allege police officers operated a system designed to defeat the provisions of
PACE. The appeal was allowed for non-disclosure at trial of i) a disciplinary
finding against one of the officers, ii) the circumstances of a connected case
involving four of the officers in the instant case which was discontinued after their
evidence was and iii) circumstances of a connected case which was
discontinued after the evidence of one officer involved in the instant case was
discredited.'°6 It is noted that, although the judgment referred to jury acquittals as a
relevant 'eventual outcome', for both of the cases considered relevant in Edwards
the facts did not go before juries, as the CPS discontinued proceedings.
Edwards developed the law in two areas regarding examination of police witnesses'
credit worthiness. Firstly it required the CPS to disclose disciplinary findings
against police witnesses 107 and secondly, police witnesses could be cross-examined
on their conduct in other cases subject to the outcome of those proceedings and
sufficient connection being established between the cases.
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice considered Edwards and concluded that
it 'went too far'. It suggested that disclosure of disciplinary findings should be
restricted to findings consistent with allegations made in the instant case. On the
relevance of the outcomes in connected proceedings the Royal Commission failed to
see how, on account that reasons for jury verdicts cannot be revealed, it could be
102 Exceptions apply in order to show witness bias (R. v. Shaw (1888) 16 Cox C.C. 503). The
interpretation of R. v. Busby (1982) 75 Cr. App. R. 79 that evidence could be called to show officers
'were prepared to go to improper lengths to secure a conviction' was dismissed.
103 R. v. Edwards (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 48, at 56 per Lord Lane CJ.
104 Ibid., at 59.
105 R. v. Dandy (1987) unreported, 12 November, see below.
106 R. v. Jones (1987) unreported, 25 June, see below.
107 For the DPP's interpretation of Edwards see 'DPP's advice to chief officers of police on the case of
R. v. Edwards', 5 October 1992, reprinted in Harrison and Cragg (1995), pp.370-374.
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inferred that police evidence had been disbelieved.' 08
 But, these remarks cannot be
taken as serious comment on a judgment which carefully considered what was of
relevance to a police officer's credit, and what was not, under extraordinary
circumstances. Consideration had to be given to allegations of police wrongdoing
which were themselves subjected to consideration, at different times, by two police
services, West Midlands and South Yorkshire; separate departments of the CPS,
with responsibilities for standard prosecutions and appeals, and prosecutions of
police officers; and the PCA; and which were raised before the criminal and
appellate courts. If anything, the Court of Appeal adopted an enlightened approach
which refused to allow public opinion to influence criminal proceedings by rejection
of the argument that evidence showing a system of corruption should be admissible.
On the other hand, the cumulative effect of the scandal was given due weight by the
court permitting cross-examination of police officers on disciplinary findings which
went to their credit and likewise, under strict conditions, closely connected criminal
proceedings. The Court of Appeal was asked to consider the relevance of four cases
to Edwards, two of which were ruled admissible for the purpose of cross-
examination of police officers reliability. After examination of R. v. Thorne'°9 and
R. v. Gary Cooke"° it was determined:
• .where a police officer who has allegedly fabricated an admission
in case B, has also given evidence of an admission in case A,
where there was an acquittal by virtue of which his evidence is
demonstrated to have been disbelieved, it is proper that the jury in
case B should be made aware of that fact."
The Lord Chief Justice cautioned, per curiam, that each case would have to be
assessed on its merits, without the assistance of a rule of thumb, because of the
marginal relevance of witnesses' credibility to the issues before a jury and that
judges would rarely have to rule on such matters. 112 The two cases ruled relevant
were firstly, R. v. Dandy," 3 an armed robbery case heard at Birmingham Crown
Court where four of the officers concerned with the investigation were involved in
Edwards. After scientific evidence was adduced which suggested that implied
admissions had been included in re-written interview notes, the case against Paul
'° Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Cmnd. 2263), 1993, p.97.
'° (1978) 66 Cr. App. R. 6.
° (1987) 84 Cr. App. R. 286.
R. v. Edwards (1991)93 Cr. App. R. 48, at 57 per Lord Lane L.C.J.
112 Ibid., at 59.
"3 (1987) unreported, 12 November.
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Dandy was discontinued at trial, along with proceedings against two co-defendants
at a later date. Secondly in R. v. Jones," 4 heard at Dudley Crown Court, the case
was discontinued after scientific evidence showed that interview notes taken by an
officer also involved in Edwards were inaccurate. Two Court of Appeal judgments,
R. v. Parchment115 and R. v. Khan," 6 each case having one officer in common with
Edwards, were ruled inadmissible. In Parchment a robbery conviction was quashed
as unsafe and unsatisfactory on the basis that there was a distinct possibility that the
jury would have reached a different verdict if new scientific evidence had been
placed before it that interview notes had been interfered with. Regarding Khan, it
was stated that there were similarities with Edwards, but in that case the Court of
Appeal was particularly disturbed that notes written by torchlight in a moving car
bore no signs of irregularity in the handwriting, a feature absent from 17
Thus, it was determined that there was sufficient connection to allow the defence in
Edwards to put to officers that they had given evidence in Dandy or Jones, at issue
in those trials was whether statements had been fabricated and the outcome of
proceedings. Given that connections with Parchment and Khan were ruled
insufficient to permit cross-examination, it can be taken that a judicial ruling on the
possibility that a different conclusion might have been reached was no substitute for
a jury finding, and allegations had to be in close proximity.
It is suggested that Edwards signalled a willingness of the judiciary to take notice of
the failings of the police complaint process, particularly when faced with complex
and time consuming investigations against several officers, and provided the means
by which jury verdicts could be taken as an alternative barometer of credibility.
Rather than 'go too far', as suggested by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice,
Edwards allowed for the administration of criminal justice to continue, and retain
some credibility in the process, independently of the cloud of suspicion hanging over
the West Midlands police. Pausing there for one moment, by ruling on Dandy's
relevance to officers' credit in Edwards, the Court of Appeal was hardly stepping
beyond the limits of reasonableness. Two of the officers involved in Dandy later
accepted their interviews were not contemporaneous, admitted destroying interview
(1987) unreported, 25 June.
(1989) unreported, 17 July.
116 (1990) The Independent, 2 March.
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notes and were disciplined for neglect of duty; and, in October 1993, Mr Dandy
settled an action for malicious prosecution against the Chief Constable of West
Midlands Police, who denied liability." 8 Thus, Edwards need not be taken as
symptomatic of a critical judicial attitude to those responsible for police complaints
and discipline, but there can be no doubt that it represents a pragmatic response to
police scandal in the interests ofjustice.
Stoke Newington and Operation Jackpot
This was given practical demonstration following events at Stoke Newington
Division of the MPS and Snaresbrook Crown Court in the mid 1990s. In January
1992 the MPS announced the transfer of eight Stoke Newington officers to other
duties in order to facilitate a PCA supervised Complaint Investigation Bureau
inquiry codenamed Operation Jackpot." 9 The investigation, generally described as
an anti-corruption inquiry, was into allegations that officers had been engaged in
supplying drugs, theft and conspiracies to pervert the course of justice. It was
initially an undercover operation, commencing in April 1991, and the first complaint
was recorded in September 1991 and the last in January 1993. In connection with
Operation Jackpot one officer was suspended in November 1991 and convicted of
theft and misfeasance in a public office in December 1992;120 three officers were
suspended from duty in the summer of 1992,121 two of whom were acquitted of
perjury and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.' 22 It was not until February
1994 that the PCA granted a certificate of satisfaction for the investigation of 24
cases totalling 134 complaints with regulation 7 notices served against 46 officers.'
Dispensation to investigate was granted in two cases causing one regulation 7 notice
to be withdrawn. A particular feature of the investigation was that the same officers
featured in several complaints; one officer featured in eight cases (a third of the
" R. v. Edwards (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 48, at 57 per Lord Lane L.C.J.
118 Guardian, 14 October 1993.
' Guardian, 31 January 1992.
120 Guardian, 21 November 1992.
121 Guardian, 24 June and 12 September 1992.
122 See below fh.123.
123 PCA Press Release of 3 February 1994, reported in the Guardian, 4 February 1994, and Annual
Report of the Police Complaints Authority 1 January 1994 - 31 March 1995 (H.C. 530), 1994, p.29.
Two of the suspended officers were charged with perjury and conspiracy to pervert the course ofjustice
against one complainant, and one of the officers was charged with perjury in a separate case, Guardian,
27 July 1994. The author attended both hearings in December 1995 which ended with acquittals for the
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total), one in seven, three in six, two in five, two in four, four in three and five in
two 124
The main public stage for what was quickly dubbed the Stoke Newington Drug
Scandal' 25 was Snaresbrook Crown Court. A self-help group for the victims of
police crimes, Hackney Community Defence Association, had been campaigning
against police wrongdoing, primarily violence, in Hackney and Stoke Newington
since 1988.126 In November 1991 it met two members of the Royal Commission of
Criminal Justice and presented them with a report detailing cases of police
wrongdoing in the area. 127 HCDA had been aware of Operation Jackpot prior to the
MPS announcement and had provided Guardian crime correspondent Duncan
Campbell with details of allegations against Stoke Newington officers used in his
exposé accompanying the public announcement. 128 HCDA monitored criminal
proceedings involving Stoke Newington officers and on the same day that the PCA
made its announcement on the completion of Operation Jackpot presented a
submission to the Home Secretary urging him to order a public inquiry into policing
in the area. 129 Out of 90 incidents known by the Association to involve suspected
Stoke Newington officers, criminal proceedings were initiated in 77. Between
December 1988 and November 1992 these cases were heard at Snaresbrook Crown
Court; 22 resulted in acquittals, the CPS offered no evidence in 18, and 11
convictions were overturned by the Court of Appeal in 1993.'° By the time Maxine
two officers in the first hearing and the CPS offered no further evidence after a police sergeant failed to
come up to proof in the second.
124 PCA Press Release, 3 February 1994.
125 Time Out magazine ran a weekly column by reporter Denis Campbell.
126 The author was a founding member of the Association.
127 
'A crime is a crime is a crime', published as a pamphlet by Hackney Community Defence
Association in 1992.
128 Guardian, 31 January 1992, see above. In Bennett v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd, five of the officers
transferred failed in their libel action against article by Crime Correspondent, Duncan Campbell;
Guardian, 8 February 1997.
129 Under s.32 of the Police Act 1964.
130 Guardian, 4 February 1994. Two cases not then heard were subsequently discontinued. The 11
quashed convictions, for drugs offences unless stated, all unreported, were James Blake and Francis
Hart (manslaughter, 15 February), Everald Brown, Rennie Kingsley, Idayatu Oderinde and Dennis
Tulloch (2 March), Cyrus Baptiste (24 May), Basil Swaby (27 May), Winston Thompson and Raymond
Jones (14 December) and Danny Bailey (21 December).
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Edwards' conviction for possession of crack cocaine with intent to supply was
quashed in February 1996, that number had increased to 14)'
With the exception of Maxine Edwards the Stoke Newington Jackpot appeals were
not contested, primarily on grounds that the CPS was unwilling to rely on the
evidence of officers concerned with the investigations of the alleged offences.'32
With regard to discontinued cases at Snaresbrook, Mr Kenneth Aylett, who served
as senior prosecution counsel throughout the saga, explained that the CPS had taken
a policy decision to discontinue cases to prevent possible miscarriages of justice.133
However, cases which were heard at Snaresbrook during 1992, contributed to the
bad publicity engulfing Stoke Newington police.
In one such case, Michael Thompson, a crack cocaine addict with several previous
convictions, was prosecuted for simple possession of cocaine, an apparently
straightforward case which he might normally be expected to plead to.' 34 But, Mr
Thompson was to make the startling allegation before the court that Stoke
Newington officers had demanded from him the names of drug dealers who might
supply class A drugs for them, and after he failed to deliver he was planted with the
drug. An application on behalf of the defendant was allowed under Edwards to put
to one of the police officers the circumstances of a previous case, R. v. King.' 35 In
that case a jury acquittal was quickly reached after two police officers' evidence that
the defendant had attempted to conceal crack cocaine was directly countered by the
defendant's evidence that the officers had assaulted him without provocation after he
declined their request to move his car. Mr King maintained that the first he saw of
the drug was when the officers presented it to the custody officer at Stoke
Newington police station. The only witnesses called by the defence attested to Mr
King's exemplary character. After a seven day hearing Mr Thompson was also
acquitted of possession of crack cocaine.
131 Gary Winship (1994) unreported, 24 June for conspiracy to rob and possession of a firearm, Hugh
Prince (1994) unreported, 6 December for possession of crack cocaine and Maxine Edwards [1996] Cr.
A?p. R. 345 (see below p.215).
' R. v. Brown and others(1993) unreported, 2 March.
B R. v. Maxine Edwards [1996] Cr. App. R. 345, at 350 per Beldam U.
' R. v. Thompson (1992) unreported, 28 October.
' (1991) unreported, 22 November.
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At the Thompson hearing it would appear that the officer in charge of Operation
Jackpot and the CPS were unaware of King.' 36 No publicity accompanied Mr
King's arrest or acquittal and, although he did not make a complaint himself, a
complaint was recorded after several persons, including a local councillor, attended
Stoke Newington police station. Mr King declined to co-operate with the complaint
investigation and referred all correspondence to him from the police or PCA to his
solicitor. For some reason the complaint, which was not substantiated, was never
investigated as part of Operation Jackpot. If the CPS had been aware of King they
would not have proceeded with Thompson, consistent with their cautious policy to
discontinue cases. Further, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R. v.
Baptiste, Lord Taylor L.C.J. remarked that the Crown 'clearly exercised
considerable circumspection':
.had the material from the trial of Thompson and King been
available before the appellant's trial, the Crown would not have
sought to proceed with the prosecution of this appellant. In those
circumstances the Crown concedes that it cannot resist this
appeal. 137
Both of the officers who gave evidence in King were involved in Thompson,
although one did not give evidence, and with another officer who gave evidence in
Thompson had given evidence leading to Cyrus Baptiste's conviction for possession
of cocaine with intent to supply in November 1991.
Apart from Thompson, Edwards did not play a part in acquittals involving Jackpot
cases. It is evident that the judgment was fundamental to CPS policy to discontinue
prosecutions, and not contest appeals, throughout the ongoing complaint
investigation.' 38 Although the combined total of discontinued cases contributed to
the scandal, the effect was marginal in comparison to the glare of publicity which
accompanied other cases. 139 Thus, in addition to preventing possible miscarriages of
justice, Edwards also had a positive impact, certainly to protect the credibility of the
criminal justice process, if not also to cushion the blows on Stoke Newington
police's battered image.
136 The author attended both hearings.
' R. v. Baptiste (1993) unreported, 24 May.
R. v. Maxine Edwards [1996] Cr. App. R. 345, at 349 per Beldam L.J.
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However, Operation Jackpot concluded with only one officer convicted and, it
would appear, without disciplinary proceedings against any of the officers
investigated. Can this be taken as evidence of Edwards' potential for a bandwagon
effect, which is capable of disrupting the administration of justice? Such a
proposition is opposed on several grounds. Firstly, the length of time to investigate
complaints and conclude criminal or disciplinary proceedings against police officers
is equally liable to bring the criminal justice process into disrepute, particularly
where there is perceived to be a failure to take adequate action, as observed by the
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice.' 4° Secondly, if relevant disciplinary
findings functioned as the only measure of credit, justice would not have been
served if defendants or appellants had to await the completion of a complaint
investigation and possibly criminal or disciplinary proceedings against police
officers before their cases could be heard. Thirdly, Operation Jackpot left many
questions unanswered. The officer who served an eighteen month sentence for theft
and misfeasance in a public office was also alleged to have profited from drug
dealing. 14 ' The officer who was acquitted of perjury and conspiracy to pervert the
course of justice and had perjury proceedings discontinued the following week was
convicted and sentenced to 10 years prison for conspiracy to import an estimated £2
million of cannabis at Canterbury Crown Court in February 1997.142 Further, one
Stoke Newington police officer was convicted of assault and affray' 43 and received a
six month custodial sentence at the Central Criminal Court in November 1997, six
other officers were acquifted.' Given the infrequency of prosecutions of police
officers, Stoke Newington's record of three officers imprisoned in five years is not a
record of which the MPS can be proud. Finally, Sir Paul Condon's recent public
statements claiming that he has inadequate powers to deal with organised police
crime reflect on the outcome of Operation Jackpot, the last major anti-corruption
investigation concluded by the MPS, which happened to coincide with his first two
139 For example, the convictions of Pearl and Marion Cameron accompanied by allegations that an
officer earned up to £2,000 per week supplying crack cocaine, Guardian, 11 July 1992.
° Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Cmnd. 2263), 1993, p.46, see Chapter Two,
above p.76.
141 See above, fn.139.
142 Times, 25 February 1997.
' S.47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and s.3 of the Public Order Act 1986.
Times, 18 November 1997.
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years in office.' 45 The weight of evidence suggests that it was the police complaint
process which was found wanting after completion of Operation Jackpot, and
Edwards allowed the administration ofjustice to retain some credibility.
It was on the basis that the Operation Jackpot investigation had concluded without
disciplinary proceedings brought against any of the officers concerned that the
Crown sought to defend the conviction in R. v. Maxine Edwards.' 46 The same
officer considered to have been disbelieved in King and Thompson, and not relied
upon by the Crown to contest the Baptiste appeal, was also one of two officers who
gave evidence at Maxine Edwards' trial. Maxine Edwards was eminently
appropriate for an Edwards ruling - four defendants arrested within four months of
each other in four separate trials each alleging crack cocaine was planted, and one
Stoke Newington police officer was common to all cases. Further, the Crown
offered no evidence in two cases at Snaresbrook in the autumn of 1992 which were
closely connected with the instant case. 147 Beldam L.J. dismissed the Crown's
argument that their 1993 policy of not relying on officers suspected of wrongdoing
ceased with the completion of Jackpot and, in the absence of disciplinary action
against the two officers involved, there was no reason to regard Ms Edwards'
conviction as unsafe. Although no cases were referred to in the Maxine Edwards
judgment, it was allowed on the possibility that a jury would reach a different
verdict if it had the facts of other cases placed before it, consistent with the Edwards
principles. Therefore, the Crown's attempt to draw a line under Baptiste in the
sequence of cases starting with King failed, but the Court of Appeal went further:
Once the suspicion of perjury starts to infect the evidence and
permeate cases in which the witnesses have been involved, and
which are closely similar, the evidence on which such convictions
are based becomes as questionable as it was in the cases in which
the appeals have already been allowed.'48
Taken in isolation from the rest of the judgment, this is a remarkably bold statement
which suggests that once a police officer's evidence has been disbelieved in one
case, it is equally suspect in closely similar cases. This could provide grounds for
145 For example in evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee, Police Disciplinary and
Complaints Procedures, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. H., pp.117-118,
see Chapter Two, above p.93.
146 [1996] 2 Cr. App. R. 345, at 350 per Beldam U.
147 Ibid., at 349.
Ibid. at 350.
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arguing that evidence should be called to show a system of conduct.' 49
 However,
when placed in context the implications are not so radical. It is suggested that
Edwards is extended by the ruling in that, after a police officer has been abandoned
as an unreliable witness by the prosecution he is not automatically rehabilitated as a
consequence of not being convicted of a disciplinary offence, the relevance of
closely connected cases still applies. It would appear that of the two measures of
police credibility which can be put before a jury, a disciplinary finding and an
acquittal, greater weight attaches to the latter. For cases which come before the
courts before the conclusion of proceedings against police officers, jury verdicts are
the only proceedings that can be taken into account, and once their relevance has
been established it applies to subsequent cases which are closely similar. Affinning
Maxine Edwards, the Court of Appeal quashed a conviction for possession of
cannabis in R. v. Whelan' 5° where criminal proceedings had not yet concluded
against the officers involved and the Crown had discontinued proceedings in another
case for this reason.' 5 ' These two judgments have advanced Edwards slightly by
ruling that disavowal of an officer is not case restricted, it attaches to the officer,
thereby preempting its use by the prosecuting authority as a temporary tactic to deal
with an urgent crisis.
The underlying theme running through this discussion on evidence relevant to police
officers credit is of the judiciary intervening to ensure that proper regard is given to
all the factors which can give an indication of a police officer's credibility. It has
been suggested here that the case law is sceptical of the complaint process, not
critical of those responsible but motivated to restrict falling confidence in police
procedures from contaminating the administration of justice.' 52 In R. v. Clancy'53
the Court of Appeal reiterated its resistance to allowing evidence of a police scandal
to be called in criminal proceedings. Despite this unwillingness to take the
admissibility of evidence on police corruption to its logical limit, the steps the
judiciary have taken impinge on chief police officers responsibilities as the
discipline authority for the officers under their direction and control. Firstly, by
R. v. Clancy [1997] Crim. L. R. 290, see commentary at 291.
150 [1997] Crim. L. R. 353, and commentary at 354.
'' Ibid. at 354.
152 Exclusion of evidence under s.78 of PACE has been considered in similar terms, Sanders and
Young (1994), pp.420-427; Uglow (1995), p.85; Zander (1995), pp.238-247; Dixon (1997), p.170.
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ruling that a police officer's disciplinary record' 54 has similar relevance to credit as a
criminal record and, secondly by allowing for court verdicts to serve as an
alternative gauge of police conduct to disciplinary findings. Regarding disciplinary
findings against officers, prior to Edwards the general significance of awards short
of dismissal or a request to resign was largely confined to internal police
administration, with their relevance to an officer's career prospects largely
dependent on his chief officer's discretion. After Edwards, a disciplinary award
against a police officer can threaten his efficiency as a police officer by undermining
his credibility when giving evidence in legal proceedings, even though the cause of
that finding may be unconnected with the allegation in the instant case. On this
point the PCA has expressed some concern that chief officers will be disinclined to
discipline officers.' 55 The account given above of events at Stoke Newington and
Snaresbrook is testimony of how Edwards has allowed the courts to decide on an
officer's credibility independently of any decision of the Metropolitan Police
Commissioner. However, events at Snaresbrook and the Court of Appeal connected
with Stoke Newington officers in 1992 and 1993 were exceptional. It was only
because of the regularity with which cases were discontinued, and court monitoring,
which allowed those representing defendants and appellants to discover closely
connected cases. Under normal conditions, in the absence of official records on the
outcomes of criminal proceedings' 56 Edwards only allows for admissibility in this
regard,' 57 whereas disciplinary findings have to be disclosed. Thus, the value of the
[1997] Crim. L. R. 290, see commentary at 291.
154 Disciplinary cautions and findings regarding work performance are not taken into consideration
(paras.7 and 8 of the DPP' s advice on Edwards, see above fn. 107). Where substantiated complaints are
not considered by chief officers or the PCA to warrant disciplinary proceedings it is asswned that they
are admissible under the Edwards principles on grounds of relevance. However, as far as I am aware
there have been no rulings on the admissibility of substantiated complaints, or challenges to their
inadmissibility, most probably as a consequence of the CPS policy of non-disclosure of any findings
less than a reprimand.
Annual Report of the Police Complaint Authority 1993 (H.C. 305), 1994, p.30, see Chapter Two,
above p.82.
156 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice recommended arrangements to inform chief police
officers of courts' criticisms of police officers, Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
(Cmnd. 2263), 1993, p.48.
'"The recent case of R. v. Guney (1998) Times, 9 March, an unsuccessful appeal against conviction in
a case involving Stoke Newington police officers investigated by Operation Jackpot takes the situation
forward again. Judge L.J. ruled it was 'wholly unrealistic for the prosecution to attempt to maintain
records of each and every occasion when any police officer gave evidence..'. However, the judgment
went on to refer to present haphazard arrangements for maintaining records of cases with the
suggestion that the CPS should maintain records where police officers' 'misconduct or lack of veracity'
were evidenced in i) Court of Appeal judgments of quashed convictions, ii) cases stopped by trial
judges or iii) discontinued cases. These records, the judgment added, should also be disclosed.
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second aspect of Edwards'is largely restricted to occasions when there is a crisis in
confidence with the police which generates public interest in all criminal
proceedings, including those aborted.
To conclude this discussion on the Operation Jackpot inquiry, the CPS policy not to
rely on Stoke Newington police officers suspected of wrongdoing appears to have
been adopted by the Metropolitan Commissioner when defending police actions
brought by plaintiffs alleging malicious prosecution. I am aware of 11 concluded
actions involving cases connected with Operation Jackpot, all of which have been
settled, for a total of £5 66k, and two statements have been made in open court. The
standard was set in King v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis at £70k for
assault, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The plaintiff suffered a
relatively minor injury, which required hospital treatment, spent four hours in
custody and was acquitted at the end of a three day trial having had the prosecution
hanging over him for 10 months; the Commissioner denied liability.' 58 Settlement
for the same causes of action in Kingsley v. Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis was for £76k, the principal difference being that the plaintiff served a
four month prison sentence for drug offences before his conviction was quashed on
appeal; the Commissioner did not submit a defence.'59
IV. Exemplary Damages Quantum
Exemplary damages are a fundamental common law protection for constitutional
rights in the face of state abuse of power. 16° In the eighteenth century case of
Huckle v. Money' 6 ' the Court of Appeal found that a jury had been correct to include
exemplary damages in an award of £300 to a plaintiff detained by King's
158 Statement in Open Court, 7 November 1994, reported in the Times, 8 November. This compares
with a £70k settlement in Dandy v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, an action for malicious
prosecution after the plaintiff had spent 282 days remanded in custody, Guardian, 14 October 1993, see
above p.210.
Statement in Open Court, 11 December 1995, reported in the Guardian, 12 December. See further
below, p.230.
'° See Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutory Damages, The Law Commission Consultation Paper
No. 132 (1993) for general discussion of the issues.
161 (1763) 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 ER 768.
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messengers for six hours and served with beef-steaks and ale.' 62 The law was
recently clarified in two leading cases brought before the House of Lords, firstly by
Lord Devlin's judgment in Rookes v. Barnard' 63 and then, primarily by Lord
Hailsham L.C. and Lord Diplock, in Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd.IM Lord Devlin
adjudged three separate categories of case appropriate for exemplary damages - i)
'oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of government', ii)
where 'the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for
himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff' and iii)
where expressly allowed by statute. 165 Any misunderstanding that exemplary
damages might not be available in police actions, as police officers are not
government servants, was cleared up by Lord Hailsham in Broome with Lord
Devlin's first category declared to apply.' 66 The courts have displayed a reluctance
to precisely define the purpose of exemplary damages and have preferred to make
vague references to 'punitive damages', 'showing that tort does not pay' and
'vindication of the rule of law'. The Law Commission most succinctly described
their function as a combination of i) punishment for wrongdoing, ii) to deter further
wrongdoing and iii) to mark the court's disapproval.' 67 Finally, in Holden v. Chief
Constable of Lancashire' 68 the Court of Appeal interpreted the 'or' in Lord Devlin's
first category to apply to actions which included any one of the three types of
condemnable conduct.' 69 Thus, exemplary damages apply in the majority of police
actions because of the unconstitutionality of intentional torts committed by law
enforcement officers.
The above paragraph is a brief statement of the law on exemplary damages in police
actions before the Metropolitan Police Commissioner appealed against quantum in
10 cases between June 1995 and October 1996.170 This represents an opportune
moment, before analysis of the judgment of Lord Woolf M.R. in the test case of
162 Other early exemplary damages authorities include Chambers v Robinson (1726) 2 Str. 691, 93 ER
787 and Wilkes v Wood(1763) Loffi 1,98 ER 489.
163 [1964] A.C. 1129.
[1972] A.C. 1027.
165 Rookes v. Barnard[1964] A.C. 1129, at 1226-7.
[1972] A.C. 1027, at 1077.
167 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 132 (1993), p.114.
[1987] 1 Q.B. 380.
169 Ibid, at 388 per Purchas L.J.
'° See Table I., Chapter Two, above p.61.
219
Chapter Six: A Developing Area of Law
Thompson and Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,' 7' to briefly
summarise how the case law on police wrongdoing contributed to the popularity of
police actions and escalating awards. Firstly, the preoccupation of the courts with
protecting the rights of police officers when complained against by members of the
public undermined the efficiency of the complaint process. Secondly, the granting
of class P11 to complaint statements had the effect of discouraging victims of police
wrongdoing from complaining, and encouraging them to sue for damages. Thirdly,
Edwards improved the prospects of defendants maliciously prosecuted by police
officers to succeed in criminal proceedings and, therefore, their opportunities to
obtain damages in civil proceedings. And, although the Edwards principles do not,
strictly speaking, apply in the civil courts, there are similar rules on disclosure,'72
which makes it incumbent on chief officers to settle cases where police officers have
a record of failure in criminal proceedings.' 73 Fourthly, the availability of
exemplary damages to the victims of police wrongdoing means that plaintiffs are
able to receive damages in excess of the sum necessary to make good their losses.'74
Thompson and Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
The main feature of the Thompson and Hsu	 was the introduction of 14
itemised jury guidelines to assist assessment of damages in police actions according
to similar principles in defamation cases.' 76 This included refinement of the
definitions of the separate damage elements hitherto described as compensatory,
including aggravated, and exemplary 177 as basic, aggravated and exemplary
171 [1997] 2 All E.R. 762.
172 In Steel v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1993) unreported, 18 February, Beldam L.J.
ruled - evidence that an officer was previously prepared to pervert the course of justice was not
collateral to proceedings in an action for malicious prosecution, and ordered disclosure of documents in
three similar fact cases.
As demonstrated in the Stoke Newington cases. If the Commissioner had proceeded to trial under
such circumstances, he would have run the risk of the jury being informed of previous allegations of
wrongdoing against the officers involved, and substantial awards of exemplary damages.
Although listed here as the fourth 'inducement' for the victims of police wrongdoing to sue for
damages, exemplary damages were available to citizens of abuses of state power prior to clarification
under Rookes, and before s.48 of the Police Act 1964 made police actions practicable.
The author attended the Court of Appeal hearing. Miss Claudette Thompson's action involving
Hackney police officers is unconnected with the Michael Thompson Operation Jackpot case.
176 Sutclffe v. Pressdram [1991] 1 Q.B. 153; Rantzen v. Mirror Group Newspapers [1994] Q.B. 670;
John v. Mirror Group Newspapers [1996] 2 All E.R. 35. In giving the Thompson and Hsu judgment,
Lord Woolf M.R. travelled a considerable distance from Abbassy v. Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis [1990] 1 All E.R. 193, at 200-201 when, as a Lord Justice, he ruled against interfering with
a jury award and upheld the practice established in Ward v. James [196511 All E.R. 563, that general
judicial guidance was sufficient.
' 77 Broomev. Cassell& Co. Ltd [1972] A.C. 1027, at 1124 per Lord Diplock.
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damages, and suggested ratios between them.' 78
 In Chapter Five the proposition
was put that irreparable damage to the office of constable, after the introduction of
chief officers' vicarious liability for police torts, could only be averted if s.48 of the
Police Act 1964 was to be restricted to an administrative function. By this it is
meant that substitution of the officer who is tortfeasor with his chief officer as the
defendant serves no relevance other than to facilitate civil proceedings; on account
that a chief officer is not his subordinate's employer and the law of agency does not
apply.' 79 It follows that the separation of defendant and tortfeasor should have no
bearing on police actions with regard to liability' 80 or damages. It is argued here that
Thompson and Hsu seriously undermines the office of constable at common law by
taking account of vicarious liability in the exemplary damages guidelines.
Lord Woolf commences the Thompson and Hsu judgment by focussing on the large
sums of exemplary damages awarded in police actions. The preamble to the jury
guidelines examines the circumstances under which the Court of Appeal is allowed
to interfere with jury awards and the similarities between defamation and police
actions, particularly where liability is for false imprisonment and malicious
prosecution. However, after completion of this exercise several assumptions rest at
the core of the conclusion that a 'more structured approach to the guidance given to
juries in these actions is now overdue." 8 ' On inspection of lists of awards and
settlements, the Court of Appeal noted the striking variation in awards, as
demonstrated by the 10 cases appealed by the Commissioner, and wondered on what
criteria settlement was based. Although exemplary damages are awarded in addition
to compensatory damages, their effect is calculated on the global figure.
Examination of the 10 appeal cases reveals that the fluctuations in global awards are
more attributable to variations in compensatory rather than exemplary damages.182
For exemplary damages, apart from three awards in six figures, they fall between
' For a general assessment of Thompson andHsu, see Smith, G. (1997a) (See below Appendix 3).
' Farah v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 1 All E.R. 289, at 303 per Hutchinson
L.J., see Chapter Five, above p.183.
ISO Subject to where vicarious liability is ruled out because the tortfeasor went off on a frolic of his
own, Makanjuola v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1989) 2 Admin. L.R. 214, or by
statutory exemption, Farah v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 1 All E.R. 289, see
Chapter Five, above p.180.
'' Thompson andHsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 All E.R., 762 at 773 Lord
Woolf M.R.
182 See Table I, Chapter Two, above p.61.
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£35k and £55k, with six coming within a LiOk bracket, and the highest award of
£200k is ten times greater than the lowest of £20k. For compensatory damages the
highest award of £132k is 88 times that of the lowest, and there is a modal range of
six cases between £14k and £25k. Inferring that jury awards in the cases under
appeal are excessive, without explanation, judgment attributes fluctuations in
quantum to the difficulties faced by juries, particularly when having to distinguish
between aggravated and exemplary damages and the inherent danger of double
counting. 183 Although the Court of Appeal accepted that some form of convention
did allow for the settlement of police actions, it went no further than ask a rhetorical
question on the bases for settlement and ponder whether the vagaries of jury awards
are ignored in negotiations.' 84 Perhaps such an approach is not surprising in a
juridical forum where emphasis is placed on normative analysis and principles of
consistency. However, it is suggested that failure to explore the political issues
underpinning police actions, namely the regularity with which settlements have been
accompanied by disciplinary inaction giving the impression of a management
orchestrated 'cover up', 185 caused the Court to conclude that the solution to the
problem lay in issuing guidelines. Justification for interference with the principles
laid down in Rookes and Broome, that juries should be left to determine damages
with minimal assistance from judges, was on grounds that to do nothing would be to
allow the jury system to fall into disrepute, to a degree that 'could be instrumental in
bringing about its demise."86
Guidelines 12 and 13 are the principal pointers on exemplary damages.'87
(12) Finally, the jury should be told in a case where exemplary
damages are claimed and the judge considers that there is evidence
to support such a claim, that though it is not normally possible to
award damages with the object of punishing the defendant,
exceptionally this is possible where there has been conduct,
including oppressive or arbitrary behaviour, by police officers
which deserves the exceptional remedy of exemplary damages...
Thompson and Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 All E.R. 762, at 772-3
Lord Woolf M.R.
Ibid, at 773.
Dating back to Garrati v. Eastmond, which served as the catalyst for the 1962 Royal Commission
on the Police, see Chapter Five, above p.164.
186 Thompson and Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 All E.R. 762, at 773 per
Lord Woolf M.R.
Guideline 14 states that the plaintiffs actions can reduce or eliminate exemplary damages if the jury
thinks his conduct caused or contributed to the tortious conduct punishable.
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[Emphasis in original. Four points follow for the jury's assistance.
188]
(13) Where exemplary damages are appropriate they are unlikely
to be less than £5,000. Otherwise the case is probably not one
which justifies an award of exemplary damages at all. In this class
of action the conduct must be particularly deserving of
condemnation for an award of as much as £25,000 to be justified
and the figure of £50,000 should be regarded as the absolute
maximum, involving directly offences of at least the rank of
superintendent.'89
The Master of the Rolls makes the further suggestion that, as a rule of thumb and
subject to the upper limits given, 'it will be unusual for the exemplary damages to
produce a result of more than three times the basic damages being awarded (as the
total of the basic aggravated and exemplary damages) except .. where the basic
damages are 190 Of fundamental importance to the present discussion is the
Court's declaration:
In the case of exemplary damages we have taken into account the
fact that the action is normally brought against the chief officer of
police and the damages are paid out of the police funds for what is
usually a vicarious liability for the acts of his officers in relation to
which he is a joint tortfeasor (see now s.88 of the Police Act 1996).
In these circumstances it appears to us wholly inappropriate to take
into account the means of the individual officers except where the
action is brought against the individual tortfeasor.'9'
It is held that by taking vicarious liability into account in the exemplary damages
guidelines, Thompson and Hsu adversely effects the office of constable. In Broome
exemplary damages were awarded against two co-defendants, the author and
publisher of a book found defamatory. It was ruled that exemplary damages should
be assessed on the conduct of the least liable - 'If any one of the defendants does not
deserve punishment or if the compensatory damages are in themselves sufficient
punishment for any one of the defendants, then they [the jury] must not make any
(Taken largely from Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, at 1227-8 per Lord Devlin, and Broome
v. Cassell & Co. Ltd. [1972] A.C. 1027, at 1081-2 per Lord Hailsham LC.) - a) aggravated damages,
although compensatory, include a punitive element, b) the 'if, but only if' test, c) that exemplary
damages amount to a windfall for the plaintiff and d) the award should be the minimum to mark the
jury's disapproval.
189 Thompson and Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 All E.R., 762 at 775-6
Lord Woolf M.R.
' 9°Ibid, at 777.
'' Ibid., at 776.
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addition to the compensatory damages." 92 Two points emerge here - i) that
exemplary damages are not to be awarded if one of the defendants is undeserving of
punishment and ii) quantum is to be assessed on the means of the defendant least
able to pay. But, what are the implications of this ruling where joint tortfeasors and
only one defendant are allowed by statute, as under s.48 of the Police Act 1964.
Neither party in Thompson and Hsu addressed this question. However, during the
course of the hearing Auld L.J. raised the closely related matter of whether quantum
should be assessed on the defendant or tortfeasor's means. Comment is made in the
judgment that a consequence of the vicarious liability rule is that the personality of
the defendant is irrelevant to the level of punitive damages.' 93 But, the Court of
Appeal concludes that exemplary damages should not be assessed on the tortfeasor's
means on grounds that the guidelines take vicarious liability into account. This
represents a practical approach to the calculation of damages which avoids defining
the statutorily imposed relation between defendant and tortfeasor by capping
exemplary damages, at £5k, £25k and £50k, irrespective of the means of either. It is
suggested that, in addition to its pragmatic approach to the problem of excessive
exemplary damages, the Court of Appeal should have considered their implications
for the constitutional position of the police. Exemplary damages and the office of
constable are both of constitutional significance for the way in which police officers
are controlled, and the right of a citizen to gain redress against abuse of power by
state officials. Problems with how to assess quantum exemplary damages exposes
the compromise at the heart of the vicarious liability rule. On the one hand, the
defendant chief officer is undeserving of punishment for he is not the tortfeasor. On
the other hand, the tortfeasor's means are irrelevant for the assessment of exemplary
damages as he is a third party to proceedings. Although the introduction of
guidelines serves as a practical solution to this problem, the office of constable
suffers further damage as a consequence. That is because Thompson and Hsu
ignores Parliament's attempt to restrict s.48 to a purely administrative function, to
facilitate and make funds available to cover costs and damages in police actions.
' Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd [1972] A.C. 1027, at 1090, see also Lord Hailsham LC. at 1063,
'awards of punitive damages in respect of joint publications should reflect only the lowest figure for
which any of them can be held liable.'
Thompson and Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 All E.R., 762 at 772 per
Lord Woolf M.R.
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With consideration given to the technical separation of tortfeasor and defendant for
the assessment of exemplary damages, as predicated in the guidelines, vicarious
liability is no longer limited to a practical function. In Thompson and Hsu it is taken
to justify interference with standard civil law principles. Further, as s.48 was
cumbersomely constructed to safeguard the office of constable,' 94
 the statute cannot
be interpreted so that vicarious liability applies where beneficial to police
administration (by protecting officers from personal liability) and simultaneously
disregarded where unfavourable (by protecting chief officers from exemplary
damages). This is precisely what the Court of Appeal manages to achieve by
removing the defendant chief officer's means as one of the grounds for assessment
of exemplary damages. For the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, with an annual
budget of close to £2 billion,' 95 this means that the punitive effect of future awards,
even if they reach six figures, will be minimal. However, chief officers of provincial
forces with much smaller annual budgets, who are subject to the same guidelines,
will suffer disproportionately.
In keeping with recent tradition, judgment in Thompson and Hsu did not conceal the
judiciary's disdain for the anomalous status of exemplary damages in civil
proceedings.' 96 As the Court was concerned with Lord Devlin's first category,
police actions were singled out as particularly deserving of criticism compared to
defamation cases - 'At least ... the defendant profiting from the libel provides the
independent justification for the award of exemplary damages." 97 Again, the finger
of suspicion points at the separation of defendant and tortfeasor:
The fact that the defendant is a chief officer of police also means
that here exemplary damages should have a lesser role to play.
Even if the use of civil proceedings to punish a defendant can in
some circumstances be justified it is more difficult to justify the
award where the defendant and the person responsible for meeting
any award is not the wrongdoer, but his 'employer'.'98
194 See Chapter Five, above p.169.
Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 1996/7 (1997), p.99.
1% Cf. Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd. [1972] A.C. 1027, at 1087 per Lord Reid, 1123 per Lord Diplock;
AB v South West Water Services Ltd [1993] 1 All ER 609, at 626 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR.
introducing a 'cause of action' test.
197 Thompson and Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 All E.R., 762 at 772 per
Lord Woolf M.R.
' 98 Ibid., at 772.
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The judgment emphasises the punitive function of exemplary damages,' having
declared there should not be much call to punish a defendant chief officer for failure
to maintain control over his officers20° or where a false defence is maintained at
trial.20 ' Little mention is made of the deterrent effect of exemplary damages or their
function as a mark of disapproval. 202 This is surprising given that the judgment
stops short of a full broadside against exemplary damages by reference to the Law
Commission Consultation Paper's support for their retention. 203 The Paper makes
the general point that where vicarious liability attaches to exemplary damages the
employer is best placed to administer the deterrent effect by introducing policies to
avoid future actions and expenses. In addition, the Law Commission Paper points to
the important symbolic effect of exemplary damages as an indication of the court's
disapproval, voiced through the jury. 204 The weight of evidence detailed in Chapter
Two on the escalating cost of police torts 205 suggests that vindication of the rule of
law plays a significant part when juries decide how much chief officers should pay
for the transgressions of the officers under their direction and control.
Despite criticism in Thompson and Hsu on the availability of exemplary damages in
police actions, Rookes and Broome bound the Court of Appeal. 206 It is claimed in
the judgment that the upper limits selected for exemplary damages make it clear that
juries can award serious civil punishments and mark their vigorous disapproval of
police conduct. 207 It is significant that the judgment fails to mention the deterrent
effect of damages here. It would be disreputable to claim that an award of £50k can
'Ibid., at 777, it is stated that punishment is the primary objective in this class of case.
200 1bid, at 772.
201 Ibid., at777.
202 The substituted award of £35,000 in Hsu is described as sufficient 'to demonstrate publicly the
strongest disapproval of what occurred and make it clear to the commissioner and his force that
conduct of this nature will not be tolerated by the courts.' Ibid, at 777.
203 Ibid., at772.
204 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 132 (1993), p.148.
205 See Graph I., Chapter Two, above p.62.
206 The All England Law Report misinterprets the judgment in the Thompson and Hsu headnote (op.
cit., at 763). The ruling is summarised as 'the jury should be told that it was possible, in exceptional
circumstances, to award damages to punish the defendant where there had been conduct (including
oppressive or arbitrary behaviour) by police officers which deserved exceptional remedy.' This
suggests that exemplary damages are ruled rarely appropriate in police actions. In fact the judgment
does not deviate from Lord Devlin's first category or Purchas L.J.'s interpretation in Holden (see above
th.169). It reads (see above, p.202, guideline 12) that exemplary damages are available in exceptional
cases, of which oppressive or arbitrary conduct by police officers is a category deserving this remedy.
207 Thompson and Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 All E.R. 762, at 776 per
Lord Woolf M.R.
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have a major deterrent effect on the Commissioner, or even that the record total of
damages for 1996/7, which amounted to 0.13% of the MPS annual budget, was
substantial in this regard. 208
 The Court's limited claims are also debatable on
several grounds. Firstly, the maximum sum of £50k approximates to the mean
average of the 10 awards appealed by the Commissioner, and they do not come near
to meeting the conditions under the guidelines allowing the same amount. If the
Court of Appeal had applied the principle maintained in Rookes and Broome, that
juries decide exemplary damages, it would have attempted to reflect the ratio
between jury awards and police torts in recent years, and not impose judicial
standards. Secondly, having warned of the dangers of double counting aggravated
and exemplary damages,209 the advised ratios outlined in Thompson and Hsu set
aggravated and exemplary damages against each other. Guideline 10 suggests that
aggravated damages should not be more than twice basic damages, except where
basic damages are modest, which is the same equation as a global figure of three
times the basic when exemplary damages have been included.210 Thus, a jury which
considers a case deserving of aggravated and exemplary damages, and wishes the
full weight of its decision to be known to the defendant, will have to trim aggravated
damages in order to remain within the suggested ratio for exemplary damages.
Finally, the introduction of ratios is antithetical to the principle of exemplary
damages, which should be unconnected with the amount required to make good the
damage caused. Further, a jury faced with a list of 14 detailed guidelines and then
given the choice of a simple mathematical equation is likely to take the easier
option. This can work to the advantage of the plaintiff or defendant depending on
the basic damages. Either a multiplier takes effect so that where basic damages are
relatively high the global award may be tripled (subject to the upper limits on
exemplary damages) or, if basic damages are low the award may be capped.
Having disregarded the deterrent function of exemplary damages, the judgment
proceeds to make an interesting comment on the relevance of progress in
disciplinary proceedings:
Mr Pannick [on behalf of the Commissioner] submitted that the
jury should be invited to take into account the disciplinary
208 See Chapter Two, above p.92.
209 See above p.222.
210 See above fi.I9O.
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procedures which are available as against the officers when
considering whether the case is one which warrants the award of
exemplary damages. In our view, this should only be done where
there is clear evidence that such proceedings are intended to be
taken in the event of liability being established and that there is at
least a strong possibility of the proceeding.21'
It is suggested that the Commissioner attempts to recover some of the ground lost in
ex parte Wiley by asking the Court of Appeal to prioritise the statutory complaint
process over police actions as a legal remedy to police wrongdoing, along similar
lines to that established by Neilson. The way in which their Lordships rebutted the
submission bears some resemblance to the deterrent principle, although in a different
proactive sense, which rebounds against the Commissioner's intention. The
judgment appears to be saying that if disciplinary action is taken against police
officers whose tortious conduct bring them before the civil courts, then this
determination will go to the reduction of exemplary damages. Thus, significance
does not attach to exemplary damages for their deterrent effect, on the contrary,
there is an incentive for the Commissioner to limit damages by taking appropriate
disciplinary action. Whether intended or not by the Court, this establishes a close
connection between police action and complaint outcomes, which amounts to a
'stick and carrot' approach.
To conclude this discussion on Thompson and Hsu, reference is made back to the
assertion in Chapter Five that s.48 of the Police Act 1964 left the constitutional
position of the police precariously balanced, and that the statutory intention was to
restrict vicarious liability to an administrative function. 212 Over 30 years later, the
Court of Appeal adopted an equally practical approach by attempting to unravel the
implications for exemplary damages of the separation of the defendant and tortfeasor
in police actions. Issue is not taken here with the fact that Thompson and Hsu has
developed police action law, it is axiomatic of common law systems that case law
interferes with the intentions of the legislature. All that has been argued above is
that, with the separation of the defendant and tortfeasor serving as one of the
grounds for assessing quantum damages, the office of constable emerges as a
casualty of a pragmatic approach to quantum damages. If, on the other hand, the
211 Thompson and Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 All E.R. 762, at 777 per
Lord Woolf M.R.
212 See Chapter Five, above p.172.
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office of constable were to be abandoned, and a master servant relation established
in actuality, or the law of agency applied, then it would be arguable that a defendant
chief officer could only be liable for exemplary damages if a tortfeasor.213
V.	 Statements in Open Court
In Thompson and Hsu the interconnection between police complaints and actions
and the constitutional significance of the separation of defendant and tortfeasor are
subsidiary to the principal issue of exemplary damages. The same two common law
trends are more apparent in the final area of police action case law considered in this
chapter, on the contents of statements made in open court by plaintiffs after
settlement of their claims for damages. Further, the final point made above on
Thompson and Hsu regarding the Commissioner's attempt to accord judicial
supremacy to the disciplinary process over civil proceedings, applies equally to the
cases discussed below, with the major difference that police officers have enjoyed
greater success.
Provision was first made for a plaintiff who settled an action to make a statement in
open court by changes to the Royal Supreme Court rules in 1933.214 The power was
restricted to libel and slander cases on grounds that allowance for the defendant to
deny liability when settling an action should be balanced by entitling the plaintiff to
make a statement, with the approval of the judge, to vindicate his good name and
character. 215 As part of the developing law in police actions, further rule changes
were made in 1989, extending this right to a plaintiff settling an action for false
imprisonment or malicious prosecution, 216 and in 1992, allowing for mention of
joined causes of action (principally assault) in the statement. 217 It has been accepted
that false imprisonment and malicious prosecution were included in recognition of
213 In the U.S., where police officers are employed by local administrations, normally punitive damages
can only be recovered from the tortfeasor. Cheh (1996), p.266.
214 RSC 0.22, r.2(4).
215 Wolseley v. Associated Newspapers Ltd [1934] 1 K.B. 448, at 453 per Greer L.J.
216 R.S.C. 0.82, r.5(1).
217 R.S.C. 0.82, r.5(3).
229
Chapter Six: A Developing Area of Law
their similar consequences for the reputation of the plaintiff as libel and slander.218
However, restriction to these two causes of action in police cases created difficulties
of principle where the alleged tort of assault was the catalyst for the plaintiffs
alleged unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution, 219 which precipitated the further
rule change.
Statements in open court have been used to good effect by plaintiffs, and not only
for their primary function as a means of public vindication. They also point an
accusatory finger at the defendant chief police officer for his failure to properly
maintain control over the officers under his direction. 22° And, by naming police
officers as alleged tortfeasors they have ensured, regardless of whether the officers
have been disciplined, that their alleged wrongdoing becomes a matter of public
record. The Metropolitan Commissioner was the first to take up the cudgel in the
already mentioned Stoke Newington case of Kingsley. Objection was made to the
mention of five officers' names in the statement on the grounds that they were not a
party to the settlement. 22 ' Rather than their being named in court, it was argued,
they should be named in a forum not covered by privilege, for example at a press
conference, so that if anything defamatory were to be said a legal remedy would be
available to the officers. Judgment explained that the reason why the application
was made by the Commissioner, and not by the officers, was because of the
Commissioner's concern that mention of the officers would threaten the trust
between them and himself. Given that this was one of many cases contributing to a
public scandal that seriously rocked the MPS this was a remarkable claim. By the
time Mr Kingsley's statement was made, one of the alleged tortfeasors had
completed a one and a half year prison sentence, another had been acquitted of
perjury and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice offences and was
subsequently to receive a 10 years sentence for importation of drugs and a third had
been spoken to following substantiation of a complaint in connection with the case.
Furthermore, the Commissioner's failure to lodge a defence to the plaintiff's claim
218 Smith v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1991] 1 All E.R. 714, at 716 per Michael Davies
J.
219 Ibid. at 719.
220 A consequence of the ruling in Thompson and Hsu that the discipline process can only mitigate
against exemplary damages where there is a clear prospect of a fmding, see above p.228, is that the
absence of clear evidence of the same will be grounds for exemplary damages.
221 Kingsley v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1995) unreported, 5 May.
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was taken as an admission of liability. Sir Michael Davies allowed the officers to be
named on grounds that i) the Commissioner had abandoned the officers at the Court
of Appeal,222 in that he had not relied upon them, ii) he had not served a defence and
iii) quantum.223
More extraordinary was the subsequent appearance in the High Court of counsel
representing the officers, independently of the Commissioner, arguing that they
should be joined as defendants so that their objections to being named could be
heard or, alternatively, that they be allowed to make their own statement
immediately after the plaintiff. 224 Although there was no need for Sir Michael
Davies to rule on the issue, the plaintiff having added a paragraph to his statement,
he declared the applicants had no standing after hearing counsel's submissions on
their behalf. The officers' eleventh hour intervention was on grounds that no
disciplinary proceedings had yet been taken against the officers in connection with
Mr Kingsley's action, a point the additional paragraph in the revised statement made
clear:
A formal complaint on behalf of the Plaintiff was recorded by the
Metropolitan Police at the outset of the events which are the
subject of this action. That complaint came to be investigated in
due course under the ambit of the wider 'Operation Jackpot'
enquiry conducted on behalf of the Defendant under the
supervision of the PCA in respect of similar allegations against a
number of officers based at Stoke Newington police station. As a
result of that investigation, the CPS decided that no officer was to
be prosecuted in connection with this case for any criminal
offences, and similarly the PCA decided that no such officer was
to face any disciplinary charges. The individual officers continue
to maintain their innocence of the Plaintiff's complaints against
them. The Plaintiff therefore considered that the only course of
action left open to him to pursue his grievances was through these
civil proceedings which were commenced by way of a Writ issued
on 3rd February 1995.225
Thus, as a consequence of the officers efforts to ensure their exoneration in the
public statement, the plaintiff also explained that it was as a result of the failure of
222 No resistance was offered when Mr Kingsley's conviction was quashed, R v. Brown and others
(1993) unreported, 2 March, see above p.2 11.
223 Kingsley v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1995) unreported, 5 May.
224 Kingsley v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1995) unreported, 24 November.
225 Plaintiff's Statement in Open Court, read on 11 December 1995 in the High Court, reported in the
Guardian, 12 December.
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the Commissioner to take action against the officers that left him with no alternative
other than civil action.
In Ludford v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis226 the plaintiff settled his
action for assault, false imprisomnent and malicious prosecution and issued a
summons for leave to make a statement in open court. However, the two parties
were unable to agree on the naming of the officers and the matter was brought
before French J., the judge due to have heard the listed case. After Kingsley it was
accepted that named officers could be heard and their inclusion in statements was at
the discretion of the court, although in Ludford it was decided that the officers could
not be named. The judgment listed five factors taken into consideration in reaching
this decision, the first four generally concerned with the seriousness of the case,227
and finally, whether the officers had been named as defendants.
The county court trial judge in Williamson v. Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis228 adopted a different approach to Sir Michael Davies in Kingsley when
approached on behalf of three police officers objecting to the terms of a statement.229
He was eventually to allow five serving and one former officer to intervene in
proceedings after the plaintiff and defendant had settled three actions for £32.5k plus
costs; he ruled they had a legitimate concern for claiming the agreed statement
would damage their reputation. 23° Central to the officers argument was that the
Commissioner denied liability and they had not been subjected to discipline in
connection with events which gave rise to the proceedings. The trial judge
dubiously declared that an acquittal at a magistrate's court can be taken as sufficient
vindication of a defendant's character where there is no admission of liability
accompanying settlement. His line of reasoning goes behind that of Scrutton L.J. in
Wolseley23 ' whereby it was established that the right of a plaintiff to make a
statement was as a consequence of the defendant's denial of liability, so that where a
libel had been published the plaintiff's character might remain in doubt in the
absence of a public statement or apology on the part of the defendant.
226 (1997) unreported, 10 February.
227 Along similar lines to Balcombe J. in .1. v. R. (1984) unreported, 20 February.
228 (1996) unreported, 16 September; (1996) unreported, 17 September; (1997) unreported, 23 July.
229 The statement included 26 paragraphs detailing the alleged wrongdoing of police officers.
230 Williamson v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1996) unreported, 16 September.
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To conclude this chapter, points are taken separately from Kingsley, Ludford and
Williamson to show i) the linkage between the police complaint and action processes
and ii) how developments at common law have allowed the vicarious liability rule to
escape its limited administrative function intended by Parliament. Submissions were
made in each case that police officers who were alleged tortfeasors should not be
named in open court as they were not parties to the settlements between the plaintiffs
and the defendant Commissioner. In Kingsley, argument on behalf of the defendant,
repeated at a subsequent hearing by the alleged tortfeasors, focused on the fact that
following a complaint investigation disciplinary proceedings were not brought against
the police officers who were eventually named in the statement. The statement agreed
between the plaintiff and the alleged tortfeasors encapsulates the compromise at the
heart of ss.48 and 49 of the Police Act 1964. Although the plaintiff was able to state
that he was subjected to an assault, false imprisonment and a malicious prosecution,
on account of the failure by the defendant to enter a defence, he was prevented from
categorically stating that those responsible did it, they remain alleged tortfeasors.
After Ludford, consideration to whether an alleged tortfeasor has been named as a
defendant as grounds for naming a police officer in a statement in court is evidence
that the vicarious liability rule cannot be confined to procedural issues in the laws of
police actions. This has fatal consequences for the office of constable as it removes
statutory vicarious liability, now under s.88(1) of the Police Act 1996, from its
administrative straightjacket. The effect of s.48 of the Police Act 1964 was to protect
police officers from personal responsibility for their tortious conduct, the common
law position reached under Ludford is that they may also be protected from being
named as tortfeasors, or alleged tortfeasors where liability has not been admitted by
the defendant, removing them one step further from the rule of law. The situation can
be looked at from a different perspective, more mindful of the public interest. If a
rule designed to facilitate civil proceedings, which separates the tortfeasor and
defendant, should also serve to protect alleged tortfeasors from being named in court,
considerable doubt arises as to whether the police officer is accountable to the law for
his wrongdoing in any sense whatsoever. After all, the plaintiff's right to vindicate
231 Wolseley v. Associated Newspapers Ltd [1934] 1 K.B. 448, at 451.
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his name and character after concluding a private action is mainly of symbolic value
and plays little effective part in the administration of public justice.
Finally, the trial judge in Williamson, supported by the Court of Appeal, was not
concerned with protecting the interests of the defendant Commissioner, but with the
rights of the alleged tortfeasors. Placed in a position where he could not rule on the
merits of the details contained in the plaintiff's intended statement without the benefit
of a full hearing, he came down heavily in favour of the police officers - 'I wish to
make it clear that I consider it unfair to have insisted on naming the officers.' 232 It is
remarkable how the concerns expressed in Ludford and Williamson to protect the
rights of police officers as alleged tortfeasors in police actions, bear direct comparison
with the Divisional Court's concerns for officers rights as defendants in disciplinary
and criminal proceedings in the 1980s.233
232 (1996) unreported, 17 September.
233 See discussion above on fairness in disciplinary proceedings, p.190.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The Need for Constitutional Integrity
A fundamental contradiction rests at the heart of the police function in civil society. On
the one hand police officers are granted powers to infringe citizens constitutional rights
so that they can perform their law enforcement function. And, on the other hand, they
have responsibility for guaranteeing citizens constitutional rights in their duty to keep the
peace. Under these circumstances it is imperative that the constitutional position of the
police has absolute integrity; there can be no place for abstract principles, illusory forms
of accountability or fictional constitutional conventions. It has been argued in preceding
chapters that the close association between police wrongdoing and the complaint and
discipline processes resulted in the mystification of police crime. Such has been the
intensity of debate on this subject that sight has been all but lost of the function played by
the complaint process as the preliminary stage of criminal procedure for police officers.
The fact that complaints rarely result in criminal prosecutions has reinforced the
commonly held belief that there is no need to look further than the discipline process as a
means of holding police officers accountable for their wrongdoing. The infrequency of
prosecutions has not been taken as the basis for closer examination of the principle that
the police officer is accountable to the law.
In Chapter Two this thesis took the recent increase in police actions as the starting point
for analysis of the police officer's accountability to the law for his wrongdoing.
However, it was soon established that analysis of divergent statistical trends in police
actions and complaints is incapable of explaining the root cause of the police wrongdoing
problematic. Comparative study of the civil and complaint processes was persevered
with in the victimological study of police wrongdoing in Chapter Three. However, the
perceptions of the plaintiffs interviewed, who identified themselves as victims of crimes
who had been denied formal recognition of this reality, became paramount. In seeking to
gain legal redress for the wrongs they had suffered they expressed varying degrees of
satisfaction with their police actions. They accepted they had abandoned any hope of
seeing the officers responsible for their suffering punished in the criminal courts or by
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disciplinary action as a result of their non co-operation with the complaint process. They
were disturbed to find that the damages awarded to them were not paid by the wrongdoer
but drawn from the police budget and did not feel that sufficient notice was taken by
police managers of their cases to prevent further wrongdoing. The plaintiffs were
unanimous in their satisfaction with the opportunity civil proceedings provided them for
vindication, and there was a general acceptance that the amount of damages compensated
them for their losses.
Plaintiffs beliefs that they had been denied equal access to justice on account of their
being the victims of police crimes prompted a historical search for evidence of the police
officer's accountability to the law in Chapter Four. It was found to have applied in the
mid nineteenth century when modern police forces were established and police officers
were subject to the authority of magistrates. Since those times, it was argued, there has
been a gradual dismantling of the office of constable. It is apparent that this commenced
in the second half of the nineteenth century with the police's extension of their powers on
the one hand, and magistrates powers becoming increasingly superfluous as police
professionalism developed, on the other. The Police Act 1919 was pinpointed as an
important historical staging post by providing for standard police working practices,
including discipline regulations, by statutory order. However, in Chapter Five the Police
Act 1964 was taken as the defining moment in modern police history for removing the
police officer from the ambit of the criminal law in like manner as the citizen.
A central tenet of this thesis is that codification of the police complaint process under
s.49 of the Police Act 1964, as a pragmatic attempt to address citizens grievances with
police officers' conduct, caused the police officer to be exempted from standard criminal
procedure. As a consequence of this theoretical decriminalisation of unlawful police
conduct, along with infrequency of prosecutions, that attention has been focused on the
manner in which police complaints were investigated and resolved. More recently, with
the increase in police actions, debate in the field, which has yet to pervade academia, has
concerned the relative merits of the police complaint and action processes. However, in
all likelihood the plaintiffs interviewed for this study would not have commenced civil
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proceedings if they had been confident that appropriate action (their preference was for
criminal prosecution) would be taken against those who had wronged them. In the
absence of criminal prosecution of police officers for their alleged criminality a series of
compromises has emerged during the last 30 years which existed in embryonic form in
the ss.48 and 49 of the Police Act 1964 package. Introduction of a vicarious liability rule
under s.48 made police actions practicable for victims of police wrongdoing and
protected police officers from personal liability. Codification of the complaint process
under s.49 reinforced the position of chief officers as responsible for the direction and
control of their forces consistent with the doctrine of constabulary independence. The
compromise is manifest by plaintiffs establishing that police officers behaved unlawfully
in the civil courts and the internal police complaint process finding that there was no
evidence of wrongdoing by police officers. Public concern with the compromise has
concentrated on the paying of large sums of public money to persons where the alleged
offenders have escaped personal liability, giving the impression that a financial solatium
has served to conceal police unlawfulness.
Reference has been made in previous chapters to police actions as a developing area of
law. Since the plaintiffs were interviewed for this study there have been judgments in the
cases of Thompson and Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,' Ludford v.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 2 Williamson v. Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis3 and Goswell v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. 4 It is of
significance that the aspect of police actions with which plaintiffs were the most satisfied,
their vindication in the courts, has been damaged by the restrictions imposed on naming
police officers as tortfeasors in Ludford and Williamson. And Thompson and Hsu has
interfered with the amount of damages that will be available to plaintiffs in police actions
in the future by the introduction of jury guidelines. In Chapter Five it was argued that,
although codification of the complaint process under s.49 of the Police Act 1964
'[1997] 2 All E.R.
2 (1997) unreported, 10 February.
(1997) unreported, 23 July.
'(1998) unreported, 7 April, an appeal against quantum damages. The Court of Appeal heard Gerald v.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis on 22 April 1998, and gave its judgment on the same day this
thesis was completed, see Table I., Chapter Two, above p.61.
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interfered with the office of constable, the police officer's common law authority was
sustainable on a point of principle by statutory restriction of the vicarious liability rule
under s.48. The significance of the separation between tortfeasor and defendant detailed
in Chapter Five became apparent in the following chapter when examining recent case
law on police actions.
It was inevitable that the rickety s.48, founded on a compromise, would be unable to
withstand close examination in the courts in the event of an increase in police actions.5
The Commissioner partly relied on the fact that he was not the tortfeasor in Thompson
and Hsu, and the fact that tortfeasors were not defendants was relied on in Ludford and
Williamson.6 The rulings in these cases are far removed from Parliament's attempt not to
interfere with the office of constable when introducing the vicarious liability rule. After
Ludford, the name of a police officer who, as an alleged tortfeasor is responsible for his
chief officer having to defend a police action, may be omitted in statements in open court
following settlement on grounds that he is a third party to the proceedings. Here, the
rupture between the consequences of vicarious liability for the laws of police actions and
Parliament's desire to preserve the office of constable is evident. Under the office of
constable, the officer is not a third party as he is liable for his tortious conduct; under the
s.48 vicarious liability rule the tortfeasor is protected from liability; and under Ludford
the tortfeasor is protected from mention in court. Thus, where actions are settled, it is
difficult to conceive of any manner in which the police officer is accountable to the law
for his wrongdoing. He has been provided with different criminal procedures to the
citizen, he is not liable for his civil wrongs and can escape the stigma of public
accusation.
The reason given on behalf of the Commissioner for his objection to the naming of police
officers in Kingsley v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 7 was that it went to the
trust between him and officers under his direction and control. This begs the question,
For example, Hutchinson L.J.'s frustration with not being able to hold the Commissioner vicariously
liable in Farah v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. [1997] 1 All E.R 289, at 304.
'See Chapter Six, above p.232.
(1995) unreported, 5 May, see Chapter Six, above p.230.
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how can trust be endangered where a police officer who is constitutionally held to be
accountable to the law has already been provided with protection from liability and
damages by his chief officer and police authority? However, if the office of constable is
put to one side, and trust is not considered in terms of the mutual respect required
between equal colleagues in the interests of efficiency, the Commissioner's concerns in
Kingsley are not inconsistent with the doctrine of constabulary independence. The trust
between himself and other officers that the Commissioner is mindful of in police actions,
must be similar to that of a manager with responsibilities for protecting the interests of his
company and employees. Further, Thompson and Hsu, Ludford and Williamson are
entirely compatible with the statutory intention in 1964 to make chief officers more
responsible for the efficient running of their forces, 8 and recent government initiatives to
increase chief officers responsibilities more in line with standard employment practice.9
While the judiciary has devoted its attention to police actions in recent years, the
government has been considering the discipline and complaint processes. The first Home
Affairs Select Committee of the new Labour administration examined the police
discipline and complaint processes, publishing its report in January 1998,10 and Home
Secretary Jack Straw made a statement in the House of Commons in March 1998.11
Looking back over the years since the Police Act 1964 police wrongdoing has figured
prominently as one of the most enduring problems of modern policing. Complaints
consume vast amounts of police resources, have been subjected to innumerable
parliamentary inquiries and frequent reform, yet they continue to plague police
conimunity relations. Figure IV. reveals the trend in substantiated complaints for
England and Wales, including the MPS, with the major legislation, judgments and events
listed to give some indication of the nature of the problem.' 2 It is not suggested that the
8 For the Home Secretary's comments at Standing Committee on s.49 of the Police Act 1964, see Chapter
Five, above p.185.
Baker, S. & J. English (1994), see Chapter Two, above p.80, and further discussion below on the Home
Affairs Select Committee's recommendations.
10 Home Affairs Select Committee First Report Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures: Minutes
of Evidence and Appendices (H.C. 258), 1997.
' Home Office News Release, 23 March 1998, 107/98, Home Secretary Acts on Police Complaints and
Discipline; available on the internet at www.coi.gov.uk ., includes statement made in House of Commons.
12 Dates given for cases are for judgments, not when reported. The diagram also serves to illustrate
connections between the discussion in Chapter Two on the increase in police actions, based on MPS
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number of proved complaints can be directly equated with fairness and justice, but it can
be safely assumed that there is some correlation between the number of substantiated
complaints and public opinion, particularly as the figures reveal a clear trend. Despite
Scarman's warnings on public dissatisfaction with the complaint process in 1981,' the
number of complaints substantiated the following year remains the highest since records
began)4 The indications are that creation of the PCB in 1977 did have an influence on
complaint findings, but that its replacement by the PCA in 1985 has not had a similar
impact. With regard to case law, the landmark judgment covering police complaint
statements with class P11 in Neilson v. Laugharne' 5 was shortly before the 1982 peak.
There has been no significant change to the statistics since it was over-ruled by the House
of Lords in R. v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police ex parte Wiley,' 6 although it is
too soon to properly assess Wiley 's full effect. It is suggested that Neilson was the most
damaging judicial pronouncement to undermine the credibility of the complaint process.
The ruling in R. v. Police Complaints Board ex parte Madden,' 7 which declared that
double jeopardy did not exempt police officers from disciplinary proceedings in cases
where there was insufficient evidence to prosecute, should have had a positive impact on
complaint statistics. However, it came during the peak year, implying that, once the
effect of the judgments left their impression on practice, the ground lost under Neilson
was more damaging to public confidence. Also in 1982, the award by a High Court judge
of £50.5k damages to a middle aged couple for assault, false imprisonment and malicious
prosecution in White v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis' 8 signalled a
breakthrough for police actions. In 1989 a High Court jury awarded £lOOk in Taylor v.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, reduced to £60k following appeal by the
statistics and socio-political analysis, the practical problems facing police action practitioners detailed in
Chapter Three and the appraisal of case law on police wrongdoing in Chapter Six. Whereas statistics in
Chapter Two are limited to the MPS, the totals listed in Figure IV. are for England and Wales. In addition
to demonstrating that MPS complaint substantiation figures are not exceptional (compare with Table IV.
and Graph II., Chapter Two, above pp.67 and 68), English and Welsh figures are used to reflect the general
situation in response to national events and case law outside the Metropolitan Police District.
13 See Chapter Two, above p.75.
' 1,787, Home Office Statistical Research Bulletin, Issue 21/97, Police Complaints and Discipline
England and Wales, April 1996 to March 1997. Figures for England and Wales peaked two years before
those for the MPS, see Table IV., Chapter Two, above p.67.
' [1981] 1 All E.R. 829, see Chapter Six, above p.198.
16 [1994] 3 All E.R. 420, see Chapter Six, above p.201.
' [1983] 2 All E.R. 353, see Chapter Six, above p.191.
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Commissioner.' 9 Victims of police wrongdoing who sue, and either do not complain or
refuse to co-operate with complaint investigations, might account for some of the fall in
proved complaints since 1982, as there is a probability that such cases would have
enjoyed a higher than average prospect of success. However, it is unlikely that as many
as 1,000 police actions have been annually concluded in favour of plaintiffs (the
difference between the 1982 high and the 1990s trough20). The annual decline in
numbers of substantiated complaints between 1982 and 1989 shown in Figure IV. is
consistent with the proposition made in Chapter Two that it was during this period that
the public confidence with the complaint process was lost. 2 ' The following year it was
ruled in R. v. Edwards22 that, in addition to criminal or disciplinary findings against
police officers, their evidence in failed criminal proceedings are of relevance to their
credibility. It was suggested in Chapter Six, that rulings in this category of case represent
attempts by the judiciary to preserve the integrity of the administration of justice on
occasions when there is a crisis in confidence with the police.23
Chief officers' concerns with police wrongdoing have primarily been with officers
avoidance of disciplinary proceedings for poor work performance and corruption, 24 they
have not taken up the cudgel on behalf of the victims of crimes who have suffered
miscarriages of justice or violence at the hands of police officers. Home Secretary Jack
Straw's statement in response to the Home Affairs Select Committee report on police
discipline and complaints directly addressed chief officers concerns and separately
considered the need for reform of the complaint process. With regard to discipline, the
Home Secretary confirmed in his House of Commons statement that two procedural
(1982) Times, 24 April.
19 (Unreported) Independent 6 December 1989, see Chapter Two, above fn. 1
20 1989 - 765; 1992 - 760; 1993 - 750; 1995/6 - 749; Home Office Statistical Research Bulletin, Issue
21/97, Police Complaints and Discipline England and Wales, April 1996 to March 1997.
21 See Chapter Two, above p.75.
22(1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 48.
23 See Chapter Six, above p.216.
24 For example, comments by the Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, Edward Crew, reported in
the Independent, 10 July 1997 and the Metropolitan Commissioner, Sir Paul Condon, in the Guardian, 7
October 1997. Also, see evidence to the Select Committee by ACPO, Edward Crew and Sir Paul Condon,
Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures: Minutes of Evidence and Appendices (H.C. 258), 1997,
vol. II.
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changes legislated for in 1994, abolition of double jeopardy25
 and an end to the right to
silence,26
 would commence from 1 April 1999. Also from that date he accepted the
following of the Select Committee's recommendations - i) the civil standard of proof will
apply in disciplinary proceedings,27 ii) there will be a new fast track disciplinary
procedure28
 and iii) cases may be decided in the absence of the charged officer if he is
unable to attend due to ill health. 29 The Home Secretary added that police authorities are
to automatically refer to him to forfeit the pensions of officers convicted of criminal
offences. He also accepted the Select Committee's recommendation that the Home
Office should commission independent research on the independent investigation of
complaints. 30 Further, legislation will be introduced when possible which will - i) give
powers to the Home Secretary to instruct the PCA to initiate and oversee investigations
and ii) allow a prospective complainant to appeal against a decision by a chief officer not
to record his complaint. 3 ' Jack Straw accepted in principle that the PCA should have
powers to commission independent investigations,32 but he thought resource implications
would delay reform in this area. Because of coverage of police complaint reports with
class public interest immunity33 he stated he would give further consideration to the
Select Committee's recommendation that reports should be disclosed in the interest of
openness.34
The Select Committee heard and received written evidence from lawyers who have acted
for complainants35 and the DPP concerning prosecutions of police officers 36 and its
Report noted the infrequency of prosecutions. 37 However, the Select Committee, in
" S.37(f) of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994.
26 Ss.34 - 37 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.
27 Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I., p.xli.
28 Ibid. p.li .
29 Ibid., p.xlix. This decision is consistent with Sedley J.'s reasoning in R. v. Chief Constable of Devon
andCornwallexparte Hay [1996] 2 All E.R. 711, see Chapter Six, above p.195.
30 Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I., p.xxviii.
Ibid., p.xix.
32 Ibid, p.xxix.
Taylor v. Anderton [1995] 1 W.L.R. 447.
' Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I., pp.lii-liui.
Police Disciplinary and Complaint Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. II., pp.34-47 and 2 17-235.
36 Police Disciplinary and Complaint Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. II., pp.107-1 16 and 301; CPS
written evidence at pp.199-203.
Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I, pp.xxx-xxxii.
243
Chapter Seven: The Need for Constitutional Integrity
anticipation of the Butler inquiry into CPS procedure,38
 did not make any
recommendations in this area. 39
 Although the Select Committee and the Home Secretary
follow the traditional approach to police wrongdoing, by seeking solutions in procedural
reform, the Select Committee's consideration of the non-prosecution of police officers
represents a move away from orthodoxy. As does the Home Secretary's acceptance in
principle that the PCA should have investigatory powers.
For the remainder of this concluding chapter I consider the significance of the flurry of
activity since 1997 on police wrongdoing, focusing on the Select Committee's
recommendations, for the constitutional position of the police by reference to the balance
model developed in Chapter Five. There is nothing new in the argument that the police
officer's accountability to the law is an illusion. Lustgarten's 1986 study makes the
point, concluding with a thorough critique of the doctrine of constabulary independence
established under R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn.40
Instead of tracing the constitutional position solely through case law in this study of
police wrongdoing I have attempted to put it in a social context in order to reflect the
prevailing social reality in the constitutional equation.
It is beyond contention that the recent trend has been for the victims of police
wrongdoing to seek legal redress in the civil courts while chief officers have turned to the
legislature for increased powers over their subordinates to control police wrongdoing.
Use of the criminal sanction has not played a significant part in developments, although it
is envisaged this may change in light of R v. DPP ex parte Treadaway,4 ' the forthcoming
Butler Inquiry and the Home Affairs Select Committee's concerns. A corollary of police
actions has been that developments at common law have now completely undermined
Parliament's intention in restricting s.48 of the Police Act 1964 to an administrative
function so as not to interfere with the office of constable. The separation of defendant
and tortfeasor as a principle of vicarious liability is identified with standard employment
See Chapter One, above p.33.
Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I, pp.xxx-xxxii.
40 [1968]2Q.B. 118.
'(l997) unreported, 31 July, see Chapter One, above p.32.
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relations and the law of agency, a situation confirmed by Thompson and Hsu, Ludford
and Williamson. While the office of constable has declined there has been a
corresponding strengthening of the doctrine of constabulaiy independence. This has
occurred for two reasons, firstly, the damage caused to the office has not had a similarly
debilitating effect on the doctrine for the simple reason that the judgments have not
touched on constabulaiy independence. Secondly, the case law confirms the doctrine of
constabulary independence by emphasising a chief officer's responsibilities over other
police officers and for his force when defending police actions. As a defendant in police
actions he is seen to be accountable to the law for the conduct of his subordinates, and his
general duties as a chief officer also require him to safeguard both the good name of his
force and its resources. The negative effect of civil damages on the MPS budget, i.e. the
reduction of resources available for policing, was taken into consideration in setting the
Thompson and Hsu guidelines,42 and Ludford and Williamson serve to protect the good
names of police officers.
A normative approach to the constitutional position would be to hold that the doctrine of
constabulary independence is dependent on the office of constable for its integrity. I have
argued that this insufficiently explains the complexities of the constitutional position, and
that its integrity is founded on the balance between the two principles. Thus, not only is
the doctrine able to survive independently of the office, there is a dynamic to the equation
which has seen constabulary independence replace the office of constable as the
dominant element. It is argued that there is ample evidence, drawn in preceding chapters
from statistics, sociological inquiry, victimological surveys and legal analysis, to
demonstrate it has now reached the stage where the office of constable is a constitutional
fiction.
Under s.4 of the Police Act 1919 a half way house between the office of constable and
the doctrine of constabulary independence was created in the discipline process.
Introduction of a quasi-judicial process by statutory order sustained the office of
42 This approach was affirmed in Goswell (1998) unreported, 7 April, with Simon Brown L.J. taking into
account 'that the exemplary damages award will constitute a windfall for the plaintiff and a depletion of
police funds to the possible disadvantage of the general public.'
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constable by providing protections for police officers accused of all forms of wrongdoing
in line with safeguards for criminal suspects. Operational independence, a central
element of the doctrine of constabulary independence, which was not recognised at that
point in time, was provided for in the majority of forces by the chief officer serving as the
discipline authority (and in borough forces where police authorities delegated this
responsibility to their chief officer). As argued above, the Police Act 1964 caused
terminal damage to the office of constable and disturbed the integrity of the constitutional
position. And now, commencing with the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act l994
through the Select Committee's Report and the Home Secretary's announcement, the
writing is on the wall for the quasi-judicial discipline process. The significance of these
latest moves is not that they reinforce the police officer's accountability to the law for the
benefit of victims of police wrongdoing. Rather, they are disadvantageous to police
officers as they will remove some of the criminal safeguards available to them in
disciplinary proceedings, and are advantageous to chief officers by increasing their power
to deal with wrongdoing as part of their managerial responsibilities. It is interesting to
note that the legislative trend currently promoted by chief police officers and the
government is an inverse reflection of their concerns in the 1 980s for the rights of police
officers in discipline proceedings. However, the reforms being advanced are consistent
with the recent ruling in R. v. Chief Constable of the Devon and Cornwall Constabulaiy
ex parte Hay45 that chief officers have to balance the police and public interest against
police officers rights when acting as discipline authority.
Police officers, through the Police Federation and the Police Superintendents Association,
sought to defend the office of constable in evidence to the Select Committee, while chief
officers lamented their inadequate powers to deal with police wrongdoing. The Select
Committee was mindful of the difficulties created for the constitutional position by
introduction of procedures more in line with standard employment practises:
We are .. broadly sympathetic to ACPO's view that the disciplinary
process as a whole should so far as possible equate to the
n Which followed a March 1993 Home Office consultation paper, Review of Police Discipline Procedures,
see Baker. and English, op. cit., Ch.8.
See Chapter Six discussion on fairness in discipline proceedings, above p.190.
[1996] 2 All E.R. 711, see Chapter Six, above p.195.
246
Chapter Seven: The Need for Constitutional Integrity
management-based and non-legalistic procedures applicable in other
areas of employment. Nevertheless we recognise that arguments of
natural justice and the special position of police officers militate in the
other direction.46
This observation implies that an accommodation is required, and the Select Committee
proposes a compromise on similar grounds to the one underpinning ss.48 and 49 of the
Police Act 1964. This time by introduction of a discipline process commensurate with
employment law and the independent investigation of complaints. 47 Whereas retention of
the office of constable was the difficulty in 1964, in 1998 the conflict is between a
disciplinary process which is consistent with the doctrine of constabulary independence
and a complaint process which is not. It is suggested that the Select Committee failed to
appreciate that the direction in which the gathering momentum for refonn of the
discipline and complaint processes, in association with developments at common law, is
moving, requires a full re-evaluation of the constitutional position. On the one hand,
dismantling the quasi-judicial discipline process will remove the remaining practical
effect of the office of constable by introduction of standard employment practices. On
the other hand, independent investigation of complaints, will undermine the doctrine of
constabulary independence by i) undermining chief officers' operational independence
and ii) allowing an alternative authority to investigate police crime.
By considering all complaints, irrespective of whether allegations of criminal offences or
poor work performance, as one category, it is implicit in the Select Committee's proposal
that the independent body will have responsibility for investigation of criminal
allegations against police officers. Its Report foresees problems with complaints which
allege criminal offences, and will have to be investigated by the police as well as the
independent body on account of chief officers' responsibilities for law enforcement.
With the Select Committee's principal recommendation that independent investigation of
complaints should be researched, no attempt is made to preempt the outcome by
Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I, p.xxxvii.
" The Select Committee stopped short of recommending independent investigation by regarding it as
desirable in principle. 'There was almost no argument in the evidence we received against the conclusion
that independent investigation would be desirable in principle, not least because of the boost this would
give to public confidence in the system. We are of the same view.' Police Disciplinary and Complaints
Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I, p.xxvi.
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addressing practical problems in detail. However, reference is made to the conclusion
reached by Hayes in his report recommending a police ombudsman in Northern Ireland48
that responsibility for criminal investigations against police officers could also be
transferred to the ombudsman to avoid duplication.49 If similar proposals are adopted for
English and Welsh forces it will mean, firstly, that a chief officer's responsibilities for the
control of his force will be undermined by intrusion in the preliminary stage of the
discipline process by external investigation of work related complaints. 50 And, secondly,
investigation of criminal allegations against police officers by a separate body will
interfere with his law enforcement function. Both proposals are inconsistent with the
doctrine of constabulary independence, in contrast with the enhanced managerial powers
which will be available to a chief officer as the disciplinary authority.
Comparison can be made between how the constitutional situation developed in the late
nineteenth century and the present trend. The lacuna left by the decline in the
magistrate's powers over the police was eventually to be filled by the doctrine of
constabulary independence. Although it is not possible to determine what might replace
the office of constable if it were to be formally abandoned, it is evident that if the Select
Committee's preferences are put into practical effect, police officers will become
employees of their chief officers. There need not be a Parliamentary reappraisal of the
office of constable, it will have been rendered obsolete by developments at common and
statute law. The common law would follow its own course and, eventually, a new
constitutional convention will slot into place in the same way that the doctrine of
constabulary independence arrived on the scene. It will not be necessary for Parliament
to determine whether the police officer is an employee of central or local government, 5 ' it
will simply be the case that police officers will cease to exercise an original authority,
48 Hayes, M. (1997), pp.58-60.
Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (H.C. 258), 1997, vol. I, p.xxviii. Hayes proposed that
the ombudsman should have responsibilities for the recording and investigation of all complaints, reporting
his recommendations to the DPP as the prosecuting authority and/or the chief constable as discipline
authority and present cases at disciplinary tribunals, Hayes, M. (1997), p.45.
50 For example, an investigation into a complaint of harassment against an officer who has been observing
the complainant as a suspect will intrude in that police operation.
51 The two alternatives to law enforcement by independent officers of the Crown. The status of the police
officer in the USA is as a local government employee, and in France as a civil servant; see Alderson, J.
(1973).
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their duties will be delegated to them by their chief officers. In the absence of
Parliamentary reconsideration of the constitutional position, a natural consequence would
be for chief officers to exercise an original authority, conferred by Crown appointment,
and police officers to serve as deputies of their chief officers. This would represent the
eventual triumph of the doctrine of constabulary independence over the office of
constable.
It is here that the Select Committee's discipline and complaints compromise can be
recognised to have a potentially damaging effect for the doctrine of constabulary
independence, and comparison can be made with the attempt in s.48 of the Police Act
1964 to preserve the office of constable. With police wrongdoing subjected to external
scrutiny, following allegations of poor work performance or criminality, a form of words
will have to be cobbled together which will allow the doctrine of constabulary
independence to survive. However, if history is anything to go by, and the accuracy of
this thesis is accepted, this will represent the beginning of the end for the doctrine of
constabulary independence.
There is much to be said for both the office of constable and the doctrine of constabulary
independence. It is not suggested here that their demise would be fatal for independent
and impartial policing, other jurisdictions manage law enforcement with equal efficiency,
or inefficiency, and similar degrees of accountability. However, in the absence of a
written constitution, negation of these two constitutional principles will increase the
potential for political interference with policing in the U.K. It is suggested that there is
an alternative to the Select Committee's recommendations which will reaffirm the office
of constable and restore some integrity to the constitutional position. The basic flaw in
the Select Committee's analysis is to adopt a traditional approach to police wrongdoing
by examining problems with the complaint process in the first instance, and not
commencing with consideration of the non-prosecution of police officers. If the root
cause of the police wrongdoing problem identified in this thesis - the recording of
criminal allegations against police officers as complaints - is tackled in the first instance,
there need not be conflict between the Select Committee's proposals on employment
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practice and independent investigation. The re-criminalisation of police wrongdoing can
be done as a matter of principle by keeping criminal allegations and complaints of poor
work performance separate, conimencing at the point of recording. But, who is to record
allegations and how are they to be separated?
A feature of the 'who investigates the police' debate is its focus on complaint
investigations in the context of police discipline, and it is has been taken for granted that
police criminality will be investigated by the police. The assumption is that under the
doctrine of constabulary independence, chief police officers are solely responsible for law
enforcement, including the problem of police crime. The Royal Commission on Police
Powers and Procedure expressed this constitutional requirement as early as 1929 when
declaring its opposition to granting the DPP with powers to investigate the police. 52 The
First Home Affairs Select Committee also makes this assumption when considering dual
investigations of police crimes. 53 This preoccupation with the investigation of crime as
the police's constitutional monopoly is misplaced; other public officials have law
enforcement responsibilities - in Customs and Excise, the Inland Revenue and the
Department of Health and Social Security, for example. Moreover, these law enforcement
officers exercise criminal investigation and charge powers under PACE, the same as
police officers.
Whatever the merits of the police investigating the police may be, there is no
constitutional rule which requires it. Yet, the present statutory arrangements for dealing
with police wrongdoing, which have proved ineffective, have survived on the assumption
that this is the case. Further, procedural reforms introduced during the same period have
served to distance the police officer from the citizen for the manner in which he is held
accountable to the law. An imbalance in the constitutional position can be observed here;
decriminalisation of police wrongdoing and de-activation of the office of constable has
been caused by procedural reform. The doctrine of constabulary independence sustains
52 
'..alleged offences against the law of the land committed by policemen ought not to be treated differently
from offences committed by other citizens.' 'Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and
Procedure' (Cmnd. 3297), 1929, Parliamentary Papers (1928-1929), vol. 9, p.127 at p.107 of Report. See
above Chapter Five, p.145.
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decriminalisation by justifying police investigation of police crime, leaving procedural
reform as the only solution to police criminality. If this imbalance was to be reversed,
with emphasis placed on the need for the police officer to be subject to the same criminal
procedures as the citizen, and not the same law enforcement authority, the situation is
radically transformed. Creation of an independent body with responsibilities for
recording, investigating and charging police officers alleged to have committed criminal
offences under PACE, would re-establish police officers accountability to the criminal
law in like maimer as the citizen, albeit with investigation and charge by a body other
than the police. On the one hand this will reaffirm the office of constable but, on the
other, it will undermine the doctrine of constabulary independence. Yet, this does not
pose insurmountable constitutional difficulties given that the police do not have a
monopoly on law enforcement. Transfer of responsibility for police crime to an
independent body would re-establish some balance and integrity to the constitutional
position by buttressing the office of constable.
The remaining problem is how to separate criminal allegations from complaints relating
to work performance? It is suggested that the independent body records all allegations
against police officers, whether criminal or performance related, ensuring independent
statistical analysis. The independent body would have responsibility for investigation
and charge of criminal allegations, and forward complaints of poor work performance to
the relevant chief officer for investigation and determination according to standard
employment procedures. Thus, chief officers would retain their responsibility for
discipline with increased managerial powers, and police officers would retain the
safeguards due to criminal suspects when facing more serious allegations. Where border
line cases arise, they could be investigated by the independent body and in the event of no
charges being preferred, or a decision by the CPS not to prosecute, referred back to the
relevant chief officer for a decision on discipline. Although there is only a subtle
difference of principle between this proposal and that offered by the Select Committee,
regarding the investigation of police crime, the practical difference between the two is
substantial. Complaints of poor work performance would be investigated by chief
See above p.246.
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officers in the proposal advanced here, minimising interference with the responsibilities
of chief officers, and by the independent body in the Select Committee's proposal.
To conclude this thesis it is held that by constant reference to the principle that the police
officer should be accountable to the law in like manner as the citizen it is possible to
deconstruct the constitutional position of the police into its component parts. It has been
analytically reconstructed as a balance between the office of constable, which reflects the
principle of equality before the law, and the doctrine of constabulary independence,
which is founded on police discretion. That balance was destabilised by the separation of
the police officer from the citizen in his accountability to the criminal law and has now
reached such proportions that either, i) remedial action is taken to preserve the office of
constable or b) the constitutional position of the police is re-evaluated.
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